

POLS3033 Environment, Human Security, and Conflict

March 2022

Dr. Richard Frank
School of Politics and International Relations
richard.frank@anu.edu.au

Week 2: Economic development and instability

Today's outline

- Part 1: Conflict, redux
- Part 2: Human security
- Part 3: Burundi case study

Intro music

Khadja Nin. 1996. *Sina Mali, Sina Deni*. <https://youtu.be/SgACe1VjUc4>

Lyrics in English: <https://lyricstranslate.com/en/sina-mali-sina-deni-i-who-have-no-fortune-nor-debt.html>

Abba. 1982. *Money, Money, Money*. 1982. <https://youtu.be/ETxmCCsMoD0>

Nina Simone. 1968. *Ain't Got No, I Got Life*. <https://youtu.be/L5jI9I03q8E>

Video 1: Introduction

Last week I outlined the main themes of this course and described some common explanations for political violence.

This week I want to do three things:

1. Extend our discussion of the **causes of conflict**
2. Explore the myriad concepts underlying **human security**.
3. Ground this theoretical discussion in the case of **Burundi** an East African country that has low development, a recent change in leader, an ongoing risk of conflict recurrence and the birthplace of Khadja Nin.

Today's theme that connects these three topics is money—who has it, who doesn't, and what people will do to get it.

Today we are also faced with the most enduring **puzzles** in the conflict literature:

Poverty is still relatively common around the world, but conflict is relatively scarce. If economic scarcity causes conflict why are some poor countries peaceful and others are violent?

Why should we **care**?

Because over sixteen million people have died in civil conflicts since 1946.

Because the developed world has spent billions of dollars in foreign aid and untold projects trying to increase development and reduce conflict.

Because deadly conflicts are still going on today both in places you may have heard about (Syria or Yemen) but also in places you are not likely to hear about (Libya, Mexico, Phillipines).

Because people are still dying of easily preventable diseases.

Over 2.8 million children die within the first week of life each year.

Over a million die of malaria each year.

Understanding the causes of negative outcomes like conflict and human insecurity may help people, policy makers, and politicians enact changes to reduce these outcomes.

So yeah, a lot to cover this week. Let's get started!

Video 2: Why are there still civil wars?

Violent conflict seems irrational if there are non-violent ways to get what you want. Almost everyone wants to live and not die a violent death, so you would expect that people or groups with important disagreements would spend a lot of effort to settle their differences peacefully. Nevertheless, violence is obviously still an important tool for states, non-state groups, and individuals. This represents, I would argue, the fundamental puzzle at the heart of peace science or conflict studies. If most people want to live peacefully, why do various types of actors use violence instead of non-violence to get what they want?

Relatedly, another puzzle is at the heart of a large swath of the recent conflict literature.

Poverty is still relatively common around the world, but conflict is relatively scarce. If economic scarcity causes conflict why are some poor countries peaceful and others are violent?

This second puzzle is at the heart of this part of today's discussion.

Google Ngram viewer

Most traditional conflict scholars writing from E.H. Carr in the interwar period to the end of the Cold War focused on the causes of interstate conflict. The motivation for this focus was understanding and surviving the tectonic shifts happening in Europe and Asia during this time and the high stakes of nuclear-powered bipolar system.

After the Cold War, however, the risk of major power war declined in the 1990s, and there was a spike in the number of civil wars. These wars often happened in poorer states that had been allied with either the West or the USSR during the Cold War and had become dependent on the major powers' economic, political, and military support. After this support dried up after 1990 there was a push to democratize including a strong push for more representative governance from previously excluded groups around the world. These efforts in part contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of civil conflicts breaking out around the world.

Like most political scientists, conflict scholars are keen observers of politics and are interested in trying to figure out current political problems. Probably the most dramatic example of this in my experience was the increase in terrorism research after 9/11/. Another clear trend as you can see from this graph of books published that included the terms international and civil conflict is the growth in civil conflict research.

UCDP map of violence in 2019

So today we are going to reinforce a few things from last week's readings and discussion before focusing on how money affects decisions to use violence at both the group and individual levels.

