Australian National University

POLS 1005
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Semester 1 2017

TUTORIAL HANDBOOK

Welcome to POLS1005! This document is meant to be a central repository of logistical information about this course. It is a living document and additions and corrections will be made and revised drafts circulated as needed. This handbook also provides tutors with the necessary information to guide students through weekly tutorials and the simulation process. Each week's tutorial will include opportunities to discuss lectures and reading material, answer student questions, and engage in a simulation of the Syrian conflict.

Convenor
Richard Frank

Haydon-Allen (#22), room 1180

email: richard.frank@anu.edu.au
(checked during business hours)

office: 6125 3997
(never used, email preferred)

Head tutor
Jessica Genauer

Haydon-Allen (#22), room 1200

email: jessica.genauer@anu.edu.au

mobile: 431 040 033

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1. Course Guide

The course guide represents a contract between the teaching staff and the students. We have endeavored to include all necessary logistical details regarding the course in the course guide. However, it might contain minor errors. Please look at the course guide and let me know if you catch any mistakes.

2. Our students

As of 19 February, 537 students are enrolled in POLS1005. Over the course of the semester a percentage of these students will withdraw from the course, and we are working with the support staff to make sure that we have the right number of tutorials. On average, the enrolment at the start of O week is the number of students who will complete the course.

If students want to enroll but they are not able to do so online (1) because of a previous withdrawal from POLS1005 or (2) because they lack a prerequisite, please let Jessica know. She has access codes that will allow students to enroll in the course.

The course will have two student representatives. They will be selected during the first two weeks of the course after an announcement in the first week of lecture. Each lecture will have their own student representative.

A percentage of our students will have special Education Access Plans (EAPs) from Access and Inclusion due to their identified special needs. These plans should be forwarded to Jessica because she will maintain a central record of these plans in a Dropbox spreadsheet. It is crucial that we have an accurate and complete record of students with EAPs and special considerations as often these students have individualised exam needs and different deadlines for assessments and we do not want their assessments to be accidentally penalised. Tutors will be notified if any of the students they are marking have EAPs.

This course is co-badged with ANU College course ANUC1105, a course taught in the Diploma of Liberal Arts. These students do not yet meet ANU entry requirements, so they are completing a set of introductory courses that are complimentary to Bachelors of Arts courses. These students will not enrol in our tutorials, but they may attend lectures. There are also a number of informal study groups around campus and in residence halls (e.g. UniLodge). I encourage such groups as they provide another opportunity for students to discuss the course material and questions that they might have about it.

3. Lectures

Lectures are roughly 110 minutes in duration, which includes a five-minute break. Since there is no lecture theatre has the capacity to hold all enrolled students in this course, I must give duplicate lectures. If the attendance in lecture drops significantly it might be possible to go down to one lecture, but given the lecture halls we have been given I am not very optimistic.

Lectures will be recorded using the Echo360 recording system in MC Lecture Theatre 2 and Copland Lecture Theatre. They will be available for students for the duration of the semester on the course's Wattle page. Because of the lecture recording, lectures begin at five minutes past the hour and end five minutes before the hour. These recordings can be played back at faster or slower than normal speeds to help students either make sure that they understand the material or cover it at a faster pace. It is also worth

noting that we can track on Wattle who is actually watching the lectures online. This gives us another tool to verify the level of engagement of students who many not be showing up to tutorial.

The convenors and tutors are expected to attend the first lecture (13:00 on 20 February) so that students can meet (or at least see) their instructors in person. Tutors are not required to attend the lectures (although they are more than welcome to); however, tutors often do attend lectures as a means of preparing for tutorial. Tutors are expected to sit in the front row of the lecture theater so that I can easily see who is there and so I can deploy tutors to bring microphones around lecture if needed.

If tutors decide not to attend lectures in person, they are expected to review the online recording of the lecture before their first tutorial to be able to facilitate discussion in their tutorials and ensure consistency and continuity between the lectures and the tutorials.

As a means of learning a bit about our student body and to better prepare relevant and interesting course material, an initial online student survey is created every semester and announced on Wattle two weeks before the first lecture. Any questions you might think of interest should be given to Rich as early as possible (or later for next year's iteration of this class).

4. Tutoring logistics

The tutorial ratio for first-year courses is 1:15. For second and third-year courses it is 1:20. Tutor contract and hours sheets are to be signed and submitted downstairs in the Joint Office before the first week of classes. Tutors who are PhD graduates are paid a loading. If the PhD graduate has more than three years teaching experience they are paid a further loading. Tutors are allocated based on one initial tutorial and up to four repeat tutorials. Tutors are paid based on eleven teaching weeks where tutorials are provided (e.g. Week 2 to 12 inclusive). Tutors pay is based on one hour of delivery and two hours of preparation for the initial tutorial and one hour of delivery and one hour of preparation for a repeat tutorial. Preparation includes meetings with the lecturer. In larger courses with more than 300 students, tutor meetings must occur, and the first and last meeting are included in the above preparation hours. Marking support is allocated on the basis that each student will be expected to provide three items of assessment during the semester (midterm, response paper, final exam) and the total marking time will be ninety minutes per student. I have allocated twenty minutes marking time for the midterm, forty minutes for the response essay, and thirty minutes for the final exam. Please stick to these times as additional funds for marking is not available.

4.1. Tutor meetings

Over the course of the semester we will have several scheduled meetings to coordinate course logistics. These meetings are covered by the tutoring contracts as described above and are thus **compulsory**. Please make sure to plan on being in Canberra and on campus on these days. The number and times might change, but they are currently scheduled as follows and will take place in the LJ Hume centre. Each should not take more than an hour.

Date	Topic
Monday 20 February, 12:30pm	Introductory logistics
Monday 27 March, 12:30pm	Review of midterm marking logistics
Monday 15 May, 12:30pm	Review of response paper marking logistics
Monday 22 May, 12:30pm	Review of final exam marking logistics
TBD	Distribution of final exams to mark
One week after exams distributed	Return of final exams and moderation

Outside of these meetings communication is encouraged and is best conducted via email. If students ask any questions that you do not know the answer to, feel free to email Jessica. Also, I recommend tutors copy me as convenor into email exchanges with students to prevent misunderstandings and enable all of us to be on the same page (obviously purely logistical issues are excluded).

4.2. Tutorials

Forty tutorial sessions are currently scheduled in the ANU timetable, but we have scheduled only thirty-six tutorials due to this year's smaller than expected enrollment. Tutorial sessions are an opportunity for us to engage the students more directly than is possible in the lecture and encourage lively and constructive discussions surrounding the subject matter. As a means of encouraging such discussion, we will be posting discussion questions on Wattle two weeks before the scheduled lecture. These questions are also discussed in the tutoring outline below. Discussion questions are geared towards helping all students prepare for tutorials and encourage students who might find it hard to speak up to have something prepared to say. Reading comprehension questions (3-5) will also be posted online for each week's reading. These multiple-choice questions will be automatically graded by Wattle and form part of students quiz grade.

Wattle tutorial signups will occur during the first week of classes on Thursday 23 February at 10am. There are 15 students per tutorial, and the process is first-come-first-served. Students should only attend their designated tutorial. Because students must attend seven tutorials to sit the final exam, please keep records of student attendance in tutorials, preferably a sheet circulated during tutorial and entered into Wattle's gradebook. This allows the convener to monitor tutorial attendance and anticipate any potential issues. If students are interested in switching tutorials after the initial signup period, this can be done only if there is space in the destination tutorial and the destination tutor says that it is okay. This does occur every semester and is an additional advantage to have tutorial attendance recorded on Wattle. Students themselves have to drop one tutorial and sign up for another on Wattle.

Speaking of Wattle, please provide us with your office hours and office location to add to Wattle. If you do not have an office, you can book regular times in the shared tutors room in Haydon-Allen in the Joint School Office. If you have an appropriate portrait photo, I can add it to Wattle as well. Please also provide a sentence or two describing yourself and your research interests by **23 February**. We will add these to Wattle so that students can sign up for a tutorial with a tutor with similar interests.

During the semester, you will receive an email asking you whether you are interested in having your tutorial students receiving SELT surveys from the students. It is not required for tutors to give students the opportunity to complete surveys, but I would encourage you to do so. In my experience, students (although not always) provide useful and thoughtful feedback to new tutors. These surveys can also become part of your teaching portfolio and provide evidence of teaching effectiveness.

During Week 6 I will also circulate an online survey to students to gauge their feelings about the class halfway through the semester. I will provide you with the results at the beginning of week 7 after teaching break.

4.2.1 Tutorial participation assessment

10% of students' marks are allocated to participation in the tutorial. There are three elements of the participation mark: (1) a simulation role profile (2.5%); (2) a simulation role profile (2.5%); (3) attendance in tutorials; (4) active participation (2.5%) and contribution to tutorial discussion (2.5%).

Role Profile: Students are informed that the written role profile and the presentation of the role profile in tutorial are worth a combined 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. Students are required to submit the written role profile before tutorial in the week in which they present their role profile. If a student presents

the role profile in tutorial and submits the written role profile before the end of the week in which they present, they will receive 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If a student submits the written Role Profile and does not present the role profile in tutorial they will receive 1.5% instead of 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If the student presents the role profile in tutorial but does not submit the written Role Profile they will receive 1.5% instead of 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If the student does not submit a written Role Profile and does not present a role profile in tutorial, they will forfeit 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If a student is absent in the week that they are required to present their role profile, they may present in an alternative week by arrangement with their tutor.

Position Paper: The position paper is also worth 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If a student submits the position paper before the end of week 8, they will receive 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade. If the student does not submit a position paper they will forfeit 2.5% of the tutorial participation grade.

4.2.1. Student tutorial absences

If students are absent from tutorial, simply run the tutorial and simulation activity without the absent actor. This is fine, as it simulates a real-life situation where all relevant actors may not be present.

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POLS 1005 TUTORIAL SCHEDULE

Tutorial	Day	Start Time	Location	Tutor
1	Tuesday	9:00	ADH G19	Jessica
2	Tuesday	10:00	ADH G19	Jessica
3	Tuesday	11:00	ADH G19	Jessica
4	Wednesday	9:00	ADH 144	Dinara
5	Wednesday	10:00	ADH 144	Dinara
6	Thursday	9:00	ADH 144	Dinara
7	Thursday	10:00	ADH 144	Dinara
8	Tuesday	9:00	CRISP G015	Yu-Hua
9	Tuesday	10:00	CRISP G015	Yu-Hua
10	Tuesday	11:00	CRISP G015	Yu-Hua
11	Tuesday	12:00	CRISP G015	Aminat
12	Tuesday	15:00	HA 1207	Aminat
13	Tuesday	17:00	HA 1207	Aminat
14	Wednesday	12:00	HA 1207	Kelvin
15	Thursday	12:00	HA 1207	Kieran
16	Friday	12:00	HA 1207	Emma
17	Tuesday	9:00	HA 2175	Kieran
18	Tuesday	10:00	HA 2175	Aminat
19	Tuesday	17:00	HA 2175	Kieran
20	Wednesday	9:00	HA 2175	Emma
21	Thursday	9:00	HA 2175	Jessie
22	Tuesday	13:00	HA 1205	Kieran
~~23~~	~~Tuesday~~	~~14:00~~	~~HA 1205~~	
24	Tuesday	16:00	HA 1205	Aminat
~~25~~	~~Tuesday~~	~~17:00~~	~~HA 1205~~	
26	Tuesday	12:00	COP G039	Yu-Hua
27	Thursday	9:00	CRISP G015	Kelvin
28	Thursday	10:00	CRISP G015	Kelvin
29	Thursday	11:00	CRISP G015	Jessie
30	Thursday	12:00	CRISP G015	Jessie
31	Tuesday	12:00	SRWB 2.10	Emma
32	Tuesday	13:00	SRWB 2.10	Emma
33	Tuesday	14:00	SRWB 2.10	Emma
34	Wednesday	9:00	SRWB 2.10	Jessie
35	Wednesday	10:00	SRWB 2.10	Jessie
36	Wednesday	11:00	SRWB 2.10	Jessie
37	Tuesday	14:00	HA G051	Aminat
38	Friday	9:00	ADH G12	Emma
39	Friday	10:00	ADH G12	Emma
40	Friday	11:00	ADH G12	Kelvin

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5. Response paper

All writing assignments at the ANU are submitted via Turnitin. A Turnitin assignment for the response paper will be created by 1 May. Footnotes and bibliographies will be excluded from the plagiarism results. All papers suspected of systematic or blatant plagiarism should be forwarded to the conveners before grading.

Marking should be conducted in Turnitin and will include both in-line comments and feedback in the Comments area of the Turnitin page. Comments are especially important for the short essay they can be incorporated into the second essay. I will post a video on Wattle describing how students can access your paper comments.

All papers receiving a mark of under 50 or over 80 will be reviewed by the convener. All papers will also be moderated by Rich to ensure that grading is consistent across markers. This is why papers must be marked by the dates listed below. If you have any questions or concerns about the grading schedule, please let us know before the start of the semester.

Assignment	Date	Step
Midterm	Week 6	Test taken and distributed to tutors
Midterm	1st week of break	Marking completed
Midterm	2nd week of break	Grade moderating
Midterm	Week 7	Exam made available to students
Response paper	17 May	Due date
Response paper	26 May	Marking completed
Response paper	26 May-31 May	Grade moderating
Response paper	31 May	Paper made available to students

Late papers are marked down per university policy. Penalties (5 points per business day for up to 10 business days) are out of 100 points possible not the mark the essay received. Late papers normally will receive a mark but no feedback. If the extra time after the due date is arranged with us beforehand, then feedback should be given. All direct quotes from sources must have page numbers.

5.1. Response Paper: Alternative assessment

If a student is absent during weeks 8 and 9 (the main simulation weeks they will be unable to complete the assigned response paper. We have devised alternative questions if this situation should arise. Please do not reveal this option to students in advance as it may dis-incentivise participation.

> *In 1,000 words, respond to the questions below:*
>
> *In a pre-conference scenario how would your actor's position align with or diverge from the position of other actors in the simulation? Would you join other actors to form a joint position? If so, which actors and why?*
>
> *In an international conference scenario what would your actor's key demands and concessions be? Would these differ from the joint pre-conference position devised with other actors (if relevant)?*
>
> *What would your actor's strategy be to obtain their objectives? How likely do you think that your actor would achieve their objectives?*

6. The midterm and final exam

The midterm and final exams will be scheduled centrally by the ANU. The structure of the final exam will be finalized by the beginning of April and will be described repeatedly during lecture. Some international students might need a dictionary for the final exam. The School has a form for them to complete and the conveners to sign to enable them to bring a dictionary to the final exam. Rich has a digital copy of the form, and it will be added to Dropbox.

While we are not responsible for proctoring the exam, we are responsible for grading it. We will have a meeting shortly after the scheduled exam to divide them between us for grading. Each tutor will receive midterm and exams to mark with an estimated time per exam of 20 minutes for the midterm and 30 minutes for the final exam.

