





Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis,  
unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi.

Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches,  
one concerned with invention of arguments and the other with  
judgment of their validity.

Cicero, *Topica* 1:6



1

2

3


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1





1. The goal is **inference**.
2. The **procedures** are public.
3. The **conclusions** are uncertain.
4. The content is the **method** not the subject matter.

Often the **scaffolding** of intellectual buildings are taken down after being built.



**What makes for a ‘good’ theory?**

Put differently...

**What do good theories do?**







## 2

1. Offer an answer to an interesting, important **research question**.
2. Solve an interesting **puzzle**.
3. Identify interesting **variation** (across **time** or **space**)
4. Move from a **specific event** to more general theories
5. Drop the **proper nouns**
6. Use a new **Y**
7. Use a new **X**
8. Add a new **Z**
9. Use the **literature** and contribute to it.
10. Make sure the theory can be **disproven**.

2

What questions do you have about the world?





1

Why do people get struck by lightning?



Source: <https://the-riotact.com/lightning-strikes-gold-for-award-winning-canberra-photographer/415483>



A
Response
Im most interested in why involving women causes greater global growth
I am most interested in why ____higher consumption of sugar____ causes ____poor dental health____
seemingly unrelated parts of society e.g sport causes political consequences
fear-based reporting, far-right radicalism
class, voting behaviours
economic activity, wellbeing in a population
education, political affiliation
Times of conflict cause increased human rights violations.
Australia's prison system causes low rehabilitation rates
a universal basic income causes economic growth
the demand for decreasing carbon emissions, the use of nuclear energy
the relationship between socioeconomic status and conservatism
I am interested in what generalisable conditions leads to parties wining elections.
why certain policies can cause unintended detrimental effects
media coverage, changes in political behaviour
democracy, economic prosperity (or not)
I am most interested in why higher economic performance causes regime stability
Globalisation, (in)stability
misinformation causes conflict
why natural crises cause social unrest
fast public transport causes better sporting culture
I am interested in why age causes (or is correlated with) people being more conservative
the environment, political change
terrorism, intense cultural change.
Democracy causes interstate war
hunger for power, peace
I'm most interested in why
social media, voting patterns
economic recession causes democratic backsliding
Why poverty causes crime
democracy, a decrease in interstate war



*Three Puzzles  
in Search of a Researcher*

*Presidential Address*

DINA A. ZINNES

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Although everyone is for “more theory,” most of us have rather little understanding of how to get “more theory.” This essay suggests one approach to theory development: thinking in terms of puzzles. To develop the concept of “puzzlement,” three bodies of literature are reviewed, and sets of conflicting evidence are presented as puzzles. The solutions to the puzzles are left to the next generation of IR researchers.

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*Preface*

I have been intrigued in recent years by an apparent contradiction. In attempting to understand international politics it seems incredibly difficult to think in theoretical terms. When I ask “why do wars occur,” I am immediately led to a “push-pull” answer, an “if then” type of descriptive statement: “alliances produce wars” or “the distribution of power causes wars.” It appears difficult to think in process terms,

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EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the address delivered by ISA President Dina A. Zinnes at the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Los Angeles, California, March 20, 1980.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Support for this research was granted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of Army Research. Contract MDA-903-80-C-149.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 24 No. 3, September 1980 315-342  
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315

**Democracies** do not fight one another.

**Suicide terrorism** occurs despite expected utility models.

The chance of **one vote mattering** is very small, still people vote.

## Zinnes' (1980) puzzles

- Do nations interact?
- Why are some nations war prone?
- Is polarisation a precondition for war?




Why do some countries  
spend more on their military  
than others?

## Military expenditure, 2020

Military expenditure is measured in constant 2019 US\$. This data aims to include all spending on current military forces and activities.

Our World  
in Data



No data \$0 \$1 billion \$5 billion \$10 billion \$50 billion \$100 billion





Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
OurWorldInData.org/military-spending • CC BY



## Military expenditure as a share of GDP, 2020

Our World  
in Data

Military expenditures include military and ~~civil personnel~~; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid. Civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities are excluded.



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute


[OurWorldInData.org/military-spending](https://OurWorldInData.org/military-spending) • CC BY



## Military expenditure per capita, 2020

Military expenditure per capita is expressed in constant 2019 US\$. This data aims to include all spending on current military forces and activities.