For as you can see from this map of violence in 2019, civil conflict and political violence of various types are still clear and frequent dangers.

Blattman and Miguel (2010)

Last week we read Blattman and Miguel's civil war literature review.

It is a compelling place to start for a few reasons.

First, it is a readable literature review that clearly sets out the strengths of the current literature and what they see are its main weaknesses.

Second, it frames the literature using some crucial contributions from the interstate conflict literature that came before it.

Third, it highlights topics that we will be returning to over the course of the semester.

Blattman and Miguel's (2010) main points

These authors critique the literature for lack of focus on central theoretical problems. Highlights risk of **endogeneity** (i.e. you argue A causes B, but B also if not mostly causes A)

War can be seen as a **contest**.

Informational asymmetries can make peace hard.

Commitment problems (incentives to renege) and incomplete contracting
Why participate? (**selective incentives** and **coercion**)

Ethnicity and conflict (group cohesion and primordialist arguments)

Weak **institutions** and partial **democracies**

International factors (refugees and interventions)

Research design limitations in current research

Limitations

They may be right, but finding good proxies for almost anything in social science is difficult.

Idiosyncratic causes can be important. Chance can make detecting patterns impossible (Gartzke 1999).

Leaders make mistakes and overestimate chance of winning or have short shadow of the future.

One interesting point Blattman & Miguel (2010: 18) do make is that "the economic motivations for conflict are better theorized than psychological or sociological factors."

Today's path diagram

The links between human security, specifically economic security, is our focus for the rest of today.

As Blattman & Miguel (2010) suggest economic models of conflict were the most developed comparative models of civil conflict in 2010, and I would argue the same holds today.

And in this economic causes of conflict literature, the largest debate is whether groups and states are more motivated to use violence by greed or grievance.

Greed versus grievance debate

Greed—economic factors motivate actors

- Seizing lootable natural resources

- Control of distribution of government assets

- Separating to control areas of relative wealth

- Benefits from ongoing fighting may prolong war.

Grievance—dissatisfaction with current power distribution or leadership

Grievances of a particular subgroup or individuals over their economic or political circumstances.

These are ideal types and I do not know of any scholars who would say that either explanation is the sole explanation for civil conflict

Video #3: Economic causes of civil conflict

Collier & Hoeffler (1998)

One of the earliest and more influential statements of the economic model of civil war is “On economic causes of civil war” by Oxford academics Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.

Collier & Hoeffler (1998) main argument

Main point: civil wars have economic causes.

Grievances are universal but wars are not.

Wars break out when benefits exceed the costs.

Costs of conflict

There are opportunity costs for fighting instead of working a job.

Warfare disrupts economic activity.

Wealthier countries, therefore, have more to lose because they have more economic activity.

Longer conflicts, then, are more costly.

Benefits of conflict

Incentives for rebellion are contingent on the probability of victory.

The rewards of winning are, in part, determined by how much money the government brings in (and then reallocates)—the tax base, in other words.

The tax base also determines how strong the state is when fighting potential rebels.

Rebel utility formula

How many of you really spent time working through this formula?

My eyes used to cross whenever I read an article with formulas like this in a paper.

But now, I think they are some of the most important parts of papers; one that is not included in enough papers, honestly, as such formulae force writers to clearly outline what they think matters, and by omission, what they think is not relevant to their argument.

Rebel utility formula—benefits and costs

Maybe it is a bit easier to separate the two parts of the equation.

The benefits of a conflict are a function of the probability of winning times the gains of winning.

These gains of winning are determined by the size of the population and the economy's taxable capacity.

These gains are also shaped the by the expected duration of war and people's discount rate.

The costs of fighting in turn are determined by rebels' current income they would forgoe and the costs of coordinating with other potential rebels.

These costs are also shaped the by the expected duration of war and people's discount rate.

Putting both parts together, if the potential costs are smaller than the benefits, then you are more likely to see an outbreak of war.

This simple formula is quite general, of course, but it captures the kind of economic cost/benefit decision-making that economists often assume people make when deciding to do a whole host of things.

The more general the argument, the more general the possible applicability, of course; but the difficulty with this and many other explanations for conflict is with trying to come up with reasonable observable indicators of these quite general ideas.