There is also a special exam for EAP students or those missing the final exam that takes place roughly six weeks after the scheduled exam.

7. Tutor contracts and expectations

Working with vulnerable people cards now required for all ANU teaching staff. The application is at https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/app/answers/detail/a_id/1804/~/working-with-vulnerable-people-(wwvp)-registration. The fee is $79 and the card is valid for three years. Once you get your card please show it to the joint office so that they can keep a copy on file. I've also been told that CASS is still refunding the application fees, so submit a reimbursement form as soon as you complete the application.

We encourage you to look through the contract you sign to become a tutor as this is the ultimate guide to your requirements. However, it does not cover the field and we wish to make the following points very clear so everyone is on the same page.

- When you are paid for tutorials it is assumed 2 hours' preparation for the first tutorial and one-hour preparation for repeats. For example, if you are teaching 3 tutorials in a week, the 3 hours you are paid for assumes you do 7 hours' worth of work (3 hours teaching, 2+2 hours' preparation). Meetings with the course convener are also included in these rates.
- Below are provided guides for each tutorial, which should cut down your preparation time significantly. These are provided both to make your lives easier, and to ensure we keep a consistent message across all the classes. We welcome you to share your opinions in tutorials, but the content of the talking points must be conveyed as well.
- We expect that your preparation will include (a) attending or listening online to the lecture; (b) doing the readings; and (c) reviewing our talking points and preparing your own notes.
- There will be 11 weeks of tutorials.
- The School has a budget for teaching and we are expected to do everything possible to stick to it. Based on guidelines, we expect grading a proposal to take roughly 15-20 minutes (including typing comments) grading each essay to take roughly 45 minutes (also with comments), and grading each final exam to take 20 minutes. This is not your full allocation of 90 minutes, meaning there is a little wiggle room if things take a big longer. **Please stick to these times as additional funds for marking is not available.**
- Very importantly, grading is concentrated in three periods over the semester. Weeks 6-7, 11-12, and the exam period. In the first two periods, you'll be expected to do your normal tutoring AND grading a lot of proposals/essays. **These will be an intense few weeks where your workload will far exceed that in other weeks of the semester.**
- Accordingly, block out those periods in your calendars as being the busiest for your semester and plan your lives accordingly. Also, block out some time during the exam period (probably the second and third weeks of November) for grading.

8. Concluding thoughts

As tutors you have a unique and vital role in making this class a success. You can offer insight into what is, and is not, resonating with students. Moreover, if you personally find any aspect of the material unclear, most if not all students will certainly be in the same position. I say this to make two points: first, I am here to help and support you to make sure you feel sufficiently prepared to succeed in your job each week. Do not hesitate to approach me with concerns, whether they are about individual students, the materials, or logistics. I want tutoring to contribute to your professional development. My mantra is that issues should be raised **early and often**.

Second, as holders of advanced degrees your training, knowledge and experience is a valuable resource. While administratively final decisions must remain with me, we welcome your input on what is, and is not working, whether based on your own views, or on feedback from students. I need your help to make this class the best it can possibly be, as well as making the experience fun and rewarding for everyone involved.

9. TUTORING WEEK BY WEEK

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9.1. Overview of weekly tutorial activities

Tutorials are held every week from week 2 to week 12. The simulation runs from Weeks 2 – 10. The first part of class is dedicated to lecture and reading material discussion and questions. Simulation activities will take place afterwards. The only exception to this tutorial structure is Week 9 where the entire tutorial is dedicated to the conference simulation.

Below the weekly tutorial descriptions start with a brief description of the main points I want students and tutors to hit over the course of the tutorial. Then a brief reading description is given. These are largely from the instructor resources of the FLS textbook. Then there is a description of the weekly simulation activities.

This is the first year that we have included this simulation as part of POLS1005. Your feedback is thus very useful in deciding what works and what should be revised for next year's course.

Week	Simulation activities	Time
1	Introductory lectures and tutorial signup	NA
2	Introduce simulation and allocate roles	15 mins
3	Discussion regarding impact of WWI on Syrian conflict	15 mins
4	Six state actors present role profile (3 mins. each)	20-25 mins
5	Four international actors present role profile (3 mins. each)	20-25 mins
6	Four non-state actors plus Assad regime present role profile (3 mins. each)	20-25 mins
7	Activity focused on economic diplomacy between actors	20-25 mins
8	Small groups devise pre-conference positions	20-25 mins
9	Simulated international negotiations conference	50 mins
10	Student debrief	20-25 mins

9.2. Role profiles with key objectives and constraints

Syrian government

1. Syrian government: Assad regime: Bashar al-Assad has been President of Syria since 2000, inheriting power from his father, Hafez al-Assad, as the head of an oppressive, authoritarian regime. Bashar and much of Syria's ruling class are from the Allawite sect, a Muslim sect associated with Shi'a Islam, although the Assad regime is secular. When protest spread across Syria in 2011, Assad responded to protesters with oppressive violence, leading Syria into civil war.

- *Objectives:* Make sure that Assad regime members are guaranteed personal safety. Would consider stepping down if pressured by Russia and guaranteed safety in Russia. Would consider conceding control over parts of Syria in order to maintain territorial control over areas currently under regime control.

- *Constraints:* Cannot agree to form government with opposition groups as the risk of assassination is too high. You are dependent for military power on Russia, so cannot go it alone without Russia's approval.

Syrian non-government violent actors

2. Free Syria Army (FSA): The FSA emerged after the 2011 protests against the Assad regime, primarily led by military personnel who defected from Assad's regime. In the early years of the civil war the FSA was a key opposition player. As civil war dragged on, the opposition fragmented into often competing groups, and non-Islamist opposition groups either dissolved or lost prominence. The FSA is one of the few remaining non-Islamist and non-Kurdish opposition groups.

- *Objectives:* Remove Assad from power. Would agree to hold post-Assad elections for a new regime as long as Assad leaves power. Would be willing to form a government with some Islamist opposition forces (but NOT ISIS).
- *Constraints:* Cannot agree to participate in a government with Assad – the risk of execution is too high. Would not form government with ISIS.

3. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): ISIS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and by its Arabic acronym *Daesh*, is a Salafi jihadist, non-state actor, that follows a fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. ISIS has been classified as a terrorist organisation. ISIS was formed in 2013, emerging out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2013 ISIS began seizing control of territory and cities in Iraq and Syria. ISIS is currently led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

- *Objectives:* Secure internationally-recognised control over territory.
- *Constraints:* Cannot agree to participate in elections for government. Cannot form government with non-Islamist groups.

4. Jaysh al-Islam: Jaysh al-Islam (the Army of Islam in Arabic) was created in 2013 as a merger of a number of groups opposing the Assad regime. Jaysh al-Islam believes in the rule of Islamic law. It is one of the key opposition groups fighting the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. The current leader is Mohammed Alloush.

- *Objectives:* Remove Assad from power. Would agree to hold post-Assad elections for a new regime as long as Assad leaves power. Would be willing to form a government with secular opposition forces.
- *Constraints:* Cannot agree to participate in a government with Assad – the risk of execution is too high. Would not form government with ISIS as they directly compete for the same constituency.

5. Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD): The PYD was formed in 2003; the People's Protection Units (YPG) is its militia arm. Since 2011, the PYD has been engaged in fighting against the Assad Regime and ISIS. The YPG, the PYD's militia arm, has received military training and back-up airpower from the US, who consider the PYD a moderate, forward-thinking partner in the battle against extremism. The PYD is associated with The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish group engaged in an armed separatist struggle against Turkey. The current chairman of the PYD is Sallih Muslim.

- *Objectives:* Formation of a pluralist, democratic state in Syria. Or, a federal state where the Kurds govern autonomously in their region.
- *Constraints:* Cannot form government with extreme Islamists such as ISIS. Cannot agree to an authoritarian regime in which the Kurds are excluded from central government and have no autonomy.

International state actors

6. Australia – Imagined as a current holder of a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): For the purposes of this simulation, Australia has commenced a two-year rotating term on the UNSC and is an active protagonist in discussions concerning the Syrian Civil War. Julie Bishop

represents Australia on the Security Council. Australia joined the United States (US) in a joint task force, Operation Okra, that commenced a bombing campaign against ISIS in Iraq in late August 2014, and in Syria in September 2015. The Australian Government rejected US requests in early 2016 to expand its military commitment to the war.

- *Objectives:* Secure a ceasefire between all parties. Secure a transitional pathway towards creating a stable government in Syria. Must be a pluralist, democratic regime that respects civil rights.
- *Constraints:* Cannot agree to any kind of authoritarian regime. Cannot accept ISIS forming part of the government.

7. Iran: Iran and Syria have been close strategic allies since the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since 2011, Iran has intervened in the Syrian civil war to prevent the collapse of the Assad Regime. Iran has provided billions of dollars to the Assad Regime, as well as military training for government forces. Elite Iranian military personnel have fought in Syria alongside the Assad regime.

> *Objectives:* Maintain an Assad regime in Syria. Would agree to separating Syria into different regions.
>
> *Constraints:* You can pressure Assad, but your military assistance is not sufficient to give you veto power over Assad regime decisions. Cannot agree to a Syrian government controlled by Sunni religious elements such as ISIS and Jaysh al-Islam.

8. Jordan: Jordan, led by King Abdullah, shares its northern border with Syria**.** Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Syrian refugees have been flooding into Jordan, currently numbering close to 1.3 million. This influx of refugees has placed a significant strain on Jordan's economy and infrastructure. Jordanian military intervention in Syria constitutes participation in the US-led bombing campaign against ISIS commencing in late 2014.

> *Objectives:* To secure a ceasefire and a guarantee that refugees can return safely to their homes.
>
> *Constraints:* Cannot agree to a solution where Syria is under complete control of a regime that is likely to create more refugee flows, such as the Assad regime or ISIS.

9. The Russian Federation (Russia): Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, has long-standing diplomatic relations with the Assad Regime. Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in September 2015 following an official request from the Syrian government for military help to fight rebel groups. Prior to the intervention, Russia supplied military equipment and training to the Syrian Army. Russia's involvement in Syria has been cited as a 'godsend' for Assad, placing him in a much stronger negotiating position.

> *Objectives:* Secure stability in Syria and keep extremist Islamist elements out of power. Cannot agree to any deal that is likely to facilitate Islamist elements forming a majority in government. Will facilitate Assad leaving government if key goal is met.
>
> *Constraints:* Due to domestic pressures, must look strong and in control of negotiations – cannot allow Islamist elements to control a post-Assad regime.

10. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia is a Sunni-majority religious monarchy that vies with the Shi'a theocracy of Iran for regional influence. In the Syria conflict, Saudi Arabia has provided military training and funding to opposition groups fighting the Assad Regime. Saudi Arabia also joined US-led air strikes against ISIS.

> *Objectives:* To ensure that Sunni Muslim groups in Syria are part of any new regime.

Constraints: Cannot agree to Assad staying in power. Cannot agree to a regime where Sunnis will be sidelined.

11. Turkey: Turkey, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, borders Syria and had good diplomatic relations with the Assad Regime pre-2011. Turkey intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2011, training and equipping Free Syria Army (FSA) fighters. In the following years, Turkey continued to provide support to opposition groups. Turkey commenced military intervention in Syria in 2016, launching an operation against both ISIS and Kurdish groups.

Objectives: Ensure a stable regime in Syria to stop refugee flows to, and terror attacks in, Turkey.

Constraints: Cannot agree to Kurds having an autonomous region.

12. United States (US): From 2011 until 2014, US involvement in the Syrian conflict constituted financial support and military training for certain opposition groups, in particular the Free Syria Army (FSA). The US tried, with increasing difficulty, to avoid US funding reaching opposition groups with an Islamist agenda. When the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began seizing territory in 2013 and displayed an aggressive anti-Western agenda, the US began to intervene in Syria with a military bombing campaign against ISIS that commenced in late 2014 and is currently still underway.

Objectives: Creation of a stable regime in Syria. Would agree to divide Syria into separately governed regions.

Constraints: Cannot agree to a Syrian regime that includes extreme Islamist elements such as ISIS. Cannot agree to Assad's removal without a stable regime taking his place.

International interstate actor

13. European Union (EU): EU involvement in the Syrian crisis has been largely focused on attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria crisis. The EU is an active participant in the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) that is focused on facilitating a political solution to the crisis. The EU suspended its cooperation with the Syrian government in March 2011. The EU initially sent a delegation to Syria, however, since late 2012, has scaled down its activities. Delegation staff continue to operate from Brussels and Beirut, carrying out regular missions to Damascus. With Syrians fleeing the conflict, managing and responding to the humanitarian crisis has become a central issue for the EU, and for EU nation states.

Objectives: Secure a ceasefire and a guarantee that refugees can return safely to their homes.

Constraints: Cannot agree to a solution where Syria is under complete control of a regime that is likely to create more refugee flows, such as the Assad regime or ISIS.

International non-state actor

14. United Nations (UN): The UN has been actively involved in Syria since 2012 providing a UN Special Envoy to Syria to facilitate discussion between the various actors. The current envoy is Staffan de Mistura who succeeds Lakhdar Brahimi and Kofi Annan—both served as Joint Special Representatives in coordination with the League of Arab States. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also been a key area of activity and discussion with several Resolutions, Presidential Statements and Secretary General Reports' canvassing options and promoting discussion.

Objectives: Secure a ceasefire between all parties. Secure a transitional pathway towards creating a stable government in Syria. Must be a pluralist, democratic regime that respects civil rights.

Constraints: Cannot agree to any kind of authoritarian regime.

Humanitarian organisation

15. Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC): SARC is the Syrian arm of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the world's largest humanitarian network with missions all over the world. The President of SARC is Khaled Hboubati. SARC has 14 branches all over Syria, and 75 sub-branches. SARC has around 11,000 trained volunteers and works with other charity organisations in Syria. SARC is committed to the Geneva Conventions and the seven basic principles of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. SARC is one of the few international humanitarian organisations still active inside Syria, providing humanitarian relief to Syrian citizens impacted by the conflict.

Objectives: To secure a ceasefire and a guarantee that humanitarian relief can be provided to Syrians in need, and an end to hostilities between key players.

Constraints: Cannot agree to a solution where Syria is under complete control of a regime that is likely to create more refugee flows, such as the Assad regime or ISIS.

WEEK 1: Introduction to the disciple of international relations

This week's lecture and readings provide historical background to the patterns of international politics and an overview of the rest of the semester. The lecture is also meant to try and get students excited about the topic and the course. Students would be better able to assess major concepts of international relations if they have had foundational history courses (e.g. world history, history of economic thought, or the study of one region). Nonetheless, not all students will have finished (or taken) such courses. Our role in this class is not to cover all the history but to touch on several crucial eras and events that will be salient in the rest of this class as well as later international relations classes.

The following reading notes and discussion questions are provided for background and to help your preparation before your first tutorial. DO NOT SHARE THESE WITH STUDENTS!