Our World  
in Data



No data \$0 \$10 \$20 \$50 \$100 \$200 \$500 \$1,000

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
OurWorldInData.org/military-spending • CC BY




Why does leader popularity change over time?

## Leader Approval Over Time

Use the dropdown menu to select a leader and view how their approval has shifted over time. Historical data is available from the beginning of when Morning Consult started tracking each leader.

SELECT A LEADER

Boris Johnson (United Kingdom)






## Leader Approval Over Time

Use the dropdown menu to select a leader and view how their approval has shifted over time. Historical data is available from the beginning of when Morning Consult started tracking each leader.

Anthony Albanese (Australia)




— Approve — Disapprove






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Human trafficking indicators: A new dataset

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ABSTRACT

This article describes the Human Trafficking Indicators (HTI) dataset, a new resource for research on the causes of, and policy responses to, human trafficking. HTI includes country-year level information on forty-six variables for up to 184 countries from 2000 to 2017. It is the first dataset to broadly capture different trafficking types and disaggregated measures of government responses. It includes seven types of trafficking including forced labor, sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and debt bondage. The HTI also includes eighteen measures of a government’s prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. This paper presents an overview of the dataset, explains how it differs from other sources, describes several empirical trends, and highlights HTI’s potential uses with a brief empirical example.

Este documento presenta el conjunto de datos de los Indicadores de Trata de Personas (Human Trafficking Indicators, HTI), un nuevo recurso para la investigación de las causas de la trata de personas y las respuestas políticas frente a este delito. HTI incluye información a nivel de país sobre cuarenta y seis variables, correspondientes a un máximo de 184 países, desde 2000 hasta 2017. Es el primer conjunto de datos que refleja ampliamente los diferentes tipos de tráfico y cuantifica las medidas desglosadas de las reacciones de los gobiernos. Incluye siete tipos de trata, como el trabajo forzado, la explotación sexual, la servidumbre doméstica y la esclavitud por deudas. El HTI también incluye dieciocho medidas de un gobierno, relacionadas con los esfuerzos de persecución, protección y prevención. Este artículo ofrece una visión general del conjunto de datos, explica en qué se diferencia de otras fuentes, describe varias tendencias empíricas y destaca los posibles usos de los HTI con un breve ejemplo empírico.

Ce manuscrit décrit le jeu de données Indicateurs de la traite des êtres humains (Human Trafficking Indicators, HTI), une nouvelle ressource pour la recherche sur les causes de, et les réponses politiques à la traite des êtres humains. Ces HTI comprennent des informations sur les niveaux par année et par pays de quarante-six variables pour jusqu’à 184 pays entre 2000 et 2017. Il s’agit du premier jeu de données qui capture

KEYWORDS

Human trafficking; modern slavery; forced labor; sex trafficking; child trafficking

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The spatial dynamics of freedom of foreign movement and human trafficking

Sam R. Bell<sup>a</sup> and Richard W. Frank<sup>b</sup>



<sup>a</sup>Kansas State University; <sup>b</sup>Australian National University


ABSTRACT

Some existing human trafficking research has examined how trafficking laws and regulations deter traffickers. This research, however, has paid little attention to how states’ freedom-of-movement policies influence human trafficking. Existing policy debates suggest two possible effects. Europe’s experiences with open borders have led to claims that freedom of movement decreases the likelihood that traffickers are detected, thus making human trafficking in and out of states more likely. By contrast, movement restrictions could create an environment in which people become more vulnerable to traffickers. We use data from 182 countries from 2001 to 2017 to test whether freedom of movement increases or decreases human trafficking flows. We find that it is necessary, theoretically and empirically, to consider freedom of foreign movement both locally and in a state’s neighborhood, because freedom of movement increases human trafficking when the local and neighborhood practices diverge from each other.