Collier & Hoeffler's (1998) empirical proxies for benefits

Probability of winning shaped by taxable capacity (T):

Per capita income, which shapes government military expenditure

Natural resource endowment—% primary commodities in GDP

Gains conditional upon victory

Size of population (P)

Per capita income as a reward to distribute (and keep)

Collier & Hoeffler's (1998) empirical proxies for costs

Transaction costs of coordinating

Cultural distinctness—ethnolinguistic fractionalization

Size—population (P)

Opportunity costs of fighting

Per capita income

Critiques of their approach

Too quickly dismisses grievances

Cross-sectional model

Very different interpretation of per capita income than Fearon & Laitin (2003).

Multiple theoretical uses of per capita income and population

By not logging values models give more weight to extreme values

Links between onset and duration unproven

Photo of dentists' tools

Collier and Hoeffler's (1998) paper was incredibly influential in its field and beyond.

Collier ended up writing a 2003 book "Breaking the Conflict Trap" with a number of other authors for the World Bank that helped shape policymakers' responses to civil conflicts.

But it was an early effort, of course, and it was incomplete.

They followed up this article with several other pieces over the next five years addressing some of the critiques of their work and defending the underlying theoretical intuition.

The response to this piece highlights the inherent tradeoffs in research and the difficulties in linking theoretical argument to empirical research design.

Lecture question #1

We've covered a lot of theoretical and empirical ground already.

I would be interested in hearing your initial take on this economic approach to conflict.

Question #1: Do you find "greed" an intuitive explanation for conflict? Why or why not?

Please answer in Wattle under Week 2/lecture question 1. Question answers should be in by the end of Sunday of this week.

Once you have answered the question, I thought it would be worth you listening to Anke Hoeffler herself. Paul Collier has a bunch of longer talks and interviews on YouTube, but this one is one that gets out of the lecture hall and starts by talking about the drivers of conflict. The rest of the video is less relevant because it is more about celebrating her move from Oxford to Konstanz, but it does show how she links her previous research on state-level violence to current research on inter-personal violence.

Video: Anke Hoeffler (2019)

Source: <https://youtu.be/zvSzgsVvC7o>

Video #4: Alternate approaches to economic causes of conflict—an instrumental variable approach

Miguel et al. (2004) first page

Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and dozens of other scholars have found a significant relationship between national-level GDP and conflict.

In recent years, however, academics have tried to push our understanding of economic causes of conflict beyond this simple connection.

In so doing, they highlight two fundamental challenges to causal inference both here and in other research areas.

The first challenge I want to talk about is endogeneity, the second is the level of analysis problem.

When speaking of endogeneity concerns with economic factors and money, Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti's (2004) article is probably the most well-known.

Miguel et al.'s (2004) main points

Previous civil war models were flawed.

Some don't appreciate that economics and violence are interrelated (i.e. endogeneous).

Endogeneity—This is a fancy way of saying that the causal arrow actually can go the other way (B causes A rather than A causes B)

Think about the arrow going the other way in your path diagrams

Or here whether conflict can lead to greed or grievance

Collier et al.'s (2003: 14) *Breaking the Conflict Trap* find that during civil war military spending goes from 2.8% of GDP on average before the war to 5% during the conflict.

They call conflict “development in reverse.”

Some important factors are overlooked (i.e., omitted variables).

Governmental institutional quality might affect both economics and the probability of violence.

Omitted variable bias—A fancy way of saying that we missed something important

Research is about extracting out from the messiness of reality what we think has meaning.

However, this selection process can be biased or based on incomplete information or knowledge.

Miguel et al.’s (2004) empirical contributions

Estimate economic shocks and conflict simultaneously

Rainfall shocks affect economic growth in Africa but not conflict directly.
Country fixed effects and time trends.

Substantive finding: 5% decline in growth leads to a 12% increased probability of conflict in Africa

Visualizing Miguel et al.’s (2004) direct relationship between rainfall and conflict

The figure here is Figure 2 (Miguel et al.2004: 738)

Did any of you look at this figure in detail?