Chapter 1 is mostly an historical overview of crucial events related to IR, events that will reappear repeatedly in this class as well as other IR classes at the ANU. I want to make sure that students have at least a passing familiarity with these events and era without taking up too much course time. This is a class meant to present students with an introduction to the study of the relations between states (and various transnational and domestic actors) and the main theoretical approaches and empirical trends explaining them or important to understand their context. I return to a number of these events in the lectures, and this chapter can be a useful resource for students to return to in later weeks. This material is also subject to examination even though it is during the first week of class. With such a short semester all time is critical!

FLS Chapter 1 summary[1]

This chapter is organized around five major historical periods: the mercantilist era, the Pax Britannica, the Thirty Years' Crisis, the Cold War, and the post–Cold War era.

The mercantilist era was dominated by western European states intent on competing with one another in securing power and markets by establishing colonial empires. Monopoly power over colonies forced them into exclusionary economic relations with the home country.

During the mercantilist era, the foundation of the modern system of sovereign states emerged at the Peace of Westphalia. The Westphalian system included the formal articulation of the sovereignty principle.

The emergence of British hegemony gave rise to the era of the Pax Britannica. In this period, economic development and the balance of power on the European continent focused on cooperation and stability. This period saw a rapid expansion in international trade, investment, and migration. The mostly nondemocratic great-power states also shared an interest in suppressing social movements. British hegemony and the Concert of Europe served as the international institutions to manage economic and political conflict and to keep the international system stable.

The focus on economic and political stability from 1815–1870 saw the expansion of free trade and the industrial revolution within the great powers. By 1870 the rise of new great powers in Germany, Japan, and the United States led to a renewed competition for over- seas colonies and increased tension in international relations.

Rising tension among the great powers led to the Thirty Years' Crisis that begins with World War I. Increasing German power upset the balance between the great powers and contributed to growing conflict that led to World War I.

[1] Reading notes mostly from the FLS instruction manual written by Gregory Dixon. There is no summary reading notes about the introduction. Some information (e.g. the summary of theoretical 'isms) will appear in Week 2.

The Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I attempted to create a new kind of order among the great powers, one based on collective security. The League of Nations was created as an institution designed to promote collective security and avoid future great- power wars. The United States refused to join the league, fatally weakening the institution.

Ultimately, World War I did little to resolve the conflicts between the great powers but did demonstrate that the United States was the most powerful state among the great powers. World War I was followed by high inflation in the 1920s and then the Great Depression in the 1930s. The tension and chaos of this period led to the collapse of the League of Nations system and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. More deadly than even the First World War, this conflict resulted in the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union and the diminishment of other great powers.

The resulting Cold War ordered the world into two systems, each with its own interests, interactions, and institutions. They competed for the support of "Third World" countries. Both superpowers also developed large arsenals of nuclear weapons, and much of the Cold War centred on if and how these weapons would influence interstate diplomacy.

The Cold War saw the development of institutions as a means of consolidating both the Western and Eastern Blocs. NATO and the Bretton Woods System bound the Western Bloc together. The Warsaw Pact bound the Soviet satellite states closer to the Eastern Bloc. Periodic crises represented the rise and fall of superpower tensions, but did not result in great power wars.

Decolonization took place in the context of the superpower competition of the Cold War. Former imperial states shed their colonial possession and many new states were created as part of this process.

The post–Cold War era began the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 following two decades of upheaval in the international system. Significant economic changes such as the oil shocks of the 1970s and the rise of regional trade organizations such as the European Union signalled that the world had become a much more globalized place.

The end of the Cold War saw the expansion of UN activities, including international collaboration to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Many hoped this was the beginning of a more cooperative international system. But states were unable to cooperate on some important issues, such as intervening to prevent genocide in Rwanda. The changing nature of security concerns continued to challenge political leaders. Ongoing turmoil in the Middle East following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring of 2010 have left a legacy of instability and conflict among fragile and failing states. The Russian annexation of the Crimea has raised the spectre of a return of great-power competition to the European continent.

The chapter closes with discussions of two developments that are likely to shape world politics in the coming decades. The first is American predominance and challenges to this pre-eminence from rising powers. Since 1945 the United States has promoted international institutions and economic cooperation. Will the rise of competing powers such as Russia and China erode America's ability to continue to act as hegemon? The second development is globalization. The economic crisis that began in 2008 raised questions about the gains from integration into the global economy. The rise of the BRIC economies shows how economic power is being dispersed in the global economy. Protectionist pressures may increase in the United States and European Union, weakening their commitments to openness. The crisis also aggravated tensions over how international institutions govern the global economy and the environmental harm that can arise from rapid economic growth.

Discussion suggestions

While there are no tutorials this week the following questions reflect the sort of big questions this field is focused on. These questions might also be useful to keep in the back of your mind as you approach the material in later weeks.

1. World politics has seen two hegemons or predominant powers—Britain (1815–1914) and the United States (1945–present). Discuss and compare their degree of influence over the international system, how they exercised power, and the costs and benefits to other states of these actions. Imagine that in the future, another state, such as China, becomes predominant. How would a Chinese-dominated international system

differ from the current system? Would this change any of China's interests in political and economic institutions?

2. The end of the Cold War reflected a long-term trend in the reduction of power among the superpowers. This reflected the relative decline of the superpowers compared to other states in the system. One advantage to the Cold War was the stability that came with only two major powers. Does the growing number of major powers suggest a return to the more conflict-prone world of the last decades of the Pax Brittania? A discussion of system polarity and stability could be included here if desired. Alternatively, a discussion of the relative rate at which we convert economic potential to military power could also be included by comparing military spending before and after the end of the Cold War.

Discussion questions

As with the above discussion suggestions, these discussion questions touch on important themes and open questions at the heart of the study of international relations.

1. The economic prosperity of the nineteenth-century global economy was based on a system of relatively open trade, the gold standard, and cooperation among the great powers to minimize security disputes. Why were world leaders unable to recreate such a system after World War I, despite its advantages? What implications does the collapse of this sys- tem have for contemporary world politics?

2. Compare and contrast the European economic interests of free trade within Europe with the monopolization of colonies. What factors motivated the different approaches to internal trade (trade within the empires) and external trade (trade between the empires) under the Pax Britannica?

3. Why did the United States take a unilateral approach to international relations at the end of World War I, yet a multilateral approach at the end of World War II? What type of institutions resulted at the end of each war? How did they pattern state interactions? Do interests, interactions, and/or institutions account for more recent changes in the US view on a multilateral foreign policy?

4. Will US preponderance last? For how long? What actions might the United States take that would undermine this preponderance? To pro- long it? How might other states react to this American power in coming years and decades?

5. The Pax Britannia was characterized by the Hundred Years' Peace be- tween great powers, but was followed by the Thirty Years' Crisis which saw unprecedented human suffering and material destruction. What changes to the institutions of the period of the Pax Britannica could have helped prevent the Thirty Years' Crisis?

6. The response to the 2007 financial crisis required the formation of a new group of states, the Group of 20. Hegemonic power has been based largely on the state's financial strength and integrity, but America was unable to resolve the crisis without significant help. Does this reflect an end to the period of American hegemony in international affairs?

7. What are the costs and benefits of globalization? How are these distributed in the United States—in other words, who gains and who loses from globalization? How are these costs and benefits distributed in economically different countries, such as China or countries in Africa? What does this suggest about international cooperation to sustain globalization in the future?

8. The Pax Britannica ended in the First World War. As American hegemony comes to an end today, states have military spending that is only about half of what it was in the last decades of the Pax Britannica. Does this lower spending on the military lower the risk that the Pax Americana will end in a global war? What signs in contemporary conflict would support your answer?

WEEK 2: Theories of International Relations

Overall goals for Week 2's tutorial

The main goals for this week's tutorial are (1) to have all tutors and students introduce themselves, (2) answer any questions students may have about the course or the course guide, (3) have a brief group-breakout discussion of individuals, interests, and institutions involved in the *New York Times* reading, and (4) introduce the Syrian simulation and assign roles.

During this tutorial, please send around an attendance sheet (or print out and mark it down yourself using the Wattle group function) for students to sign. Once tutorial is over, please enter in attendance into Wattle's gradebook. This is essential to allow us to centrally keep track of which students are showing up and which tutorials are being attended over the course of the semester**. You will also want to write down which student is taking which role after they are assigned during tutorial.**

I will provide a means by which students can randomly be assigned countries. Please use this method to assign roles.

Given the small size of first year tutorials, please arrange students' desks and chairs into a C or O shape. This will allow all students to see each other and facilitate student interaction. I've visited all tutorial rooms for this class and most are already in this shape. If you do not want to move the tables and chairs yourself, you can ask the students to move them as well. Most tutors do have multiple tutorials in the same room back to back, so this should not have to be done more than once per day.

If there are fewer than 15 students in your tutorial, please follow the following list to drop simulation roles. Actors to drop in order (i.e., drop Saudi Arabia first and Assad Regime last): (1) Saudi Arabia; (2) Australia (UNSC); (3) European Union (EU); (4) Jordan; (5) Iran; (6) Free Syria Army (FSA); (7) Turkey; (8) ISIS; (9. Kurdish PYD; (10) Jaysh Al-Islam; (11) Red Crescent (SARC); (12) United Nations (UN); (13) US (14) Russia; (15) Assad Regime.

FLS Chapter 2 summary

Chapter 2 describes the interests, interactions, and institutions of the book and related concepts that are used in many subsequent chapters. The chapter begins with a survey of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003–2011. The example illustrates the complex relationship between interests, interactions, and institutions in practice. Actors and their interests are the starting point. States, groups, international organizations, and individuals in global politics have different goals concerning power or security, economic and material welfare, and ideological goals. Individuals are the most basic actors. Individuals make up larger political units. States are particularly important actors in international politics because they exercise sovereignty and control most of the world's military force

When discussing states, scholars use the concept in two ways: 1) to refer to a single, collective entity with a single set of interests and 2) as a shorthand for the actions taken by political leaders in the name of the country. This is an important distinction as the first sees the state as an independent entity with its own interest and the second sees the state as a collection of actors with their own interests that act in the name of the state.

Key categories of actors in world politics include 1) states, 2) politicians, 3) firms, industries and business associations, 4) classes or factors of production, 5) bureaucracies, 6) international organizations, and 7) nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

The interests of relevant actors combine to produce interactions. While actors are rational and strategic, problems of cooperation and bargaining can yield unanticipated outcomes. Two key assumptions in interactions are 1) actors behave with the intent of producing a desired result and 2) actors adopt strategies

based on what they believe to be the interests and likely actions of others. Interactions can be divided into two classes—cooperation and bargaining. Many interactions in world politics involve elements of both cooperation and bargaining.

Cooperation refers to two different constellations of interests—coordination and collaboration. Coordination issues may be the easiest to address, since actors have few incentives to deviate from an order once it is established. Collaboration problems are more visible in international relations. Collaboration requires that actors sacrifice something they already have for a greater expected benefit in the future. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a good example. A special type of collaboration problem is the problem of collective action and public goods. Actors may be better off if all cooperate, but all actors have an incentive to be a free rider. In domestic politics governments step in to solve this type of problem, but in world politics there is no central authority to do so. Cooperation is influenced by several factors: (1) a smaller number of actors are more likely to cooperate, (2) repeated interaction lengthens actors' vision of the future and discourages short- term opportunism, and (3) a lack of information may create uncertainty of outcomes and misperception of intent.

In bargaining, actors differ in their goals, power, and the acceptability of the reversion point. Actors must choose an outcome that makes one actor better off at the expense of the other. Therefore, bargaining is sometimes called a zero-sum game. The actor least dissatisfied with the status quo or reversion point has the most bargaining power.

Power is a commonly used term in international relations, but it can have many meanings. Power in the context of bargaining and cooperation tends to focus on "compulsory power": the power to make an actor do something they normally would not do.

Coercion can take military, economic, and other forms, and the threat to use it is limited by the actor's resolve. Actors may have access to options outside of the negotiating table and see these as more attractive than what the rival offers at the table. Some actors can define the conflict and specify alternatives in a way that in- creases their bargaining power.

Institutions shape interactions. Institutions include both formally chartered decision-making bodies as well as informal norms and practices that guide behaviour. Under the anarchic conditions of international relations, institutions can rarely force members to comply. They must rely on other means to influence outcomes. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by creating standards of behaviour that all parties agree to abide by in exchange for some bene- fit. Trade agreements provide the benefits of mutual trade in exchange for abiding by the standards of behaviour for members. To violate the standards risks forgoing the benefits. Institutions can also impact behaviour by supplying information, providing for negotiations, and developing dispute resolution mechanisms. These provide information and reduce uncertainty for members.

Wealthy and more powerful states typically exercise more power within institutions, which shifts bargaining outcomes in their favour. However, all states can benefit from institutions that facilitate cooperation. Despite their lack of reliable enforcement, international institutions enjoy impressive compliance rates. Indeed, powerful countries often make concessions to the rules-based appeals of lesser states. Creating new institutions is expensive and time-consuming, leading actors to work to preserve existing institutions (even imperfect ones) rather than to create new ones.

Discussion activities

Begin by introducing yourself and go around the room and ask all students to introduce themselves, describe why they are taking the course, and one reason they find international relations interesting.

Next, a brief article about the first day of a recent Syrian peace talk has been assigned as required reading for this week. Print out paper copies of this article (15 per tutor) and bring them to share with students. Collect the article at the end of class and use for your other tutorials. Provide some time (2-3 minutes) for students to go over the article in tutorial (they should have read it already before tutorial) and then divide the students into five groups of three students. Have each group take 5 minutes to list the various actors involved (states, the UN, etc.) and list at least one interest that the actor appears to have based on their behaviour in the first day of the peace talks. Have each group briefly share their choices. Do different types of actors have similar types of interest? What factors allow us to see these interests in practice?

Simulation activity (**15 minutes at end of tutorial)**

The main tasks for this week's simulation time are (1) introducing the simulation and (2) allocating roles.

1. Introduce the simulation phases and explain that the simulation culminates in a simulated Syria Peace Summit in week 9:

- Phase 1 (wk 2 & 3): introducing the simulation and the Syria conflict
- Phase 2 (wk 4, 5 & 6): students present role profiles; and
- Phase 3 (wk 7, 8, 9 & 10): pre-conference positioning, conference, and debrief.

Next, explain the simulation's assessment structure. There are three assessable items. Detailed information about all assessment items can be found in the Simulation Guide. The first assessment item is the *role profile*, which needs to be about 300 words. The combined written role profile and presentation in tutorial are worth 2.5% of students' overall tutorial participation grade of 10%. Students will upload their role profile to Wattle before the tutorial in which they present the role profile – a separate forum will be created per tutorial. Students will be given three minutes to present their profile during tutorial in week 4, 5 or 6 depending on their allocated role. The second simulation assessment is a 300-word *position paper*, which is also worth 2.5% of students' 10% participation grade. Students will submit the position paper in week 8, before their tutorial. The third simulation assessment is their response paper, which is to be 1,000 words and is worth 15% of their overall course grade.