Introduction

Beginning with the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, and culminating with the Schengen agreement in 1995, European Union (EU) member states have increasingly shifted toward greater freedom of foreign movement.<sup>1</sup> Many lawmakers and law enforcement agencies have responded to the increase toward freedom of foreign movement with criticism of its effects on the trafficking of people and goods. For example, while evaluating its membership in the European Union, a 2014 United Kingdom (UK) Home Office (2014, p. 45) report concluded, “Free movement within the EU is extensively exploited by organised criminals to bring illicit commodities including ... human trafficking victims.” This conclusion is based on a 2013 Europol report titled, “Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment.” In that report, a clearly stated cause of human trafficking in the European Union was relaxed regulations for freedom of movement. The report suggested, “EU nationals are easily trafficked in the EU due to the freedom of movement realised by the Schengen Acquis and the combined low risk of identification and detection” (Europol, 2013, p. 24). This conclusion was later reported in mainstream UK press outlets like *The Telegraph* (Hope, 2014). Although this quote speaks to specifically to trafficking of EU nationals, it is but one example of policymakers linking freedom-of-movement policies to the trafficking in persons. Much of this line of argument’s logic rests on the idea that freedom of foreign movement makes it easier for traffickers to skirt laws that punish human trafficking. As a

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 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.  
Data used in the study can be obtained for purposes of replication at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jhr>.  
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Correlates of Voter Turnout

Richard W. Frank<sup>1</sup> · Ferran Martínez i Coma<sup>2</sup>

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**Abstract**  
Despite decades of research, there is no consensus as to the core correlates of national-level voter turnout. We argue that this is, in part, due to the lack of comprehensive, systematic empirical analysis. This paper conducts such an analysis. We identify 44 articles on turnout from 1986 to 2017. These articles include over 127 potential predictors of voter turnout, and we collect data on seventy of these variables. Using extreme bounds analysis, we run over 15 million regressions to determine which of these 70 variables are robustly associated with voter turnout in 579 elections in 80 democracies from 1945 to 2014. Overall, 22 variables are robustly associated with voter turnout, including compulsory voting, concurrent elections, competitive elections, inflation, previous turnout, and economic globalization.

**Keywords** Elections · Turnout · Extreme bounds analysis · Meta-analysis

Introduction

A common challenge in the study of comparative politics is balancing theoretical and empirical comprehensiveness with substantive importance. Consider voter turnout. If we ask what the most statistically significant and substantively important predictors of national-level voter turnout in democratic elections are, even after more than 50 years of comparative voter turnout research, there are few certainties beyond the fact that compulsory voting increases turnout. For example, several studies including Radcliff and Davis (2000) find larger district magnitudes increase turnout while others like Tavits (2008) find either no significant relationship or even a negative one (Fumagalli & Narciso, 2012).

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Migrant remittances and the onset of civil war

Conflict Management and Peace Science  
2014, Vol. 31(5) 502–520  
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DOI: 10.1177/0738894213520369  
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SAGE

Patrick M. Regan

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Richard W. Frank

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Abstract

Civil wars reflect, in part, internal contestation over the provision of resources. A government’s ability to “buy off” rebellion by providing social welfare payments is one mechanism to help ensure social stability. In times of economic distress, however, the government becomes increasingly constrained in its ability to provide social welfare and, absent some form of financial relief, will be subject to increasing pressure from potential rebel groups. Migrant remittances can serve as a smoothing mechanism that provides for social welfare needs outside the formal mechanisms of the state, and therefore acts to reduce the incentive for rebellion. We develop a model of migrant remittances as a vehicle that provides domestic stability in times of economic constraints. We test hypotheses from this model on World Bank remittance data to 152 countries from 1980 to 2005. Our results suggest that a significant increase in migrant remittances during crises can lower the risk of civil war.

Keywords

Civil conflict, economic shocks, migrants, remittances


Introduction


Those who study migration and remittances trace social welfare stability in a number of countries to remittances sent to migrants’ families back home (Fagan and Bump, 2006; Frankel, 2009; Ratha, 2006). Those who study civil war often think of migrant diasporas as a potential source of funds for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a; Gunaratna, 2003). By contrast, we argue and provide evidence suggesting that, in the aggregate, formal migrant remittances increase political stability. That is, formal remittances reduce social welfare demands on the state and in doing so reduce the motivation to rebel. At its core, our

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[Australian National University](#)  
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[Civil conflict](#) [political violence](#) [contentious politics](#) [human trafficking](#)



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TITLE	CITED BY	YEAR
<a href="#">Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset</a> PM Regan, RW Frank, A Aydin Journal of Peace Research 46 (1), 135-146	217	2009
<a href="#">Measuring electoral integrity around the world: A new dataset</a> P Norris, RW Frank, FM i Coma PS: Political Science & Politics 47 (4), 789-798	142	2014
<a href="#">Assessing the quality of elections</a> P Norris, RW Frank, FM i Coma Journal of Democracy 24 (4), 124-135	113	2013
<a href="#">Contentious Elections</a> P Norris, RW Frank, FM i Coma Routledge	110	2015
<a href="#">Advancing electoral integrity</a> P Norris, RW Frank, FM i Coma Oxford University Press	108	2014
<a href="#">New datasets on political institutions and elections, 1972—2005</a> PM Regan, RW Frank, DH Clark Conflict Management and Peace Science 26 (3), 286-304	70	2009
<a href="#">Migrant Remittances and the Onset of Civil War</a> P Regan, RW Frank	62	2014


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Based on funding mandates	

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What causes might be missed/**overlooked**?