Does it raise many red flags?

We are going to be getting into this and the other readings in more detail in the workshop, but I want to highlight two things about this graph that annoy me.

My annoyance relates to some of the skills I want to leave you with this semester when reading influential academic works.

First, always be a skeptical reader. The authors have to make tradeoffs in their argument and evidence. Some of these tradeoffs are visible, some are not.

Second, I want you to focus on substantive effects. They argue that rainfall growth decreases conflict. Table 3 suggests this. The authors helpfully graph this relationship in Figure 2. The solid line is the predicted effects of rainfall growth on conflict. The overall downward arc of this relationship is reflected in the negative coefficient in Table 3 for this variable and in Figure 2.

Look closer though, and two things stand out.

First is the Y-axis—the likelihood of civil conflict. How does this figure have a negative -.2 on the Y-axis? Anyone? Oh yeah, it is because they use ordinary least squares regression. This means that predictions from the models can be negative. However, the dependent variable is the probability of conflict, and that cannot be negative. Weird, right?

Second, is the fact the top 95% confidence band only dips below 0 in two small sections at 10% rainfall growth over the previous year or more. This means that rainfall growth only really has an effect at higher-than-average rainfall growth. That makes sense, but I wonder (1) how many observations have values in these two small areas and (2) how influential particular observations around these values have. Most predicted value graphs we will see in this class have confidence intervals much less likely to include zero.

So yeah, I went into the weeds here a bit, but I wanted to highlight that you can look at any piece of work and see choices about theory or estimation that you can discuss and potentially raise questions about.

What is important about this article is that they highlight the importance of endogeneity and omitted variable bias in studies of conflict.

And it has shaped the field and has been cited 3,054 times (as of 28/02/22) according to Google Scholar.

Schultz and Mankin (2019)

And I am not the only one who had questions about this article. Others have published critiques or refinements of the Miguel et al. (2004) article, but it is clear that the paper had a clear effect in making researchers think about the potential endogenous relationships between our independent and dependent variables.

One recent article that raises some important questions about this earlier work is by Ken Schultz and Justin Mankin.

They ask a question about the Miguel et al. (2004) piece that like all great questions make you go “wow, I had not thought about that!”

Schultz and Mankin question how exogenous the rainfall measures that Miguel et al. (2004) and others use.

Weather stations on Mt. Everest

We all depend on weather stations to tell us whether or not to pack an umbrella or a jacket.

However, weather stations are also used to help us understand more about the climate and how it is changing.

The most dramatic example of a weather station that I could find is one on Mount Everest.

There are a series of weather stations at various parts of the mount. One over 8,000 meters does not seem to be working at the moment.

One right below it does. You can see here that on Sunday when I checked, it was a balmy -5.7C at the South Col.

Anyways, two important things to note about the weather station in the picture are (1) the thing looks fragile. The Khumbu ice fall is in constant movement. (2) people have to manually set the thing up and someone has to monitor it and come out if the sensors get damaged or if the thing is not responding. And some weather stations are not automated at all and require constant human observation.

Sources: Kornei, Katherine. 2019. "What Is It Like to Install a Weather Station at the Top of the World." *Science Magazine* (<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/12/what-s-it-install-weather-station-top-world>) and National Geographic (<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/perpetual-planet/>).

Average Coverage and Civil Conflict Incidence, 1946-2016 figures

This leads me to the importance of Schultz and Mankin's (2019) work, which has only been cited 17 times as of 28/02/22.

Their main point is that civil conflict and the number of weather stations reporting in a country are negatively correlated.

Conflict can directly damage stations and it can drive people away from monitoring them or prevent countries accessing their data.

They find that the resulting measurement error actually reduces the strength of the relationship.

Once you combine sources and reduce measurement error the effect of temperature on conflict is twice as large as others have found.

Evolution on Coverage in the CRU data

To try and make this effect more visceral, take a look at this figure from Schultz and Mankin (2019).

They plot the number of weather stations over time in sub-Saharan Africa.

You can clearly see the number of stations within 1,200km reduces dramatically in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Note the white areas of DRC, Tanzania, Zambia, and elsewhere in 2015.