2. Allocate simulation roles to students. The tutor will write down all 15 roles on small pieces of paper, which are then folded and placed into a hat or box. The tutor then walks around the room and students pick a piece of paper. This process helps randomize the selection of roles (and thus increases fairness) but it also helps raise student interest in the simulation as well as the stakes (Oh, no only Russia and ISIS are left, which one am I going to get?).

Discussion questions (if needed)

1. Give examples of coordination, collaboration, and bargaining in your daily life. Support your classification by using the definitions of each concept.

2. What are the major security, economic, and ideological interests of Australia today? How much agreement is there on these interests? What tradeoffs does Australia face in pursuing these interests?

3. Why does sovereignty matter for international politics? What are some examples from contemporary or historical international politics of one state violating the sovereignty of another state? What interests lead one state to violate the sovereignty of another?

4. What is a failed state? What are some examples of failed states in the international system today? What problems do these failed states create for the international system? Do other states have a responsibility to assist failed states?

5. How does game theory help us to understand the relationship between interests, interactions, and institutions in world politics? What are the strengths and weaknesses of using game theory in this way?

WEEK 3: Why do wars occur?

Overall goals for Week 3's tutorial

This week's tutorial centers on reinforcing (1) students' understanding of the main causes of interstate wars, (2) a balloon version of the prisoners' dilemma as an activity to reinforce the difficulties in cooperating in a self-interested world, and (3) a simulation discussion/activity where students tie the week's lecture (interstate war, WWI) to the simulation case of Syria.

Balloons and pins which will be given to tutors before Week 3. Watch out for an email from us by the end of Week 2 about picking up these supplies.

Also make sure to answer any final questions that students might have about the course guide, quizzes, assessments, simulation roles, etc.

FLS Chapter 3 reading summary

Given the great costs of war, why can't countries reach negotiated settlements instead? Even successful wars are **costly**. Often, several bargains are available that would produce benefits to both sides that can be achieved at a cost that is lower than the cost of war. All wars are uncertain, and it is common for the instigator of the war to be the eventual loser. This paradox is illustrated in numerous cases, for example, the possible settlements that could have prevented the Mexican-American War and those that could have averted World War One.

At first glance, irreconcilable state interests would seem to lead to war. Territory, security, and ideological conflicts and shifts in the balance of power remain the most frequent causes of war. National leaders often claim that these issues are indivisible, meaning that no compromise is possible. Looking deeper, however shows that bargaining can resolve even difficult issues between states. Understanding why wars occur requires that we understand why bargaining efforts fail. Figure 3.2 in the textbook demonstrates that a negotiated settlement is usually possible. However, states cannot reach a mutually beneficial compromise due to the specific bargaining issues considered: information, commitment problems, and indivisible goods.

Because war is costly and uncertain, a peaceful settlement that all sides would prefer to war is often available as an option. **A series of factors such as perception of the capacity of another state to wage war, the lack of credible commitment, and the indivisibility of the objects of the dispute**. The decision to choose conflict over a bargained solution comes when the potential cost of conflict is less than the potential cost of the settlement. Wars are the organized use of military force by actors (or groups of actors) that pass a minimum level of severity. Interstate wars are wars between states. Civil wars (intrastate wars) are wars that take place within a state.

There are **three broad approaches to understanding war: 1) realism: war is the result of anarchy through the incentive to preempt and through the security dilemma, 2) misperception: leaders do not accurately estimate the cost of a war, and 3) interest groups**: war benefits a small but powerful set of groups within the state. These groups seek war to bring themselves greater benefits.

States tend to fight over goods that are seen to be important such as territory. **Territory** can have value due to the resources found within it or because of the strategic value of the area. Territory can also have significant symbolic value. States also fight over whether to change a policy. War and threats of war can be used to alter state behavior. States may fight over what is the right form of government. Countries may seek to alter the regime type of another country for a range of reasons. These reasons for states to fight are affected by the relative power of the states.

Conflicts of interest are necessary conditions for war, but conflict of interests alone **are not sufficient** cause for war to take place. To understand why some conflicts become wars and others do not, we have to think about the strategic interactions that states engage in when they seek to settle their disputes.

The international system lacks a clear system for the enforced resolution of disputes. This means that most states must generally seek to settle their conflicts through bargaining. A crisis occurs when at least one side in bargaining seeks to influence the outcome by threatening the use of force if it does not get what it wants. Bargaining under these conditions is called crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy.

War is costly, so a solution short of war that is preferable to both sides is generally available. The costs and likely outcome of war influence the outcomes that each side considers acceptable in crisis bargaining. The bargaining range represents the set of deals that both parties prefer to going to war. Two key concepts are **compellence** and **deterrence**. Compellence is the attempt to change the status quo through threats of force. Deterrence is the attempt to preserve the status quo through threats of force.

Misperception can play a powerful role in the onset of war. States nearly always make decisions under the condition of incomplete information. State leaders exacerbate information problems when they misrepresent their capabilities and resolve. Much of bargaining consists of such attempts to manipulate beliefs.

Since target states have good reason to discount threats, states sending threats take efforts to make them credible. A key component of credibility is perceived **resolve**. Brinksmanship, or taking a crisis to the brink of war, is one such way to show resolve. A second strategy to strengthen the credibility of threats is through "tying hands" or making irreversible commitments to engage in war before backing down from demands. Such statements increase the audience costs for the state making the threat.

While demonstrations of resolve help to clarify the position of the parties in bargaining, they can also spiral out of control. This means that coercive bargaining always carries the risk of accidental war.

Even if both states are searching for ways to avoid war, **commitment problems** may prevent a negotiated settlement. States may agree to a mutually beneficial bargain that avoids war today, but it is difficult for them to credibly promise not to use force to revise this bargain in their favor in the future.

The inability of the target state to credibly commit may cause the sending state to consider preventative or preemptive action, such as a surprise attack, while still the more powerful actor.

Bargaining over goods that are a source of future power can be problematic. Advantage in the current bargaining will add to the advantage in later bargaining.

An expected change in the **relative power** of states can make bargaining difficult. If a state perceives that its bargaining partner will becomes more powerful in a relative sense in the future, the incentive to risk preventive war while the odds are relatively more even is stronger.

An expectation of attack by the bargaining partner can also lead to war. If the country perceives that it has a **first strike** advantage, this increases the incentive to fight a preemptive war.

Indivisible goods cannot be divided without destroying their value. Bargaining over indivisible goods is more difficult, since truly indivisible goods must go to one state in their entirety. Indivisibility is not a physical characteristic, but one that depends on how states value goods. Actors have incentives to claim that a good is indivisible to strengthen their bargaining leverage.

This analysis suggests **four developments or practices that might reduce the likelihood of war**: (1) War may be deterred if its costs are exceptionally high. The great destruction that a nuclear exchange would have produced helps to explain the peace between the superpowers during the Cold War. (2) International institutions can increase transparency so countries know the capacity of others, monitor and enforce commitments of the parties, and facilitate bargains across issue areas (e.g., concessions on territory for economic gains). (3) Indivisibility may be tackled with creative bargaining solutions such as shared control or linkage.

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Tutorial activity

Ask students to break into pairs and play a simple game. If there is an odd number of students, the tutor will play with the odd person out. The games payouts are based on preferred outcomes.

Players each get a balloon and a pin. Players are told that they can use the pin to burst the other player's balloon. The payouts are as follows **and should be written on the board**:

		Player 2	
		Don't burst	Burst
Player 1	Don't burst	2, 2	0, 3
	Burst	3, 0	1, 1

Have the students play **four turns for each of the following scenarios**. You can burst balloons or you can just use moves written on paper. **Personally, I would recommend bursting balloons.**

1) Each player writes the move on a piece of paper. Both players **simultaneously** reveal their moves.
2) The players move in **sequence** with **Player 1 moving first** each time.
3) The players move in a sequence, but **each player alternates turns**.
4) The players move in alternating sequence, but a player whose balloon is burst can have one additional move at the end of the turn.

Scores are assigned based on the total number of points scored for each category. The total available points would be 32 points (2 points per move) with any points above that as extra credit. The overall winner **will get a treat**, which will be distributed to tutors.

Activity question (after playing the game)

In which of the four scenarios was it hardest for BOTH players to get the maximum points (32)? Ask the students to discuss how the changes in move order changed their thinking about their moves.

Discussion questions (may be useful for reinforcing students understanding of the reading and the lecture.

1. Why is war a relatively rare occurrence?

2. Why does the absence of a central authority usually lead states to bargain to resolve their conflicts?

3. How does poor and incomplete information contribute to the likelihood of war?

4. How do commitment problems affect the likelihood that war will occur?

5. What makes a good indivisible, and how do indivisible goods affect the possibility of war?

6. In what way in the city of Jerusalem an indivisible good, and how does its indivisibility affect the possibility of a peaceful settlement to the conflict between Palestinians and Israel?

7. What is the difference between a pre-emptive war and a preventive war?

8. Explain how World War I was both a pre-emptive war and a preventive war.

9. War gets more attention than peace, even though many disputes between states are settled peacefully. What important international conflicts were resolved without war? What concessions were states able to extract from each other? What prevented these conflicts from escalating into war?

10. One explanation for the long peace of the Cold War is the presence of nuclear weapons. How might nuclear weapons have contributed to the long peace? Could nuclear proliferation today decrease the incidence of violent interstate conflict? What factors would make the peaceful aspects of nuclear weapons less likely to materialise?

WEEK 3 SIMULATION ACTIVITY (20 minutes at end of tutorial)

The focus of this week's initial simulation activity is to understand the impact of World War I on the current Syrian conflict.

Students should have read the required reading on Wattle, a BBC article on Sykes-Picot and the Syrian conflict. If they have not, it may be necessary to let students take a few of the initial 10 minutes of simulation time to skim the article.

10 minutes: Divide students into pairs. If there is an odd number of students one group of 3 students will have to be formed. Student should discuss and answer three questions. These questions can either be projected onto the screen or written on the white board.

- How was your actor involved in/or affected by WWI?
- What is your actor's position on the existence of the state of Syria?
- Does your actor's position converge or diverge with other actors' positions?

10 minutes: Have a group discussion of what their answers were and how this ties into the reading and lecture.

WEEK 4: Domestic Politics and War

Overall goals for Week 4 tutorial

Monday's **lecture** is not being held this week because it is Canberra Day. Wednesday will be the only lecture and I encourage all Monday students to attend Wednesday's lecture if there is space in the lecture hall. If not they should watch it on Echo 360.

This week's main **case study** for the lecture is the conflict in Afghanistan, focusing specifically on the years 2001 to 2017. Please make sure to highlight in tutorial discussions the potential domestic reasons for US, Australia and others becoming involved (and/or leaving) this conflict.

This week also sees the first series of student role profiles for the **simulation**. The students who represent the six state actors (Iran, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, US) should have uploaded their written role profile to Wattle before tutorial. Do make sure that students are familiar about what should be included in these profiles and how they can post to their tutorial forum. Also make sure to mark down in the Gradebook whether students have uploaded and presented their role profiles by marking a 1 for the role profile column. You can narrow the list of students presented in the gradebook by using one of the dropdown menus to the particular tutorial you want to record. Also make sure to keep up to date with recording tutorial attendance on Wattle as well.

Student role **presentations** should be no more than 3 minutes each. Please monitor the time and let students know (politely and as discretely as possible) when their time is done. Students often think that they will not be able to fill that much time, but once they get started time flies by quicker than they realise. Presentations should also address the impact of domestic politics on the actor's objectives. If students' presentations do not touch on domestic politics, this would be a useful opportunity for the tutor to ask a follow-up question addressing domestic issues.

Also make sure that students are familiar with the resources we have on Wattle and remind them to complete their weekly quizzes. Since all tutorial do have computers or computer projectors (with your laptop), it might be worth showing students around Wattle a bit. For Weeks 1 and 2, we had roughly 10% of the students not complete their quizzes.

FLS Chapter 4 summary

This chapter analyzes how domestic interests who value the costs and benefits of war influence international politics. This requires differentiating between **general** (national) interests and **particular interests**. Conflicts between states often arise from the interests of domestic actors within them, and these interests include more than the basic need for physical security.

Differentiating between national and particular interests is complex in practice. Institutions and interactions determine which interests will be the most likely to influence foreign policy. Institutions determine which groups have formal power within the government and constrain interactions between actors. Institutions provide the rules through which the bureaucracy and interest groups interact.

In general, the **logic of collective action** predicts that small groups with much at stake will enjoy greater political pressure and access than the majority facing dispersed costs.

Elected and unelected leaders of political institutions attempt to promote their political agenda and their hold on office. Politicians may pursue an aggressive foreign policy as a diversionary tactic, asking citizens to "rally round the flag" and ignore dissatisfaction with government. The less secure the leader, the greater the diversionary incentive. Leaders must consider how their decisions impact the interests that keep them in power. Leaders listen to interest groups that control their fate. Regime type matters in who these interest groups will be in a given country.

The **political benefits of war in domestic politics impact the bargaining range**. The cost of war to political leaders is measured against the potential benefits. When political benefits are high, this changes the bargaining range. Even if the leader of one state expected large political benefits from waging war, these benefits would be sufficient to cause war only if they outweighed the war costs to both sides.

War imposes domestic costs as well as benefits. The outcome of war is not certain and depends on the actions of the target states. The costs of war increase as the conflict drags on, creating domestic political problems for leaders. The mutual benefits available through negotiation also reduce the value of diversionary conflicts.

Bureaucratic actors include agencies with a stake in foreign policy issues. These actors have considerable information and expertise.

The **military** may favor war, as it serves their institutional mission, necessitates larger budgets, and offers avenues for personal advancement. But war, especially a lost war, also imposes costs on the military. The institutions of the state determine how much control the military may have. The more democratic a state, the less the military is able to determine whether the state goes to war.

Private actors with an interest in foreign policy include economic and ethnic groups. Foreign investors may seek protection of over-seas assets. Countering the pro-war interest groups are economic actors who depend on peace for commerce and investment. Ethnic groups may seek to influence policy in favor of the ethnic homeland country.

The interactions between **interest groups** in each state determine how much influence groups will have on decisions of war and peace. State institutions play a role in framing these interactions, but other factors such as the organizational effectiveness of the interest groups also matter. Better-organized groups with concentrated interests are better able to impact policies (especially in democratic states) compared to large and poorly organized groups.

The **democratic process** forces some alignment between the interests of the ruling elite and the mass public. Liberal democracy is defined by three necessary conditions—contestation, participation by a large portion of citizenry, and constitutional limits on the powers of governments to violate individual rights. The political cost of losing the war is higher and more certain than in a less responsive system. The more accountable political leaders are to the broad population of the state, the higher the political cost of war. Greater costs of war narrow the list of objectives that the democratic state is willing to fight for, thereby increasing the chance of a peaceful settlement. Therefore, war is unlikely among mature democracies. This restraint does not hold when democracies confront an authoritarian state.