Can theories be used **elsewhere**?

What are future **implications**?

Does it apply at a different **unit of analysis**?



2


Keywords mentioned **5 times**






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Keywords mentioned **3 times**





Falsifiability is crucial!






1. Offer an answer to an interesting **research question**.
2. Solve an interesting **puzzle**.
3. Identify interesting **variation** (across **time** or **space**)
4. Move from a **specific event** to more general theories
5. Drop the **proper nouns**
6. Use a new **Y**
7. Use a new **X**
8. Add a new **Z**
9. Use the **literature**
10. Make sure the theory can be **disproven**.



3





“I would rather discover one causal law than be King of Persia.” (Quoted in Kellstedt & Whitten (2018: 56)

He is best known today for formulating an atomic theory of the universe.



Image source: [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Bust\\_of\\_Democritus\\_-\\_Victoria\\_and\\_Albert\\_Museum.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Bust_of_Democritus_-_Victoria_and_Albert_Museum.jpg)



Bivariate vs. multivariate relations

Deterministic vs. probabilistic




Image source: <https://www.data-to-viz.com/graph/network.html>



1. Is there a **credible mechanism** connecting X and Y?
2. Can we rule out Y causing X (**endogeneity**)?
3. Is there **covariation** between X and Y?
4. Have we controlled for potential **spuriousness** (Z)?








The “**how**” and “**why**” questions we focus on in this class

(Elster’s [1989] “**causal mechanisms**”)

The mechanism must be **credible/plausible**.




Any credible mechanism connecting this X and Y?





Any credible mechanism connecting this X and Y?





Note

A Get-Out-the-Vote Experiment on the World’s Largest Participatory Budgeting Vote in Brazil

TIAGO PEIXOTO, FREDRIK M. SJOBERG AND JONATHAN MELLON\*

Keywords: get out the vote; experiment; turnout; vote choice; participatory budgeting; Brazil

While academic studies of voter mobilization have taught us much about what drives turnout,<sup>1</sup> we know little about the effect that get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns have on election outcomes. Experimental work has shown that there are heterogeneous treatment effects – in other words, that encouragements have different turnout effects on different people.<sup>2</sup> However, there is little evidence from turnout experiments about whether mobilization efforts affect the outcome of the vote. One reason the GOTV literature primarily focuses on turnout is data availability. Individual vote choice is difficult to observe directly due to the secret ballot, while administrative turnout records can be obtained in many places. The few previous studies of GOTV on vote choice look at partisan mobilization and rely on incomplete self-reported or aggregate vote choice.<sup>3</sup> As a result, we do not know whether GOTV campaigns actually mobilize people who vote differently than those who would otherwise have voted.

Several studies have looked at the relationship between turnout and policy outcomes at the national level, and consistently find that higher turnout is associated with higher levels of redistribution.<sup>4</sup> However, these studies rely on observational data and cannot assign higher turnout experimentally.

This study has two main outcomes of interest. First, we examine the vote encouragement treatment effects on online turnout in a participatory budgeting (PB) vote. This part of the study is similar to much of the established GOTV literature, in which the outcome of interest is whether an eligible voter turns out to vote on election day. Secondly, we study the effect of GOTV treatments on the actual vote using administrative records of vote choice. To our knowledge, this has never been studied before using real vote data. The nature of the PB vote in our case allows us to study both the average cost of proposals selected by voters as well as specific sectoral (health, education, environment etc.) preferences.