Location of active and defunct weather stations in SSA

Another map from this article that shows the huge gaps in coverage.

This is why Schultz and Mankin (2019) conclude with a discussion of satellite-derived climate data.

Weather stations in NSW and ACT, 02/08/20

Contrast the Africa map with Australia, with a quick check to the Bureau of Meteorology suggests there are 5,057 weather stations just in NSW and ACT that measure daily rain totals.

Data source: <http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/data/stations/>

The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up

Harvard economists Reinhart and Romer (2010) argued that high public debt slowed economic growth.

Then three UMass Amherst academics found that “the selective exclusion of available data, coding errors and inappropriate weighting of summary statistics lead to serious miscalculations that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt and GDP growth,” Herndon et al. (2014).

Source: Herndon, Thomas, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin. 2014. “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff.” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 38(2): 247-279.

For more details see Cassidy, John. 2013. “The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up.” *The New Yorker* <https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-reinhart-and-rogoft-controversy-a-summing-up>.

NASA world map

Some takeaways from this discussion of Miguel et al. (2004)

Previous civil war models were flawed.

Some don't appreciate that economics and violence are interrelated (i.e., endogenous).

However, it is hard to find truly exogenous factors for most political phenomena. Some important factors are overlooked (i.e., omitted).

Governmental institutional quality might affect both economics and the probability of violence.

Is it possible to include every relevant factor?

Let's take a quick break and come back to continue this conflict discussion before moving to human security.

Here is a video that shows the entire year of 2020 in weather. It is long so a few days are probably enough to get a sense of what types of (free) information about the world we now have at our fingertips.

Before I go, though, I would ask you to answer another question about today's material.

Lecture question #2: Can you think of (and briefly describe) an endogenous relationship between conflict and another causal factor (not economic growth) we have discussed so far?

Now a bit of a palette cleanser before diving back into the conflict literature. The next video is 2019, a year in weather in 19 minutes (you do not have to watch it all of course).

Video—EUMETSAT: A year of weather, 2020

Source: <https://youtu.be/GKFzL2XB9Ow>

Video #5—Absolute and relative poverty and conflict

Buhaug et al. (2011) first page

Blattman and Miguel (2010) point to something important in the conflict literature that we have not really talked about but that I briefly mentioned in last week's lecture.

Namely, there are two main levels of analysis in the study of conflict—the individual level and the state level.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Miguel et al. (2004) both focus on the state level in their empirical models, although Collier and Hoeffler (1998) do outline a rather individual-level cost benefit analysis at the heart of their greed approach.

We do often think of countries as one political entity rather than their constituent parts—especially countries we are less familiar with.

For example, you might speak of Australia's security interests in the Asia-Pacific at the national level because it is often assumed that we all share a common interest in the survival of the Australian state.

However, when we speak about interests and policy prescriptions in Australia's mining, live animal exports, or even the COVID-19 response I see more differentiation across the states and territories.

Or in the US there might be less of a difference in opinion about US policy to Iran across different regions than there would be to migration policies with Mexico and Central American countries.

This is but a long-winded way for me to start talking about our third article for this week by Buhaug et al. (2011).

Buhaug et al. (2011) main argument

Their criticism of existing literature:

Income varies within states.

Where conflict happens is not typical of the larger context.

Argument:

Conflict likely to break out in areas with low **absolute** income.

Conflict likely to break out in areas with large **deviations** (in both directions) from national averages.

Map of Indian GDP by state from Buhaug et al. (2010)

You can see how broadly there is different amounts of economic production within this large country both at the grid level and at the state level.

Their argument is quite intuitive, and my knowledge of the country does suggest that there is likely to be quite different amounts of violence in Bangalore than there will be in Assam.

In a number of cases, we will be looking at there are dramatic levels of regional inequality.

In India and elsewhere these differences are often linked to ethnic differences.

However, there are a number of cases of regional differentiation that have nothing to do with ethnicity.

Nightlights an alternate measure of economic production

Other researchers have shown that the brightness of lights at night is a clear indicator of economic production.