Figure 4.3 demonstrates the role of domestic actors in changing the bargaining space in a conflict over territory. The relative balance of domestic interests can change the bargaining range from what one would expect if considering only national interests.

Democratic systems require greater **transparency** in government. This lowers the cost of gathering information for partners in bargaining with the democratic state. This can increase the credibility of the positions taken by leaders in democratic states. Would a world of democratic states experience no war? The **democratic peace** suggests that the answer is yes. However, there have been periods, such as the 1930s and 1970s, when many democratic regimes collapsed. Another such reversal in the increasing number of democratic states could make war more likely. It is also possible that the spread of democracy could empower publics that have a high tolerance for war against ethnic or religious rivals in other states.

Discussion

The United States killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist group, in a raid in May 2011. Was this the equivalent of assassinating the leader of a state? How has the response by Al Qaeda differed from that of the response likely to have come from a state whose leader was assassinated? Does the institutional makeup of Al Qaeda make it fundamentally different from a state?

Discussion questions (to use if needed to provoke discussion amongst students)

1. The understandings of domestic politics and war in this chapter build on and extend the models developed in Chapter 3. How do domestic interests coincide or contrast with the causes of war from outside of the state? For example, are some types of states more likely than others to engage in brinksmanship and

other hard negotiation tactics? What groups and societies are more likely to hide information or be less credible? What regime types are best at communicating national resolve?

2. Would an attempt by an Australian PM to start a war to generate a rally effect be effective or not? What factors would make such an effort more likely to succeed? What elements of society, the media, and the government might undermine an attempt to create a rally effect?

3. President Eisenhower warned against the influence of the "military-industrial complex" on US foreign policy. As one of a series of interest groups with a stake in foreign policy, is the military and its related corporate and political interests powerful enough to make a country more bellicose in its foreign policy? What types of interest groups push against a more bellicose foreign policy? When are the voices of pacifism likely to be louder than the voices of belligerence?

4. List some reasons why the military bureaucracy would have an interest in promoting war and when it would be more cautious than the general public in the decision to go to war. Apply these insights to a recent conflict, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the military intervention in Libya in 2011. Would this same logic apply in the case of the recent intervention against Islamic State?

WEEK 4 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

Role profile presentations: State actors

State actors should have uploaded their written role profile to Wattle before tutorial. Six state actors present their role profile—Iran, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, US.

Presentations should be no more than 3 minutes each. Please monitor the time and let students know (politely and as discretely as possible) when their time is done.

Presentations should also address the impact of domestic politics on the actor's objectives. If students' presentations do not touch on domestic politics, this would be a useful opportunity for the tutor to ask a follow-up question addressing domestic issues.

WEEK 5: Political institutions and war

Overall goals for Week 5's tutorial

Students' top priorities for this week's tutorial are likely to be (1) presenting their role if assigned and (2) being clear what is on the midterm. Therefore, some of the substance might get short shrift, but do try to cover what you can. There is guidance below regarding the midterm in the discussion section.

Substantively this week focuses on how states can create institutional mechanisms to either avoid violent conflict or maximize their chance of survival or success if violent conflict breaks out. Like the reading, the lecture focuses on alliance formation and collective security organisations. There is little this week about institutional design of international organisations or regimes as this topic is covered after the break.

FLS Chapter 5 summary

This chapter focuses on how international institutions affect the interactions between states as they try to cooperate to prevent or stop conflict. Alliances and collective security organizations both influence whether outsiders will intervene in the event of war. They play a role in the process of bargaining before the onset of conflict and the bargaining that seeks to end conflict once it has begun.

Alliances are institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of a war. They specify how their members will come to one another's assistance and under what conditions. Their principal purpose is to signal common interests and increase the credibility of promises of mutual assistance to influence the actions of third states. Alliances can be offensive or defensive in nature. Alliances form when their states have compatible interests that provide the basis of cooperation. In situations in which the capabilities of blocks of states are relatively equal, alliances are sometimes formed as part of an effort to create or preserve a *balance* of power. An alternative motivation to form alliances is *bandwagoning*: a desire to join the winning side in a conflict.

Alliances succeed when they are backed by common interests, the adversary is convinced of commitment, and alliance partners' potential opportunistic (or entrapment) behavior is limited. Alliances influence the bargaining interaction between states by influencing the states' beliefs about what third parties will do. This means that they are subject to concerns about the credibility of the commitments by allies.

A concern with alliances is that ironclad commitments can lead allies to be bolder than they would normally be. The protection of alliance commitments may lead to riskier behavior. This requires that alliances accept a trade-off between the credibility of alliances and the control over allies' behavior.

A balance-of-power approach may explain the long peace of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact divided Europe into capitalist and communist alliances. The bipolar alliance structure contributed to the lack of direct conflict between the superpowers.

Collective security can be understood as a universal defensive alliance. Institutions such as the League of Nations or the United Nations disallow the aggressive use of military force by considering any attack by one member to be an attack on the entire community. When faced with war against all other states in the system, aggressors should be deterred from starting conflicts. The definition of collective security has expanded since the creation of the United Nations to include intervention in the case of civil wars and in cases of gross violations of human rights such as genocide leading to a number of humanitarian interventions since 1947.

Like all public goods, optimal provision of peace faces problems of free riding and leadership coordination. States may contribute their votes towards condemning an aggressor, but actions such as enforcing sanctions, providing peacekeepers or supplying troops are politically costly and states may attempt to avoid honoring their commitments in the hope that other states may bear the costs of enforcement.

To cope with the problem of leadership coordination, the UN vests decision power with the most powerful states in the Security Council. Although this often leads to inaction, any actions approved by the council credibly reflect the desire of the most powerful members.

The Security Council authorizes peacekeeping operations. Lightly armed soldiers under the UN command occupy a buffer zone that separates exhausted combatants who have agreed to a cease-fire. The "Blue Helmet" UN soldiers avoid combat and try to build confidence with the warring parties.

Collective security depends on the agreement of its members on the shared interest in response to crises. This is a major reason for the relatively weak collective security efforts during the Cold War, when two of the P5 nations were opposed to each other in many cases.

When parties to the conflict do not consent to a neutral peacekeeping mission, the council may authorize **peace enforcement**.

The United Nations often fails to act to preserve the public good of security (or sometimes it acts too late) in cases where there is a lack of commitment by member states. In the absence of a compelling interest in action, the UN can find it difficult to reach decisions and implement them. It is at best an imperfect institution, hampered by issues of sovereignty and great-power competition.

Discussion

The mid-term exam will take place on Monday 27 March at 3:30pm. The exam will consist of 15 minutes reading time followed by 90 minutes for the exam. The exam will cover all readings and lectures from week 1 to week 5, inclusive.

Mid-term exam breakdown

Task	Marks	Time
15 multiple choice questions	30 Two marks per question	30 minutes
5 short answer questions *All questions must be answered.*	30 Six marks per question	30 minutes
1 essay *Students will choose one of five questions.*	40	30 minutes
TOTAL	**100**	**90 minutes**

Key points for exam revision

The exam will cover all material from lectures and readings in the textbook introduction and chapters 1 to 5, inclusive. The exam is designed to test students on key IR terms and concepts discussed in lecture and in the textbook – not on knowledge of specific case studies that have been raised. All key terms and concepts in the textbook are noted in the margins, as well as at the end of each chapter. Students should be familiar with these terms.

Short-answer questions will test students on central ideas introduced in Weeks 1 through 5 and discussed in tutorials. Responses to short-answer questions will be short, the response need not be more than one paragraph, and do not need to be structured like an essay. They are designed to give students a chance to demonstrate their knowledge of key concepts covered in the weeks so far. The essay should be well-structured with an introduction that outlines key points that will be discussed, a clear discussion of all key points in separate paragraphs, and a conclusion.

Discussion questions (if needed, which is not likely)

1. UN members have been able to agree to collective-security measures only twice in the institution's history: Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1991. Why is collective security such a difficult concept to enforce? What made it easier to enforce in these cases? In what other cases did collective security fail, and why?

2. On the eve of World War I, states did honor their alliance commitments and went to war. Yet theoretically, alliances are a tool to balance power and prevent war. Explain the discrepancy between theory and practice. Why did the pre–World War I alliances fail to prevent the war? If a collective-security organization had existed, would it have been more effective in preventing war?

3. Historically, the United Nations supported a small number of peacekeeping operations. However, after 1990, the United Nations not only moved to more aggressive peace enforcement, but also dramatically expanded the number, scope, and length of such operations. What explains the shift?

4. After the 9/11 attacks in the United States, NATO invoked the principle that the US had been the target of an attack and that the alliance would collectively respond. Despite this, NATO support for the American war against terrorism has been mixed. Similar efforts against Al Qaeda and the group calling itself the Islamic State have faced similar problems of alliance cohesion. What challenges to non-state actors are present in the use of alliances to promote peace in the international sys- tem?

5. Peacekeeping forces are typically small, lightly armed, and lack a mandate to use force. How can such small and weak forces prevent conflict between better-armed belligerents? How effective has peacekeeping been in keeping the peace? What are the limitations of peacekeeping agreements? What does this suggest about the ability of peacekeepers to resolve the conflicts of interest that create such conflicts in the first place?

6. Alliances are only as effective as the credibility of their commitments. How do alliance members signal that they will honor these costly commitments in times of conflict? What function do these actions play in providing information to potential adversaries?

WEEK 5 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

Role profile presentations: International actors

International actors should have uploaded their written role profile to Wattle before tutorial. Four state actors should present their role profile (Australia [representing the UNSC), European Union, Red Crescent [SARC], United Nations).

If your tutorial is on a Tuesday, then you will have to work in the additional presentations from Week 4 as outlined in this document above.

Presentations should be no more than 3 minutes each. Please monitor the time and let students know (politely and as discretely as possible) when their time is done.

Presentations should address the impact of the actor's role their role as an international actor on their objectives. If students' presentations do not touch on domestic politics, this would be a useful opportunity for the tutor to ask a follow-up question addressing domestic issues.

WEEK 6: Civil war and terrorism

Overall goals for Week 6's tutorial

This is midterm week, so students are likely to be worried about how they did on the midterm. We are not sharing copies of the midterm even after the midterm occurred. We are also not returning examination papers, although they will be available if students want to look to see how they did on a section after the teaching break. Hopefully there might be time for you to try and address any questions or concerns that students had about the exam. You can also let them know that the exams are blind marked and randomly distributed by Jessica and I to particular tutors. Given that the exam is in five different locations, it is not feasible for us to be available during the reading period to answer student questions. Indeed, I will not be able to collect the exams until we receive them in our administrative offices downstairs. We will be letting you know as soon as the exams are ready to be picked up from my office. We will need to write down all the uni ids from the exams you take out so we can be sure we receive all of them back. We will also be giving you a handout with the correct multiple choice answers and guidance for what to look for in the short answer and essay questions. Please use the grade breakdown in the exam and write the totals for the three sections and the final grade on the front cover of the exam booklet. Also, be sure to return your graded exams to me or Jessica as soon as you are done with them. We ask for all exams to be returned to us by the end of business on **Tuesday 4 April**. This deadline is necessary so that I have the time to moderate over 550 exams and eight tutors. I will then release grades on Wattle during the second week of teaching break.

This week's lecture and reading topic is one of the closest to my research interests (the other is human rights), so some of the lecture material will be from my own research and experience. I'm focusing on the case study of the DRC conflict while Keiran will be presenting a case study of Abkhazia based on his research there. This is the last week of the causes of war before we move to political economy. Hopefully by now students have a firm foundation for understanding the causes of war, the difficulties in resolving them, and their impact on domestic and international politics. These foundations will help students understand the topics in the rest of the semester as they represent a relaxation of the assumption that national security is the fundamental (indeed only) interest of nation-states.

FLS Chapter 6 summary

The tools used to explain interstate violence shed considerable light on violence by non-state actors. These actors have interests that bring them into conflicts with states; and information asymmetries, commitment problems, and indivisible goods can lead these conflicts to escalate to the use of force. Nevertheless, non-state actors face an important challenge that states do not need to face—a collective action problem. This problem centers on building a working organization—they must identify individuals and groups that share their interests, and persuade them to take risky actions, such as engaging in violence, to advance these interests.

Civil wars are armed conflicts between groups for the control of a state. Often this is the government fighting one or more groups in rebellion against it. In some cases, this can involve several groups fighting to control a state whose government has collapsed (see Chapter 3.) The causes and effects of civil wars often cross international borders. Foreign states often intervene in civil wars, and such wars can produce flows of refugees that burden neighboring states.

Both **grievances** and **greed** can drive rebellions. Groups can more easily organize when they are bound together by strong ethnic or religious ties, when they share a sense of injustice, or have access to resources they can use to finance rebellion. Countries are more likely to experience an armed rebellion when they are not democratic, are poor, or have mountains, jungles, or large populations that make it difficult to root out rebels. International drivers of rebellion include intervention by foreign states. Civil wars can become **proxy wars** in which outside states or organizations back sides in the civil conflict.

Rebellions over territory generally fall into two types: **irredentism** or **separatism**. In separatism, a group seeks to create its own independent state on the disputed territory. In irredentism, a rebel group seeks to join the disputed territory to a neighboring state.

Nearly all states have some groups that are disaffected. To move from disaffection to rebellion requires more than the presence of grievance and greed. Three key factors are often used to explain the emergence of violent groups: the features of the disaffected *group*, the features of the *state* in which the group resides, and the features of the international *system*.

Civil wars often reflect a **contagion effect** that appears in the form of geographic clusters of civil wars. Civil conflict can spill across borders and this manifests in a process that appears like the spread of disease.

The potential for civil violence arises when (1) there are groups of people within the country motivated by greed or grievances that put their interests in conflict with those of the government; (2) those people cannot pursue their grievances through regular political institutions; and (3) those people can, owing to their own resources, foreign support, and/or the state's weakness, overcome the collective action problem to recruit enough fighters and purchase enough weaponry to pose a threat.

Conflicts between a rebel group and the authorities can be resolved through negotiations that avoid the costs of war. Information asymmetries, commitment problems, and indivisibilities can interfere with such bargaining. Civil conflicts have several characteristics that make them particularly difficult to resolve peacefully.

Insurgency (a form of asymmetric warfare) and counterinsurgency (COIN) are common strategies pursued in civil wars. Insurgency is the use of small, lightly armed units to engage in hit-and-run attacks against a range of targets. COIN is a collection of policies designed to counter insurgent actions during a conflict.

Third parties can help to prevent or end civil conflict by helping to resolve commitment problems by, for example, guaranteeing the safety of demobilized rebels or creating new institutions that facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence against noncombatant targets by individuals, states, or non-state groups for political ends. Terrorist organizations are often perceived as irrational. They often hold views that are not widely shared. They often are willing to pay a personal price that is higher than the perceived returns. Finally, terrorists sometimes attack targets that appear to be selected at random.