\* Digital Engagement Evaluation Team, World Bank (emails: tpeixoto@worldbank.org, fredrik.m.sjoberg@gmail.com), Digital Engagement Evaluation Team, World Bank and Manchester University (email: jonathan.mellon@manchester.ac.uk). The pre-analysis plan was submitted to the Evidence in Governance and Politics pre-registration repository prior to random assignment and treatment application (20140523AA). We would like to thank Vincius Wu from the Rio Grande do Sul Government, Motta, Davi Schmidt, Paulo Coelho at SEPLAG, Uirá Porã, Luiz Damasceno and the rest of the staff at Gabinete Digital, Rosane Maria Ludtke Leite and Guilherme Donato at PROCERGS, and Louis Dorval at Voto Mobile. Funding for this research was provided by the World Bank. Note that no pre-approval by an Institutional Review Board was sought for this study, since no such process exists within the World Bank. However, the study was approved *post facto* by three World Bank research staff who were not involved with the original research; they agreed that it adhered to the research and ethical standards of World Bank research. Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: <https://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PSWLYR>, and an online appendix at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000412>.

<sup>1</sup> Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Green, McGrath, and Aronow 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014; Imai and Strauss 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Arceneaux 2005; Arceneaux 2007; Pons 2014; Rogers and Middleton 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993; Larcinese 2007; Mahler 2008.

To test whether increased turnout from voter mobilization affects the popular vote, we conducted a randomized controlled trial during the June 2014 participatory budgeting vote in Rio Grande do Sul (RS) in southern Brazil.<sup>5</sup> Note that this is not a regular election in which votes are cast for candidates and parties.

We randomly assigned subjects, in equal proportions, to one of four groups: control, informational, public benefit of voting, and private benefit (lottery reward) using a simple random allocation scheme.<sup>6</sup> All of the messages were non-partisan in nature and were focused on increasing turnout. The sender of the



Peacekeeping causes less election violence.

Or might violent areas attract more peacekeepers?

$X \longleftrightarrow Y$

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doi:10.1017/S0007123421000132

British Journal of  
Political Science

ARTICLE

Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence

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(Received 3 May 2020; revised 24 December 2020; accepted 11 March 2021; first published online 9 July 2021)

Abstract

Democracy assistance, including the promotion of electoral security, is often a central component of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Preventing violence during post-conflict elections is critical for the war-to-democracy transition. Yet little is known about the role of peacekeepers in this effort. To fill this gap, this study provides the first comprehensive sub-national study of peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing the risk of electoral violence. It combines geo-referenced data on peacekeeping deployment across all multidimensional peacekeeping missions in Africa over the past two decades with fine-grained data on electoral violence. The analysis finds a negative association between peacekeeping presence and the risk of electoral violence. The relationship is of a similar magnitude in the pre- and post-election periods. However, the association is more strongly negative for violence perpetrated by non-state actors compared to violence perpetrated by government-affiliated actors. Analyses using two-way fixed-effects models and matching mitigate potential selection biases.

Keywords: electoral violence; United Nations; peacekeeping; conflict management

In recent decades, the holding of multiparty elections has become a core part of the international community's peace-building agenda (for example, United Nations 2008). Elections are critical events in war-to-peace transitions: they mark the transition from violent to peaceful modes of political contestation and spearhead efforts for more inclusive and legitimate governance (for example, Manning 2004; Reilly 2008). If elections are seen as credible, they can facilitate democratization by legitimizing political institutions, strengthening norms of nonviolent conflict resolution and habituating contenders to democratic routines. If they degenerate into violence, they may de-legitimize the regime that comes to power, but also undercut trust in electoral institutions, and in the worst case precipitate a return to civil war (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Brancati and Snyder 2013; Norris 2014).  
The pivotal role of elections in the political trajectories of conflict-affected societies has led the international community to invest heavily in their safety. Most contemporary United Nations peacekeeping missions have mandates to oversee, organize and secure elections (Smidt 2020a). In addition to technical electoral assistance, peacekeeping missions, for example, deploy uniformed personnel to safeguard polling stations, conduct military patrols to ensure that voters can exercise their political rights, and protect electoral materials. However, prior research on the ability of UN peacekeeping operations to augment electoral security and reduce the risk of electoral violence is limited and focused on single cases (Mvukiyehe 2018; Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Smidt 2020b) or aggregate cross-national relationships (Smidt 2020a). A growing body of literature has testified to the ability of UN peacekeepers to end civil war violence, prevent its resurgence

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## The democratic transition

Fabrice Murtin · Romain Wacziarg

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**Abstract** Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.