Here is a map using satellite data from PRIO-GRID (<https://grid.prio.org/#/>)

Night light differences across the 38th parallel

The most common visualization of the difference in economic development and output is that of North Korea with its neighbors.

Almost the entire country is dark at night except for a few dots at Pyongyang and surrounds.

Source: The Economist. 2019. Satellite data shed new light on North Korea's opaque economy. 4 May 2019. <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/05/04/satellite-data-shed-new-light-on-north-koreas-opaque-economy>

Relative vs absolute inequality

When looking at inequality, it is theoretically and empirically important to differentiate between several different types of inequality.

First, let us consider relative vs. absolute inequality.

A recent study in the journal *Review of Income and Wealth* finds that relative inequality is declining worldwide while absolute inequality is growing.

In an interview one of the authors put it well:

'Take the case of two people in Vietnam in 1986. One person had an income of US\$1 a day and the other person had an income of US\$10 a day. With the kind of economic growth that Vietnam has seen over the past 30 years, the first person would have now in 2016 US\$8 a day while the second person, US\$80 a day. So if we focus on "absolute" differences, inequality has gone up, but if you focus on "relative" differences, inequality between these two people would have remained the same.'

(<https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2016-08-25-global-income-inequality-down-relative-terms-absolute-sums>)

This has important implications for the conflict literature depending on which type of inequality you think is most important for conflict.

Source: Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel, Laurence Roope, and Finn Tarp. 2017. "Global Inequality: Relatively Lower, Absolutely Higher." *Review of Income and Wealth* 63(4):661-684.

Horizontal vs vertical inequality

A different way to think about this is horizontal or vertical inequality.

"Vertical inequality consists in inequality among individuals or households, while horizontal inequality is defined as inequality among groups, typically culturally defined – e.g. by ethnicity, religion or race." (Steward, Brown, & Cobham 2009: 3)

For example, the drone photo here is from a *Business Insider* piece on Mexico City.

Buhaug et al. (2010: 817) find more evidence for horizontal inequality.

Sources: Frances Stewart, Graham Brown and Alex Cobham. 2009. *The Implications of Horizontal and Vertical Inequalities for Tax and Expenditure Policies*. Oxford University: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity. Robinson, Melia. 2016. A drone captured these shocking photos of inequality in Mexico's biggest city. *Business Insider* (<https://www.businessinsider.com/drone-photography-mexico-city-2016-11>)

Piles o' cash

A particularly blatant case of inequality occurred a few years ago in Nigeria.

\$43 million discovered in a Lagos apartment building in 2017.

The photo of the cash in this week's Wattle page.

The former head of the Nigerian intelligence agency was brought in for questioning a few months later. It was claimed that the money was for intelligence operations.

You can see how this instance of corruption could be seen through a lens of horizontal inequality if the head of intelligence was of a dominant group that had disproportionate power and economic influence.

It could also be a case of vertical inequality if power and money were divided less by group than by a few powerful individuals.

Source: Ibrahim, Idris. 2017. *Premium Times*
(<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/248041-43-million-ikoyi-money-efcc-summons-ex-nia-chief-oke-wife.html>).

Exchange rates over time

Zimbabwean dollar

1980: 1 ZD = 1.00 USD
2000: 1 ZD = 0.01 USD
2002: 1 ZD = 0.001 USD
2005: 1 ZD = 0.0001 USD
2006: 1 ZD = 0.00001 USD

Turkish lira

1980: 1 T£ = 0.0125 USD
1995: 1 T£ = 0.0002 USD (10,000 T£ = 23cents)
2000: 1 T£ = 0.0000016 USD (<2 cents)

Australian dollar graph a bit different

Buhaug et al. (2011) weaknesses

They use cross-sectional models, so we cannot assess changes over time.

They did not include all instances of no conflict but a random selection of peaceful areas.

It is unclear the substantive change in risk of conflict. So we do not know how much the likelihood of conflict would decline with greater output or a decrease in inequality.

Similarities between this week's readings

They use a rationalist approach that focuses on the costs and benefits of violence.

They focus more on models and less on theory.

The measurements they use is less than ideal.

Any others? This will be a key area of discussion in this week's workshop.