Terrorist organizations are weaker than the states they oppose and they typically have goals that are large relative to their capabilities. Terrorists attack civilians in part to compensate for these weaknesses. Terrorist groups, like states, use violence to impose costs on their opponents to elicit concessions. As is the case for interstate relations, incomplete information, commitment problems, and indivisibilities make it difficult for terrorists and governments to agree. It is difficult for targets to collect accurate information about terrorist groups because they are covert and because the terrorists have incentives to exaggerate.

Commitment problems also make it particularly difficult to resolve disputes peacefully with terrorists. Terrorist groups worry that disarming will expose them to capture and reneging on concessions by the more powerful target. Governments may be reluctant to strike deals with terrorist groups that cannot reliably control the use of violence by all their members. The political goals of terrorists are often seen as extreme because they involve claims to indivisible goods.

Terrorist groups use four **strategies** to achieve their objectives: coercion, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. States have a range of strategies available to prevent terrorism: deterrence, preemptive attacks, defense of potential targets of terrorism, criminalization, and negotiation.

Discussion questions (if needed)

1. Non-state actors that engage in political violence, such as insurgents or terrorist groups, must overcome powerful collective action problems. That is, they must develop mechanisms for persuading individuals to join their groups and take risky actions to further the goals of the group. What mechanisms are discussed in the chapter? Can these mechanisms be applied to other groups that use violence, such as criminal groups? What differences do groups pursuing political objectives face that groups with criminal or nonpolitical objectives do not face?

2. Terrorism is one form of action that can be undertaken to achieve political ends. Insurgents may sometimes use terrorist tactics as part of their efforts to undermine and defeat their enemies. Despite the use of similar tactics, it is generally acceptable for states to negotiate with insurgent groups, while negotiation with terrorist groups is unacceptable. Given the discussion of these two kinds of non-state violence, why have states treated these kinds of opponents so differently?

3. Civil wars and non-state conflict kill and displace millions of people each year. Does the international community have an obligation to expend more effort to prevent these types of conflict? What would such an effort look like? How would such efforts overcome the problems of collective action that would arise in any such effort?

WEEK 6 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

Role profile presentations: Non-state actors and Assad Regime
Non-state actors and Assad Regime should have uploaded their written role profile to Wattle before tutorial. Four non-state actors and Assad Regime present their role profile (Free Syria Army (FSA), ISIS, Jaysh al-Islam, Kurdish PYD, and Assad Regime). Presentations should be no more than three minutes each. Please monitor the time and let students know (politely and as discretely as possible) when their time is done.

Presentations should address the impact of the actor's role as a non-state actor on their objectives (or their role as the government of the state with a civil war). If students' presentations do not touch on how these groups motivations tie into the week's reading on the causes of violence by rebel or terrorist groups (or how states respond to such threats), this would be a useful opportunity for the tutor to ask a follow-up question addressing these issues.

WEEK 7: The politics of trade and finance

Week 7 Overview

There is no Monday **lecture** due to the Easter holiday. Therefore, the only lecture will be held on Wednesday. The case studies are of the WTO, IMF and global citizenship. The later topic is by suggestion of April Biccum with give a partial **guest lecture** this week during the second hour. Dr. Biccum used to teach POLS1005 until this year, and so it is good to be able to keep her involved in this class for a bit longer.

During lecture, I will be including some results from the **mid-semester survey** as well as the **midterm**. Exams will have been released during break so some discussion of overall topics and difficulties with the midterm are likely. During tutorial, feel free to spend a bit of time answering any questions that students might have about the midterm. Because some students have deferred exams later in Week 7, **please do not discuss specific questions during tutorial.** I will also be touching on the scheduling of the final exam (if the schedule is released by then), and I will mention that the final exam will be of similar format to the midterm but longer in all parts as it is scheduled to last two hours.

FLS Chapter 7: International trade summary

Trade stands at the intersection between domestic and international politics. It involves powerful interests at all levels of economic organization. While we often discuss trade in terms of nations, trade really involves many individuals and firms with well-defined interests. Trade is thus the product of the melding of interests, interactions, and institutions on a global level. The liberal theory of **comparative advantage** proves a compelling rationale for trade liberalization. Specialization through the division of labor promotes economic efficiency through greater access to resources and by achieving economies of scale.

Countries differ greatly in the degree to which they are endowed with various **"factors of production"** such as land, labor, and capital. Socioeconomic actors within a state are often associated with different factors of production. The **Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory** predicts that countries will export goods that make use of abundant factors and import goods that require scarce factors. Wealthy countries export capital-intensive products to poor ones. Labor-rich countries such as China export labor-intensive products. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory provides a rough but generally accurate description of export patterns.

While powerful arguments exist that demonstrate the broad, overall benefits of free trade, restrictions on trade are the norm, not the exception. The narrow costs and benefits to specific groups lead these groups to restrict trade for their own benefit, and to the cost of everyone else, leading to a phenomenon called **protectionism**. Tariffs, quotas, nontariff barriers, and subsidies are the most common type of trade-distorting policies used in the practice of protectionism. Trade restrictions benefit some groups in society while harming the economic interests of others. Trade barriers have benefits and costs. The most direct cost of protection is paid by consumers of the protected good in the form of higher prices. Trade protection thus has redistributive effects, shifting consumer income to the producer of the protected good. Trade barriers and protectionism may also be pursued as a means to other ends. John Maynard Keynes argued that the evils of protectionism were an acceptable price in order to promote policies such as full employment during the Great Depression.

Domestic actors who influence trade policy include firms competing against imports, exporting firms, and, less frequently, consumers. The latter two groups benefit from liberalization, while import-competing actors can realize rents through protection. Within any country there will be groups that benefit from trade protections and those who are harmed by them. There are often many groups with incompatible interests in trade policy.

The **Stopler-Samuelson theorem** holds that protection will benefit the scarce factor of production and hurt abundant factors. If a country is high in the labor factor and restricts labor, those persons involved

in the labor sector suffer as do the consumers of the goods produced. In contrast, the **Ricardo-Viner specific-factors theory** recognizes that owners of land, labor, and capital are often tied to a particular economic sector or industry and that they seek policies that favor their specific sector more than their general type of factor.

The logic of collective action holds that smaller groups often enjoy political advantages, in turn suggesting that economic sectors enjoy an organizational advantage vis-a-vis class interests. However, the organization of interests varies across countries. **Interest groups** seeking protection do so at the expense of the general welfare in the form of redistribution and efficiency loss. Generally, a broad-based system of national representation should reflect better **public interest** concerns and decrease protectionism, but such institutions are limited by the organizational challenges of collective action. While electoral institutions vary widely, in most democratic countries concentrated benefits and costs make it easier for sector and factor-based groups to organize when compared to groups representing the country or its consumers as a whole.

In international trade the simultaneous domestic political processes of multiple states can make **cooperation** difficult by raising the costs of coordination. Governments set trade policy while taking into account how other governments will respond. International cooperation in trade is subject to the same limitations that plague cooperation in other areas. Gaining international cooperation can be expensive and difficult. In particular, states have strong incentives to **free ride** on the open trading of other states.

States overcome these problems through a range of strategies: 1) **small numbers**: limiting organizations to a few members reduces the coordination problems. 2) **information**: institutions can improve the flow of information between members. 3) **repeated interaction** between governments: frequent interaction can increase trust and build avenues of communication to reduce future problems. 4) **linking**: linking of issues across sectors can allow costs and benefits to be shifted to limit the specific economic costs.

Promises of mutual restraint in protectionism can fail in the face of distrust and the creation of new forms of protectionism. **International institutions** can overcome such problems, particularly when they are managed by a small group of countries, when they allow transparency and an exchange of information and when they establish a long history of repeated interactions that may link concessions in one area to another. The trade regime since World War II has proven successful in addressing these problems. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) set standards of behavior, allowed an exchange of information and resolve disputes. Both institutions centered on the norm of reciprocal liberalization where liberalizing efforts of others would be matched and countries extended trading privileges to all in the club.

Reporting requirements and trade reviews of countries make accessible information and allow monitoring of fellow members. The WTO has a more formalized dispute-resolution process than the GATT. Many regional trade agreements also serve to set standards, share information and resolve disputes.

FLS Chapter 8: International financial relations summary

International investment has many dimensions. Individuals and groups are divided in how they perceive international investment. The investment impacts groups unevenly, generating tension over how to respond to it. International institutions structure the relationships between groups in international finance, however the ways in which they do so are controversial.

Foreign investment can be classified into two types, **portfolio and direct investment**. Loans and equity are examples of portfolio investments; investors enjoy a fairly secure right to some rate of return but have no say in how the debtor manages funds. Sovereign lending (lending by private entities to sovereign governments) is a substantial part of portfolio investment in developing nations. In **Foreign Direct Investment** (FDI), companies build (or buy) with their own funds productive facilities in other countries. In FDI the investor has control over the asset, but assumes the risks associated with the asset.

In developed countries, capital is relatively more abundant than in developing states. **Developing states** face a shortage of capital, making returns to capital larger but also riskier. Direct investment in developing and emerging markets has grown in recent years to two-thirds of foreign investment. This has been driven largely by FDI from multinational corporations. Lenders in capital-abundant countries can realize greater rates of return by taking their money abroad where interest rates are higher, reflecting the scarcity of capital. (See the Heckscher-Ohlin theory in Chapter 7, page 295.) Borrowers benefit from getting foreign loans cheaper than prevailing national rates.

In cases of **concessional finance**, international organizations loan money at rates below the market rate as a form of aid to developing nations. This aid often comes from the World Bank and similar organizations. Concessional finance normally comes with strict restrictions on its use.

International investment presents risks for all parties in the process. Borrowing governments can use foreign capital to foster new economic sectors or create public goods (i.e., education or transportation infrastructure) that will yield future economic growth and tax revenues to pay off the debt. When government revenues fall or interest payments increase, the borrowing government may have to increase tax collection, raise interest rates, and cut spending on social services. Lending institutions and corporations face a range of risks from losses in the marketplace and from political changes in the host country. When a host government cannot pay its loans, political pressure to renegotiate or default can grow.

If a state becomes overburdened by debt, the policies needed to maintain debt payments can lead to a recession or depression in that state. In extreme cases the burden can be great enough that a country must default on its debt by failing to continue to make payments.

Domestic politics can worsen the basic economic tensions present in international investment. While there are few problems when economies are prospering, crises can lead to problems as debtors struggle to maintain payments and lenders push for repayment. Debtors hope to reduce the amounts that they must pay, while creditors favor repayment in full. Debtors can threaten to default, and creditors can threaten to cut off future lending.

The **bargaining interactions** between lenders and debtors have the same form as bargaining in other areas: both sides have incentives to restructure the debt and realize at least some of their interests. This is like bargaining over outcomes in the context of war in Chapter 3. The role of the **IMF** is to address commitment problems through supplying information and reinforcing commitments among its members. In practice, it tends to act most often in crises in developing-country economies, normally promoting a program of austerity, leading critics to see its role not as providing neutral information but as representing the interests of lenders at a the expense of borrowers.A series of recent borrowing and debt crises since the 1990s in countries of many different types from Ireland and Greece to Argentina and Russia, to Indonesia and Thailand have shown the potential problems with the current system.

Multinational corporations (MNC) may engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) to gain access to markets or resources. MNCs can shift investment and production to gain the best return on their capital. MNCs' efforts to maximize return on investment can lead to political problems in the home country. Groups may see "outsourcing" of jobs as bad for the home country and seek limits on MNCs' ability to invest abroad. MNCs may also be criticized for seeing re- turns on investment at the expense of environmental, social, or other noneconomic goals of various groups in the home country.

Foreign direct investment lacks a centralized international institution analogous to the IMF. Host countries can regulate MNCs as they wish, although they may risk losing investment. Numerous bilateral investment treaties offer information and commitment guarantees for MNCs. MNC-driven investment can also be fleeting as the drive for returns causes MNCs to shift production as market conditions shift. Rising wages in Latin America and China have made South Asian countries like Vietnam more attractive. Some MNCs adopt voluntary codes of corporate conduct, such as the United Nation's Global Compact. One branch of the World Bank, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Association, provides insurance against the risks of FDI. However, the regime for FDI is far less developed than that for international lending.

Labour, too, responds to differences in its supply across countries. Large immigration flows occurred during the nineteenth-century globalization, as millions of people left Europe and Asia for less populated countries. Despite increased restrictions, today millions of people migrate, most often from labor-rich countries to those scarce in labor. The political economy of **immigration** can be complex as many factors (economic, cultural, social, political, etc.) can be involved. Countries may need young workers to maintain a tax base that can support a welfare state, but the population may feel nervous if these immigrants seem culturally different. Controversy arises as labor-importing countries debate the potential losses in employment and wages versus the gains of supplying the economy with labor to lower the cost of production and services. At times, interests that compete with immigrants (i.e., labor) may organize and pressure governments to increase immigration restrictions. Others voicing concerns that immigrants pose a cultural threat may join them.

Possible discussion topic

Review the different means of trade protection: import tariffs, export tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints, subsidies for domestic industries, government procurement policies, and regulations concerning health, safety, and environment. Have students come up with an example for each. Who benefits and who loses from each policy?

Reading questions

1. Why does a political system grant trade protection to some groups but not to others? In Australia, which competing trade groups receive protection and which ones do not? In a democracy, should not everyone be able to get the same amount of trade protection? Or should a democracy seek to keep an even playing field by offering no protection?

2. When politicians speak of the need for trade protection, it is rare that anyone points out the increased costs consumers will pay as a result. In essence, the leadership promises to transfer wealth from a large number of voters to the hands of a relative few. How do governments create trade protection for a minority at the expense of the majority, or at least a much larger group, of voters? Why does the majority not object? Why do politicians who propose trade protection get reelected?

3. In Australian politics today, do debates over trade divide society according to factors of production (by class or Stolper-Samuelson) or specific factors (by sector or Ricardo-Viner)? Consider the debates over the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). To what extent do these debates support these theories?

4. The theory of comparative advantage suggests that each country should focus on the kinds of production that it does most efficiently. Would such a policy imply that the country should never diversify into new products? How would disruptive technologies impact a country's comparative advantage? Do countries have to work to build and maintain a comparative advantage?

6. Trade openness has made the lives of billions of people better, but states continue to work to restrict trade in favor of narrow interests. In a world where democratic states are theoretically working to the benefit of their citizenries, why is there so little effort put forth to promote more open trade? What is it about the melding of interests, interactions, and institutions in trade that work to reduce general economic growth in favor of narrow interests?

7. Despite the higher returns possible from investing in poor countries, most investment flows from wealthy country to wealthy country. What factors other than the scarcity of capital contribute to this? Why do borrowers in wealthy countries sometimes not borrow from investors in their own country? Why is it that most of the conflict over international investment concerns not flows from wealthy country to wealthy country, but from wealthy country to poor country?