**Keywords** Democracy · Modernization · Human capital · GMM

**JEL Classification** I25 · N30 · N40 · O43

### 1 Introduction

Over the last two centuries, many countries underwent a democratic transition, moving from autocratic regimes with low popular participation in political decision-making and weak con-

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
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Do the variables **co-vary**?



**Fig. 1** The democratic and economic transitions. The balanced sample is composed of Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States over the 1800–2000 period. Log GDP per capita is taken from Maddison (2006) and democracy is the Polity index. Missing observations are interpolated




Is there some other factor that is causing both the outcome and the explanatory factor?

For instance, educational attainment and election violence.

Can you think of some variable that can increase the probability of both X and Y?







SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER

Democracy, well-being, and happiness: A 10-nation study\*

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This article explores the association between subjective well-being (life satisfaction and happiness) and the importance of living in a democracy in 10 countries: Brazil, China, India, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. We examine well-being as one possible indicator of the likelihood of a society's commitment to democracy. We find that there is indeed a relationship between life satisfaction and the importance of living in a democracy. Countries with high levels of life satisfaction tend to be secure democracies, whereas countries with lower levels of life satisfaction tend to experience more political and economic challenges. We briefly discuss the unique socioeconomic realities and historical trajectories that may be responsible for varied levels of well-being and diverse sentiments on the importance of democracy. We have deliberately selected a wide range of diverse case studies in order to analyse our results within varied political and socioeconomic contexts.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The many ways in which democracy has (and has not) taken root in extremely diverse parts of the world have led to a burgeoning scholarship on all aspects and contexts of democratisation. One of the most popular subjects for study has been the role of culture more broadly and political culture in particular (Qi & Shin, 2011). In this respect, Ronald Inglehart's longitudinal studies have made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of changes in people's beliefs, values, and motivations. His work has demonstrated the powerful impact that the public's changing values can have on social and political realities. Inglehart (1988) argues that cultural orientations have important political and economic implications and has found that personal life satisfaction and happiness (among other factors) are associated with stable democracies. He posits that cultures with high levels of overall life satisfaction are more likely to adopt democratic institutions and maintain them. His data shows that countries, where people have had historically high levels of life satisfaction, adopted democratic institutions earlier and have maintained them for longer than those nations where satisfaction has been lower (Inglehart, 1988, pp. 1215–1217). Inglehart also points out that the adoption of democracy in these countries occurred before the widespread prosperity associated with a large middle class. Although economic development increases the

likelihood of democratisation, it does not make democracy inevitable. Cultural conditions, including social structures and political culture, are also important because "stable democracy reflects the interaction of economic, political, and cultural factors" (Inglehart, 1988, p. 1220). A factor such as subjective well-being—as an outcome of historical experience and culture—might play an important role in the building of successful democratic institutions that are valued as inherently good even when they do not immediately deliver economic outcomes. Using Inglehart's ideas as our point of departure, we use the latest World Values Survey (WVS) data to examine a wide range of countries in order to see how populations' well-being might relate to their political systems. We do not deny the impact that other factors might also have on the development of political systems around the world; however, our largely exploratory study aims to investigate the links between democracy and well-being while keeping socioeconomic differences in mind. In doing so, we hope to shed light on the way in which these variables intersect in different societies. For our study, we have selected 10 countries that differ with regards to their political regimes, economic development, and levels of well-being. Our sample includes established democracies with developed economies (Sweden and the Unites States) as well as newer democracies with varying degrees of political and economic achievement (Brazil, South Africa, and India) and lastly, a number of mixed and authoritarian regimes (Singapore, Russia, Turkey, China, and Rwanda), also with varying degrees of economic success. Our case studies also score very differently on the Global Happiness Index (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2015), which measures and ranks well-being in 157 nations around the world. Although some (Sweden, the United States, Brazil, and Singapore) score very highly on the index, others rank

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1. A credible mechanism connecting X and Y?

2. Can we rule out Y causing X (endogeneity)?

3. Is there covariation between X and Y?

4. Have we controlled for potential spuriousness (Z)?



Research Discussion Paper

RDP 2020-07

## How Many Jobs Did JobKeeper Keep?

James Bishop and Iris Day

1. Is there a credible mechanism connecting X & Y?
2. Can we rule out Y causing X (endogeneity)?
3. Is there covariation between X and Y?
4. Have we controlled for potential spuriousness (Z)?