Video: Modern Times (1936) factory scene

Sometimes modern conflict research can resemble the factory scene from one of my favorite silent films, *Modern Times*.

Conflict scholars often have one particular set of research skills and they try and apply them to a panoply of research questions without always taking a step back to see if they are the best fit for the question at hand.

Source: <https://youtu.be/6n9ESFJTnHs>

Video #6: Human security

Human security

Everyone wants security. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and other political philosophers have long stressed the importance of physical security and secure property rights to the social compact. Without security society would be an endless war of all against all.

There are entire fields like development economics, human rights, and others trying to understand what we are all entitled to or need to be able to live full and self-actualized lives. I cannot do any of these fields justice in ten minutes. Rather, I want to highlight the myriad facets of human security that scholars focus on that touch on political conflict and environmental use.

Photo of a dry riverbed

Understanding the importance of when something is present often requires first understanding the meaning of its absence.

Like with peace studies, people look at human security largely by the absence of certain important elements of it.

BBC article on snake bites

One element I do not take for granted is not being killed by a snake bite.

I grew up in Los Angeles, and for over a decade I went to a school in the hills where there was a lot of bushlands next to our classrooms. I remember several times the science teacher would be called out by our PE teacher to go get a rattlesnake that had crawled onto one of our sports fields.

I thought that was hard core, and then I moved to Australia.

Here I still head out to go hiking in part because I know that the hospitals here stock antivenom.

In other parts of the world, there are areas that lack the resources to be able to reach people who need this sort of medication, with often fatal results.

Snake bites are a clear human security threat to some people, but less so to other people (like my sister who hates hiking).

Human security threats

Type of security	Examples of main threats
Economic	persistent poverty, unemployment
Political	government repression, human rights abuses
Food	hunger, famine
Health	infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of health care
Environmental	environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution
Personal	physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor
Community	inter-ethnic, religious, or there identity-based tensions

Source: Source: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. No date. *Human Security in Theory and Practice*. New York: United Nations.

Diarrheal diseases killed over 1.6 million people in 2017

Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/childhood-diarrheal-diseases>


WHO malaria map

Malaria kills more than 400,000 per year.

Dimensions of human security

Good health is but one, important, part of human security

Source: United Nations Development Programme. 2016: vii.



Human Development Index 2015

A means to generate an aggregate, comparative measure of human development and security.

Source: United Nations Development Programme. 2016. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries>

Elements of the HDI

Long and healthy life: Life expectancy at birth

Knowledge: expected years of schooling; mean years of schooling

Decent standard of living: Gross national income per capita, PPP (there's GDP again!)

Human development index, 1980-2015

Note that most lines are slowly increasing.

Some do go the other way.

Example of success and failures.

Human Development Report additional indices

Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)

Gender Development Index (GDI)

Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)

Push towards subnational studies

Popular across areas

Gold rush days for new data

Subnational human development database

There are many subnational datasets available from the World Bank, the United Nations, and many others.

Academics have developed their own, including on human development.

Here for example is a subnational map of education indicators.

There are clear regional differences here, and in most topics we will study.

This is something to keep in mind when you write your own paper proposal. What do we lose by looking at the national level, and what do we gain?

Source: Smits, Jeroen, and Iñaki Permanyer. 2019. "The Subnational Human Development Database." *Nature: Scientific Data* (<https://doi.org/10.1038/sdata.2019.38>)

Lecture question #3: Before you go, I am curious about:

Part 1: How much do you think Australia spends every year on foreign aid?

Either before or after you answer the question, you are encouraged to search online and see what the actual percentage is.

Part 2: Was your guess too low or too high?

Please answer both parts of Q3 the Lecture Q#3 on Wattle.

We will be coming back to domestic and international human security spending over several other weeks this semester.

Video #7—Burundi case study

Today's **puzzle** was why the lack of economic development and inequality lead to conflict in some cases but not in others.

While it is not possible to get into everything relevant about Burundi and its neighbors now, I want to highlight several things about this country that connect both to the conflict readings and our human security overview.

Burundi has faced a number of challenges similar to those faced by many other states.