8. Like international trade, international finance does not benefit all groups in society equally. This leads to political divisions over international finance, especially in times of crisis. What groups benefit most from the inflow of capital into an economy? How are these groups affected in cases where the debt repayments become unsustainable? How does the political conflict between these groups influence policy regarding investment?

9. This week's reading discusses the role of the International Monetary Fund in facilitating lending to developing countries. Without an implicit IMF guarantee of repayment, would investors have been more cautious in lending to these countries, thereby averting the cycle of boom and bust? Consider the 1994 Mexican crisis or the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Does the same logic apply to lending to developed states? Consider the Eurozone crisis that began in 2008-9.

10. What economic factors motivate multinational corporations (MNCs) to engage in foreign direct investment? To what extent do MNC investment sites follow the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade?

11. The welcome received by multinational corporations from less developed countries has varied over history. At times, developing countries actively seek MNCs, while at other times they severely restrict foreign direct investment. What factors account for the contrasting attitudes?

12. The latest round of WTO negotiations has largely stalled. This represents a large obstacle to further reductions to trade barriers, thus making billions less well off than they would otherwise be. What are the major obstacles to progress in WTO negotiations? Why would states seek positions that they know would make so many people better off? What are the different views of the developing states that are opposed to those of the developed ones?

13. Today, many people who otherwise favor freer international movement of goods and capital oppose relaxing controls on immigration. Is it contradictory to favor the free flow of goods and investment across borders yet advocate for increased government intervention to prevent migration? What are the different costs and benefits of controls on migration, capital, and trade? Are they analytically similar? Politically, do the same groups lose or benefit?

WEEK 7 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

Topic: Economic diplomacy in the Syrian conflict

Stimulus: In February 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations ('UN') wrote to the UN Secretariat of the Department of Sustainable Development stressing the 'necessity of urgent and immediate lifting of all kinds of unilateral economic, financial or trade coercive measures, which imposed, illegally, by certain Member States and Entities against other sovereign Members States… [Because] they impede the full achievement of economic and social development particularly in developing countries'.

Instructions: Students should be broken up into groups of five and asked the four questions below. If there are less than fifteen students in your tutorial, break students up into smaller groups. Tutors should to move between groups and facilitate discussions where necessary. If time allows, bring the discussion back into the entire tutorial for a quick large group recap for the final 5-10 minutes and ask each group to summarise some of the points they discussed. However, if discussion is free-flowing, the large group recap can be skipped. Summarise points on the white board for students' reference.

Questions:

1. Has your actor pursued sanctions against the Syrian regime? If not, think about your position on sanctions toward Syria.

2. What economic or political leverage does your actor possess to pressure the international community to either retain or lift the sanctions on the Syrian regime?

3. Are there other actors that would share your objective to either lift or retain sanctions on the Syrian regime? Who are they?

4. Why might you or other parties have decided to pursue sanctions against Syria?

5. What effect might sanctions have on Syria's economic development?

Guidance: At the minimum, the students representing the USA and the EU should be able to identify they are the main actors pursuing sanctions against the Syrian regime. Russia is generally opposed to sanctions and has vetoed sanctioning resolutions in the Security Council. Students may identify the challenge of enforcing sanctions against non-state actors, such as ISIS.

Primarily, the sanctions targeted Bashar al-Assad to encourage his removal from power. Students may also mention that the sanctions were aimed at preventing arms and equipment that may be used for internal repression, oil embargos – to reduce financial capacity of the Syrian Government, and the freezing assets and travel capabilities of key internal actors both persons and entities. Human rights concerns may also be raised.

Syria now heavily depends on aid; and its economic autonomy has been severely restricted. Sanctions have created hurdles in delivering humanitarian aid and wider stabilisation programmes, impediments in the financial sector as foreign funds are unable to be processed (via the formal financial sector into Syria). Hopefully, students will attempt to link this discussion back to the material for this and next week regarding the wealth and poverty of nations. "[I]nterests, interactions, and institutions at the international level can be responsible for some of the current problems regarding the development of poorer countries" (p. 434). Also see "Is foreign aid the answer?" (p. 447). This may require some prompting from the tutor.

WEEK 8: Economic and political development

Week 8 overview

Former POLS1005 convener April Biccum will be giving a 50-minute guest lecture in both the Monday and Wednesday lecture. I do hope that the material will directly relate to the second half of the lecture, but this is currently unclear. I know that she plans on focusing on discussing global citizenship education and how it related to development. Please try and incorporate this topic to the extent feasible in your tutorial discussion

For the second half of the lecture I will be focusing on the answers to one main question—Why are some countries richer while others are poorer? The lecture and reading are brief summaries of the development literature. The specific case study this week is of the Sustainable Development Goals.

During the second half of tutorial students are focused on pre-conference simulation positioning and trying to find alliances.

FLS Chapter 10 summary

Development is a complex process that shows many different experiences across countries and groups within countries. The diversity of national and group experiences leads to many questions as to the factors that contribute to (or block) development.

While nearly everyone accepts that more development is better than less development, the means of pursuing development are not agreed upon. Further, different approaches have significantly different impacts on a wide array of actors. This means that development is part of a very complex process involving different interests along many dimensions.

Why is development so difficult? Several types of factors are used to explain these difficulties: 1) geographic location, 2) domestic factors, and 3) domestic institutions.

Geography—Geography plays a role in development. Landlocked states with few resources tend to experience less development than countries along waterways that have many resources. Isolated states have less development than those in regions where they have many neighbors.

Domestic factors—Many internal factors interact to promote or impede development. Infrastructure is a key part of development. Ports, rail lines, a working electrical grid, etc. are all important as are good public policies related to health and education. These factors require trade-offs and are subject to significant argument between domestic actors.

Domestic institutions—Institutions matter in development. How institutions form and develop impacts the broader economic and political development of the country. At the same time, interests and interactions are bound with the operation and development of institutions.

Most of the world's population is poor. The percentage of the world living in poverty has decreased over the last quarter century, although the total number of people in poverty has increased as the global population has increased. However, there is significant variation in the success of countries in economic and political development.

One of the principal aims of government development policy is to provide **public goods**. Powerful domestic and foreign actors may prefer not to contribute to public goods and to instead pursue particularistic agendas. Although the wealthy, powerful countries have an interest in promoting development, distributional conflict over the proceeds of investment and uncertainty of sovereign contracts can discourage investment. States may agree that everyone benefits from development; developed states often fear the impact of competition for jobs and investment from developing countries.

The legacy of **colonialism** is often cited as a significant factor in the stalled development of poor states. The institutions developed under colonialism were inherently coercive and did perpetuate a set of relations that benefitted the colonizers at the expense of the colonized, but the legacy of colonialism remains a matter of debate due to the widely differing experiences of postcolonial states.

Another argument for the lack of development among least developed states (LDSs) is that the **international economic system favours the developed states**. As producers of finished goods, the developed states have advantages in terms of trade of their products, leading to a permanent advantage over the LDCs.

Leaders in poor countries complain that **current international institutions do little** to address obstacles to development created by geography, colonial heritage, and terms of trade. Wealthy countries use their influence to shape the rules of institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The **Import-Substituting Industrialization** (ISI) strategy aimed to reduce reliance on imports and to develop economic sectors focused more on industry than on primary products through trade barriers, state-owned industry, and subsidies. ISI policies did not produce sustained economic development.

Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) took the opposite approach and embraced international markets. Governments offered industrialists support to produce for foreign markets. The initial success in the export of low-technology products encouraged industrialists to invest in higher-technology exports such as electronics and ships.

The **Washington Consensus**, which emerged as the dominant approach in the 1990s, stressed liberalization. At times imposed by the IMF and the World Bank as a condition for loans, it prescribed privatization of state-owned enterprises, drastically reducing trade barriers, deregulating the financial sector and opening it up for foreign investment, relaxing rules on foreign direct investment, reducing government spending and its role in the economy, and other liberal policies.

LDCs sought changes in the global institutional order through a variety of efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. Groups like the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement sought to reform global economic institutions in order to favor LDCs at the expense of the developed states, effectively reversing the power relations as they saw them.

Although the proposed New International Economic Order of the 1960s and 70s called for **cartels** for most primary commodities, only the oil cartel seems to have been successful. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has succeeded in getting its members to limit output, thereby raising the price of oil. OPEC succeeded because there are few substitutes for oil and a few member countries control a large share of the world's petroleum.

Foreign aid has not proved to have a large impact on development. The amount of aid given is small compared to development needs. Geopolitical interests of the donor countries focus the aid on a few countries and much of the aid is for military instead of investing in public goods. Aid can fall prey to particular interests in a developing society and not contribute towards economic and political development.

Globalization and integration has become the norm in the last 25 years as developing states have integrated themselves into the global economy. This has not been without crises, however, and significant arguments over distributional issues remain in the management of development.

Possible discussion topics/activities

1. A review of World Bank (or other) statistics shows the disparities across countries in income levels and other standards of human welfare. The "data and research" section of the World Bank's website (http://econ.worldbank.org) offers a host of information, including countries' progress on the UN's Millennium Development Goals. Prepare some contrasts in living standards so that students can appreciate the differences. The Gapminder website (http://www.gapminder.org/tools) also has an interactive graph that I have found students really love to play with. It allows students to see how countries have developed over time according to whichever metrics they chose. They can also select specific countries to race against each other.

2. Why do some groups oppose economic development within developing states? While globalization and openness have spread widely they are fiercely resisted by many people in states at all levels of development. Select an emerging market country (China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, etc.) Divide the class into groups of 5–8 students and assign each group a short summary of the position of a group within the country, with the range of groups covering a variety of positions regarding globalization. How does the relationship between interests, interactions, and institutions manifest in how each of these groups see globalization?

Reading questions

1. In what ways does democracy promote economic development? Conversely, how can economic growth encourage democratic regimes? Does developing one first make developing the other easier?

2. If wealthy countries share an interest with poor ones for LDC economic growth, why do they provide such small amounts of foreign aid? How does the question of foreign aid become enmeshed in the mix of interests, interactions, and institutions in domestic politics?

3. Colonialism ended almost a half century ago. In what ways does the colonial legacy continue to hamper development efforts by LDCs? Do current international institutions mitigate or exacerbate such problems? Illustrate with specific examples.

4. Some factors that contribute to development require levels of capital that are effectively impossible for poor states to accumulate. Good infrastructure and effective education policies require investment over the long-term, occasionally for years before the payoff in more jobs and more tax revenue may come. How does the need to seek funding from international finance markets impact the search for economic development? Is it possible to develop without having to seek outside help and its high costs?

5. In the past decade economic development in emerging markets has been much higher than in developed states. Does this reflect a shift in the economic balance of power towards emerging markets?

6. Through the 1960s and 1970s the LDCs pushed strongly for changes in the international economic order, often without success. Having largely adopted the Washington Consensus, the LDCs have seen greater growth rates, but still have widely different experiences with development. Has the last 25 years ended the potential for LDCs to shift the global economic institutions towards policies that favor development? Or does the growing power of emerging market countries like China mean that developed states will be forced to make changes to accommodate these growing economies?

7. Consider economic development in China. As discussed at various points in the class, China's economy has grown rapidly for the last few decades; also discussed is the fact that China is not a democracy. Most EOI nations saw a shift towards democracy when median incomes rose to the global middle class. As China nears that level of development, will we see the kind of shift towards democracy that we saw in South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries? Or will China's political system value keeping the old guard in power at the expense of the economy as we have seen in countries like Zimbabwe?

8. Economic development brings benefits but can also be a significant disruption to established interests. As development progresses countries are forced to deal with these disruptions within their political institutions. Examine how political systems in emerging market states such as Brazil, India, or Nigeria are coping with the changes that have come with development. How are the interests of various groups reflected in the political systems of these states?

9. What responsibilities do rich countries like Australia have to the global poor?

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WEEK 8 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

The focus of this week's simulation activity is pre-summit positioning. Actors should be divided into the following 4 groups:

- *Group #1*—Turkey, Free Syria Army, Kurdish PYD
- *Group #2*—Russia, Iran, Assad Regime, ISIS
- *Group #3*—EU, SARC, UN, Australia (UNSC)
- *Group #4*—Jaysh al-Islam, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, US

Groups should discuss the following questions for the available 15-20 minutes:

- What are your actor's key objectives and key constraints in relation to the four Peace Summit objectives? (if students need reminding, the four objectives are written on the Peace Summit Communiqué in the students' Simulation Handbook)
- Are there points of agreement in the key objectives of actors in your group?
- Can you devise a joint strategy for achieving these objectives?
- What concessions are you willing to offer to other actors at the conference to achieve those objectives?

The aim of this exercise is for actors to (hopefully) join into coalitions, or blocs to increase their bargaining power. This may require some prompting from tutors. It will be important for each group to take notes and/or collect a list of their respective demands/ concessions and any individual positions in preparation for the Peace Summit the following week. See next week's tutors' notes for more information.

WEEK 9: International law

Week 9 overview

The main activity for this week's tutorial is holding the simulated conference! Please read the simulation description extra closely this week and leave adequate time for preparation before and after tutorial. All our efforts at designing and implementing this simulation will (hopefully) pay off this week.

It is important to note that the lecture and reading material for this week will still be on the final exam. The reading summary and discussion questions here are geared towards helping students understand the material in the hopes of having it contribute to their response paper and final exam preparations.

FLS Chapter 11 summary

International law and norms are institutions that seek to shape how states understand their interests and that constrain how states interact. International law is a body of rules that binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law. It can be self-enforcing where there is sufficient agreement among states regarding the benefits of compliance. It is created in the same manner as other institutions and is subject to a bargaining process. International norms change how individuals and states conceive of what is appropriate behavior among states.

International law and norms bind states and other agents in their relations with one another. **International law** is characterized by varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation. International law is created either through customary international law or through treaties. **Customary international law** is law that develops slowly as states recognize the law as appropriate behavior. **Treaties** are formal agreements that create new laws by explicit agreement of the parties.

Following international law can provide states with benefits by **facilitating international cooperation**. Law facilitates cooperation by setting standards of behavior, helping to verify compliance with precise rules, lowering the costs of decision making, and by man- aging disputes. These aspects can make international law self-enforcing in the sense that states have self-interested reasons for complying with the law.

Significant debate remains over the **impact of international law**. On one hand, most states comply most of the time. On the other, there is little punishment for states that do not comply in most cases.

Enforcement of international laws can be enhanced by the role of dispute-settlement provisions. In some cases, these are enshrined in international organizations such as the WTO. In other cases, domestic courts enforce international legal obligations within their countries.

Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. There are three types: constitutive, procedural, and regulative. **Constitutive** norms define who is a legitimate actor and under what circumstances. **Procedural** norms define how decisions should be made when multiple actors are involved. **Regulative** norms govern the behaviors of actors in their interactions with other actors.

Norms are created and institutionalized when their standards of behavior are seen as morally right and appropriate by a sufficiently large fraction of the relevant population. At times norms may be codified into international law. Norms can also impact behavior by altering the interests of actors in international relations.