Tall claims? Sense and nonsense about the importance of height of US presidents



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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p><i>Article history:</i> Received 7 March 2012 Received in revised form 14 September 2012 Accepted 15 September 2012 Available online 10 October 2012</p> <p><i>Keywords:</i> Height US presidents Political outcomes Leadership Greatness</p>	<p>According to both the scientific literature and popular media, all one needs to win a US presidential election is to be taller than one's opponent. Yet, such claims are often based on an arbitrary selection of elections, and inadequate statistical analysis. Using data on all presidential elections, we show that height is indeed an important factor in the US presidential elections. Candidates that were taller than their opponents received more popular votes, although they were not significantly more likely to win the actual election. Taller presidents were also more likely to be reelected. In addition, presidents were, on average, much taller than men from the same birth cohort. The advantage of taller candidates is potentially explained by perceptions associated with height: taller presidents are rated by experts as 'greater', and having more leadership and communication skills. We conclude that height is an important characteristic in choosing and evaluating political leaders.</p> <p>© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p>

1. Introduction

*"At 5'10" (on a warm day) the author is neither presidential nor destined for even near-greatness"*  
Paul M. Sommers, 2002.

1.1. Presidential height and election outcomes: Fact or fiction?

According to conventional wisdom, US presidential elections are often won by the taller of the two candidates. Indeed, US presidential height is a popular topic among essayists (Adams, 1992; Baker, 2007; Carnahan, 2004; Mathews, 1999; Page, 2004; Rolirad, 2004) and popular science writers (Borgmann, 1965; Gillis, 1982). In his book *"Too tall, too small"* for example, Gillis (1982) reported that, in the twenty presidential elections held between 1904 and 1980, the overwhelming majority (80%) was won by the taller of the two candidates. Similarly, Borgmann (1965) claimed that the shorter candidate lost all presidential elections except one between 1888 and 1960.

Similar claims are found in the scientific literature, often drawing on these more popular accounts. Jackson and Ervin (1992), for example, cite Gillis (1982), and report that taller candidates fare better in presidential elections than shorter ones. Sorokowski (2010) similarly cites Gillis (1982), stating that *'between 1900 and 1968, the taller candidate always came first'*. Using a different sample of elections, Higham and Carment (1992) conclude that US presidents elected between 1905 and 1980 were significantly

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1. A credible mechanism?
2. Endogeneity risk?
3. Covariation?
4. Spuriousness?



## Health Benefits of Methylxanthines in Cacao and Chocolate

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**Abstract:** One may wonder why methylxanthines are so abundant in beverages used by humans for centuries, or in cola-drinks that have been heavily consumed since their appearance. It is likely that humans have stuck to any brew containing compounds with psychoactive properties, resulting in a better daily life, *i.e.*, more efficient thinking, exploring, hunting, *etc.*, however, without the serious side effects of drugs of abuse. The physiological effects of methylxanthines have been known for a long time and they are mainly mediated by the so-called adenosine receptors. Caffeine and theobromine are the most abundant methylxanthines in cacao and their physiological effects are notable. Their health-promoting benefits are so remarkable that chocolate is explored as a functional food. The consequences of adenosine receptor blockade by natural compounds present in cacao/chocolate are here reviewed. Palatability and health benefits of methylxanthines, in general, and theobromine, in particular, have further contributed to sustain one of the most innocuous and pleasant habits: chocolate consumption.

**Keywords:** adenosine; adenosine receptors; adenosine receptor antagonist; caffeine; theobromine

1. A credible mechanism?

2. Endogeneity?

3. Covariation?

4. Spuriousness?

Determining causality is as much **art as science**.

It is an effort at **simplifying reality** in order to uncover an otherwise hidden truth.


It requires **thinking deeply** about your causal mechanism and considering **alternate mechanisms** that may be in play.

The strength of any causal mechanisms depends on considerations of **plausibility**, **endogeneity risk**, important **covariation**, and **spuriousness risk**.

Underlying **assumptions** are crucial to recognise and consider.



4





1. Intellectual **taste**
2. **Personality**
3. Our **interests**
4. **Logic**
5. Avoids **relabelling**
6. Stands the test of **time**
7. Can be **described to others** clearly and briefly.
8. **Simplifies** the world.
9. Learning from **bad ideas**



4



1. Curiosity
2. Hard work
3. Luck

TED talk: <https://youtu.be/L1kbrlZRDvU>



1

2

3

4



3

**Important terms**

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