A push to democratize after the end of the Cold War

An internationalized civil conflict that ended with a negotiated settlement

Problematic elections and a leader who didn't want to leave despite term limits
Landlocked and economically underdeveloped

Ethnic divisions

Subject to international political and economic pressures

A rejection of some important international norms

We will be going over several of these issues in the workshop, but first I thought I would provide some background to enable us to get the most out of our workshop time.

Country profile (CIA Factbook)

11,865,821 million people, slightly over a million in the capitol Bujumbura

Size: 27830sq km. Almost 12 times the size of the ACT.

Main ethnic groups are the Hutu (85%), Tutsi (15%), and Twa (1%)

Life expectancy is 64.6 for men and 68.8 for women

Agriculture responsible for over 40% of GDP and 90% of employment
GDP per capita, ppp (\$700 USD)

In 2015 foreign aid was almost half (48%) of national income.

Burundi's population pyramid

Notice how young this country is.

The median age is 17.7

Demography will recur as a crucial issue later this semester.

Background (BBC news)

1962—Gained independence from Belgium in 1962

1966—got rid of monarchy and established a republic

1972--~120,000 Hutus massacred by government forces and supporters in wake of Hutu-led uprising.

1976—Military coup successful

1981—one party state

1987—Another coup

1992—New constitution allowing for a multiparty political system
1993—Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was assassinated after less than four months in office.
1993-2005—Civil war leading to ~300,000 deaths.
1994—New president dies in plane along with Rwandan president, which triggered Rwandan genocide.
2005—Burundi's second democratic elections
2005, 2010—Pierre Nkurunziza elected president
2007—UN shuts down its peacekeeping mission
2015—President Nkurunziza stands for a third term after court rules in his favor, protestors active, a failed coup. Similarities to leaders coming to power after winning conflict (or at least the negotiated solution) Kagame in Rwanda, Museveni in Uganda, Kabila pere and fils in DRC.
2017—First country to leave the International Criminal Court

Overall, Burundi is an example of a small, poor country that has struggled with violence, economic stability, and democracy for most of its post-independence history.

This makes the recent events of the last few years in Burundi all the more interesting.

We will be focusing on Burundi, its possible connections to the conflict economics literature, and human security in the workshop.

Today's **puzzle** was why the lack of economic development and inequality lead to conflict in some cases but not in others.

Grievances are ubiquitous but conflict is rare.

Evidence suggests that grievances lead to action due to opportunistic actors who have the resources or realistic chance at success.

Greed is ubiquitous as well.

Greed is also enabled by opportunistic actors in areas with weak institutions, parallel sources of power, or high stakes.

Today also showed us the real discussions in the academic literature about whether or not certain factors are more or less important to explaining an outcome.

Today showed us the many factors that fall under the umbrella of human security.

Finally, today showed us the difficulties a country like Burundi faces when trying to transition from civil war to something like a stable peace.

I conclude now with a brief video update on recent events in Burundi that will be relevant to the workshop.

al Jazeera English. 2021 (Nov. 14). Burundi: Remains from mass graves linked to ethnic unrest exhumed (<https://youtu.be/rNR89Kq7E3M>).

AfricaNews. 2021 (Dec. 22). Truth Commission describes 1972 events in Burundi as genocide (https://youtu.be/VUfgvkRWV_k).

al Jazeera English. 2021 (Nov. 7). Burundi climate crisis: Thousands displaced by recurrent floods (https://youtu.be/AXMOHxErC_4).

AfricaNews. 2021 (July 24). Burundi suspends rare-earth mining in row over riches. (<https://youtu.be/KWIYPbAb0F4>).

AfricaNews. 2021 (Sept. 16). Burundi seeks to revamp the Bujumbura port (<https://youtu.be/E9QBcYIE7DA>).

UNICEF. Making Soap Affordable in Burundi (<https://youtu.be/nuC649X-rPc>)

Exeunt music

Aloe Blacc. 2010. I Need a Dollar. <https://youtu.be/nFZP8zQ5kzk>

Fred Astaire. 1936. Let's Face the Music and Dance. <https://youtu.be/Yy4QPRbTBE8>