Successful efforts to create **new norms** typically occur when individuals or groups known as norm entrepreneurs, such as transnational advocacy networks (TANs), press governments to adopt them. TANs are central to the spread of norms throughout the sys- tem.

The **norm life cycle** consists of three stages: (1) norm entrepreneurs work to convince others to embrace their beliefs, (2) once the norm has been adopted by a critical mass of actors, a norm cascade occurs in which the norm is adopted by nearly all states and other actors, and (3) the norm is internalized.

Norms influence action in two ways. First, they persuade actors to redefine their interests so that they are consistent with the norm. Second, TANs monitor state compliance with international norms, "naming

and shaming" those that violate the norm. Norms can change how states interact as these influences shift the interests and interactions of the states involved.

States can acquire information about compliance with international laws and norms in three ways: self-reporting, directly monitoring the actions of other states, and relying in part on the monitoring of trustworthy third parties, such as TANs.

TANs have strong incentives to monitor closely compliance with the norms that they support, and to convey information about compliance or violation to other states that have the power to punish violators or to reward those who comply**.** In this way TANs act as endorsers and monitors of norms in the international system.

Discussion

There is no discussion this week as the conference takes up all available time.

Reading questions

1. NGOs and TANs have proliferated since 1990. What historical factors account for the rise in transnational pressure groups? Does their increased role come at the expense of other actors in the international system?

2. Often TANs will attract individuals in wealthy countries to support changes in less developed countries (LDCs), particularly for issues of health, environment, and human rights. What impact is this dependence on far-away financial supporters likely to have on the work of the TAN in the host country?

3. Laws exist at both the domestic and international levels. One important difference is that there is no world government to punish violators of international law. One of the roles of well-functioning states is to enforce domestic law within their jurisdiction. This lack of enforcement at the international level leads many to conclude that international law must have no effect on state behavior. But at the domestic level, do individuals comply with law only because they fear punishment by the state? What other reasons might influence them to comply with the law? To what extent might states comply with international law for the same reasons?

4. As noted in the chapter, most states follow the laws of war most of the time. What elements of the Geneva Conventions and other war laws lend themselves to compliance at a time when most other rules are discarded in the interest of winning a conflict?

5. Would it be possible to create a world court that would adjudicate international legal cases without the creation of a world government to enforce its rulings?

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WEEK 9 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

Entire tutorial

Syria Peace Summit May 2017

It will be important to set up the room to facilitate the activity. Student desks should be arranged in a U-shape as for all other tutorials. Jessica and I will prepare table cards with the names of the roles people are playing as an effort to make the situation a bit more realistic. These cards should be reused for all your tutorials

Following on from the pre-conference negotiations last week, students should have already devised alliances and 'voting blocs' going into the Syria Peace Summit this week. The Syria Peace Summit will attempt to draft resolutions on the Summit's four key objectives as outlined in the Peace Summit Communiqué:

- Ceasefire
- Lifting of sanctions
- Humanitarian relief
- Post-conflict political transition

The Syria Peace Summit will be facilitated by the tutor and will be staged as follows:

Time	Activity
5 mins	**Welcome to Summit** The tutor runs through conference agenda, and notes attendees and absences
10 mins	**Working Groups** In the four small groups from Week 8, each group reconvenes to revise their position and devise specific demands and concessions regarding the four summit objectives.
15 mins	**Plenary Session I: Writing up demands and concessions** The tutor facilitates the writing up of each group's demands and concessions. See more detailed instructions below.
15 mins	**Plenary Session II: Discussion of demands and concessions** Using the demands and concessions, the tutor calls on specific actors to propose resolutions or undertakings, to stimulate discussion, the tutor can then ask whether any actors object, or can allow free flowing discussion if this emerges organically.
5 mins	**Drafting of Resolutions and Joint Statement** The tutor fills in a hardcopy of the Joint Statement with the key resolutions reached regarding each of the four objectives. And for which objectives a resolution was not reached. The joint statement is signed by all actors.

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Detailed instructions for tutors per activity

Welcome to Summit
Welcome to the international Peace Summit regarding the ongoing conflict in Syria. We are here today to work towards resolutions and undertakings on the following four objectives: ceasefire; a lifting of sanctions; humanitarian relief; and the post-conflict political transition. Our aim today will be to devise a joint statement outlining our undertakings and resolutions.

The conference will be divided into three sessions. The first session is the working group session. The second session is the plenary session (full group session). And the third session will be the drafting of resolutions. I note (one of the following) all of the actors are present today OR all of the actors are present with the exception of (absent actors). This summit will now commence. I call upon the actors to move into their pre-conference work groups to devise collective and individual demands and concessions to bring to the plenary session.

Working Groups
Give students 5-10 minutes to refresh the demands and concessions devised the previous week.

Plenary Session I: Writing up demands and concessions
The tutor should extract demands and concessions from each group and record them either on a computer that is projected onto a screen (technology permitting) or on the whiteboard.

Tutors, please fill out the table below and send an electronic copy to Rich following tutorials. If you are recording demands and concessions on the whiteboard you can take a picture of the whiteboard and enter it into the table afterwards. These tables are very important for us to be able to comparatively assess the simulation outcome in each tutorial.

Plenary Session II: Discussion of demands and concessions
The tutor should facilitate this discussion as noted above. Tutors, please fill out the table below for each tutorial and email to Rich. You can fill it out during tutorial or take a picture if you are writing on the whiteboard and fill this table out after the tutorials. This is very important for us to be able to comparatively assess the simulation outcome across groups.

Drafting of Resolutions and Joint Statement
The tutor can either print out a hard copy of the Joint Statement of Resolutions (below), one for each tutorial, and fill this in by hand on the spot. Alternatively, the tutor can fill this out on a computer projected onto a screen (technology permitting). Statements from all tutorials should be emailed to Rich.

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Plenary Session I: Demands and concessions

Tutorial Group: #			
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Demands	Demands	Demands	Demands
1.	1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.	3.
Concessions	Concessions	Concessions	Concessions
1.	1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.	3.
Individual positions of actors that fall outside of the Group Position	Individual positions of actors that fall outside of the Group Position	Individual positions of actors that fall outside of the Group Position	Individual positions of actors that fall outside of the Group Position
1.	1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.	3.

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Plenary Session II: Discussion of demands and concessions

Tutorial Group: #		
#	Proposed Resolution regarding the Summit's four key objectives	Objections / Agreement
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		

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Syria Peace Summit

May 2017

Joint Statement of Resolutions

We, the participants in multi-party negotiations at the Syria Peace Summit of May 2017, Australia (representing UNSC), Assad Regime, European Union (EU), Free Syria Army (FSA), Iran, ISIS, Jaysh al-Islam, Jordan, Kurdish PYD, Red Crescent (SARC), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Nations (UN), United States (US), agree to undertake the resolutions stated below in relation to the Syrian civil conflict.

We acknowledge the diverse and conflicting positions of parties at the Peace Summit and are committed to mutual respect and negotiation as the basis for future relationships between parties.

All parties commit to the following resolutions:

I Regarding a universal ceasefire

II Regarding the lifting of sanctions

III Regarding the facilitation of humanitarian relief

IV Regarding a post-conflict political transition

The Summit notes that agreement was **not** reached on the following objectives and the actors will reconvene at a later date for further discussion on these issues:

I Regarding a universal ceasefire

II Regarding the lifting of sanctions

III Regarding the facilitation of humanitarian relief

IV Regarding a post-conflict political transition

WEEK 10: Human rights

Overall goals for this week's tutorial

The three main goals of this tutorial are to (1) discuss the evolution of the human rights regime and make connections with this week's material and Week 9's material on international law (which has yet to be discussed because of Week 9's conference); (2) a student debrief of the simulation; and (3) relatedly, a discussions of expectations for the response paper.

FLS Chapter 12 summary

International human rights law is an institution created by and largely reflecting the political norms of Western, liberal democracies and are not shared by all countries. The global implementation of human rights is limited due to conflicting interests, the lack of substantive sanctions against offenders, and a weak yet strengthening international regime to alter state behavior. The interest of individuals in a strong system of human rights law may be great, but these interests rarely extend to efforts to compel states to pay a high price for violations of these rights. Thus, potential violators of human rights expect little or no response to their actions.

Human rights are rights that all individuals possess by virtue of being human regardless of their status as members of any group or organization. The UDHR identifies **three types**, or generations, of rights: political participation and civil liberties, social and economic rights, and community identity and national solidarity. The UDHR has four pillars supporting dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The UN has attempted to implement the UDHR in international law through a series of legally binding treaties that bind signatories to enforce the UDHR's norms: the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Implementation of these agreements was difficult due to the Cold War. The **Genocide Convention** was a further response to the Nazi genocide that enshrined the specific duty to prevent genocide into human rights law.

Given the wide range of legal traditions and domestic regime types, there is significant **disagreement** over the interpretation and enforcement of human rights law. Human rights can be thought of as a global public good. But states resist efforts from outside to constrain how they rule their society or how they respond to perceived threats.

A central tension in human rights is the concern over the **rights of individuals** as compared to the **rights of groups**. The Western focus on the individual conflicts with the communal and family orientations of other cultural systems.

States violate human rights for a wide range of reasons. In some cases, a lack of state capacity may prevent the state from protecting the human rights of its citizens. In other cases, states may seek to violate human rights as part of a strategy to keep a particular group in power or to maintain an authoritarian political system. National security is often cited as a reason for violating the human rights of a nation's population.

States ratify human rights agreements for a wide range of reasons. Some do so out of sincere belief in the rights being enshrined. Some states may ratify agreements only to give the appearance of good global citizenship or to qualify for other benefits such as trade treaties. Newly democratized states may view international agreements as a means of committing future leaders to political reform. States may commit to human rights treaties in response to inducements from established democracies.

Enforcement of human rights agreements has a mixed record in recent history. While institutions that promote and enforce human rights have expanded, violations of human rights remain commonplace. The most frequent form of violence today is that of governments acting against their own citizens. It is unclear whether or not human rights agreements and the spread of human rights norms is having an impact on the enforcement of human rights in practice. A wide-ranging debate exists among researchers about whether or not human rights agreements matter. The fundamental obstacle to a greater enforcement of human

rights commitments comes from the relatively high cost and diffuse benefits of imposing costs on violators and the strong temptation of incumbents to violate basic rights in a bid to maintain power.

Nonetheless, some states do pay the cost of enforcing human rights law. Domestic pressure, especially by a citizenry well informed about the abuses of the target country, can spur democratic governments to action. States tend to act to **enforce human rights laws under three conditions**: 1) when states are faced with domestic pressure to act to stop human rights abuses, 2) when intervention serves larger political interests and 3) when the gap between sovereignty and human rights can be bridged.

Four **current developments** offer promise in reinforcing international human rights. First, improved systems for transitional justice have developed. Second, the number of states that allow individual petition to supranational judicial entities such as the ECHR is growing. Third, the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 1998, can try individuals for war crimes and threats to international peace and stability. Finally, TANs have taken advantage of the plethora of trade treaties to attach human rights provisions to these treaties.

Possible discussion topics

1. Australia recently said that it would join the convention against torture. Analyze the philosophical and political implications of the Convention against Torture. This treaty is important because it defines the right not to be tortured as nonderogable. It also provides a reasonably specific definition of torture. What do students think of these elements? Are there conditions under which it would be justified for state authorities to engage in torture? What are the major elements of the definition of torture included in the treaty? What elements of this definition clearly constitute torture, and which are more debatable?

2. "Smart" sanctions are intended to target the leaders of countries that engage in widespread human rights abuses. The objective of smart sanctions is to focus the costs on such leaders, while sparing most of the population of the target state. Have students or groups of students select a state that is currently criticized for its human rights practices. Ask the students to develop a list of "smart" sanctions that will punish the leaders but not the population of this state. Discuss the proposals of the students. What characteristics do the proposed smart sanctions share? How difficult or easy is it to devise and implement sanctions that accurately target leaders and have little or no effect on the population?

Reading questions

1. Is a universal list of human rights that will be acceptable to all people in all societies possible? Can people in different countries agree on a common set of fundamental protections and guarantees for individuals? Consider parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What elements seem universal? Which, if any, do not? If a common set is not feasible, how can international organizations identify and sanction rights violators?

2. Why do states violate human rights? If rights promote economic and political development, is it not in the best interest of states to guarantee rights? Why would leaders have an incentive to forgo these benefits from respecting rights?

3. What should be the role of the United Nations in promoting human rights? Review the international law and consider the UN bodies responsible for human rights. Through what formal channels does the UN determine if a country has or has not violated a human rights treaty? What mechanisms does the UN have to punish violators? What are the weaknesses of these UN monitoring and enforcement mechanisms?

4. It is often observed that newer democracies are more likely to sign human rights agreements than are established democracies, especially the United States. Why are the democratizing states eager to sign while older democracies often wait? Why has the United States often delayed ratifying, or never ratified, important human rights treaties?

5. Human rights is widely discussed as a key part of international law. When it comes to acting to enforce such laws, there is rarely much desire to spend blood and treasure to protect the rights of others. If human rights are not worth enforcing, why do we spend so much time talking about them? If we argue that rights are not enforcing internationally, what does that say about our domestic rights?

6. Recently, several European courts have claimed universal jurisdiction in human rights cases, meaning that the court can try a suspect even if neither party is a resident of that state and the crime did not take place in the state's territory. What are the pitfalls and promises of more countries claiming universal jurisdiction of human rights cases? Do you agree with the position of these states that apply universal jurisdiction?

7. The UN Human Rights Council selects its members by election. The members often include states with poor human rights records (Russia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia were all members in 2015.) Can the global governance of human rights be managed by an institution that includes states that routinely violate the rights listed under the UDHR? Or does the inclusion of these states as having "poor human rights records" simply reflect the cultural bias of our ideas of human rights?

8. The United States declined to become a party to the International Criminal Court (Australia joined in 2002). Discuss why this is the case. What costs does the US government believe that participating in the ICC would impose on the country? At the same time, the United States has cooperated with the ICC, including supporting the court's indictment of former Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi. Why would the United States engage in such limited cooperation? Is such cooperation sustainable?

WEEK 10 SIMULATION ACTIVITY

20 minutes at end of tutorial

Simulation debrief

Large group discussion with each student given an opportunity to discuss their experience of the simulation and of the Syria Peace Summit.

Guiding questions for debrief discussion:

- Did you actor achieve their key objective in the conference? Why? Why not?
- What was the hardest point for your actor to concede?
- In retrospect, would you have done anything differently, as your role?
- What was most enjoyable and/or most challenging for you in the simulation?

Week 11: Environment

Goals for this week's tutorial

This is the first week that we will not have a simulation activity. If your tutorial is before the response paper due date, you may be able to answer any last-minute questions they may have. Also, remember that we have a meeting at 12:30pm on Monday this week to go over the response paper rubric and grading strategies.

In tutorial discussion, please cover both the collective action problems related to climate change and the specific case of the Artic. I covered the Artic as a major part of my class on Environmental Security (POLS3033), and I think it is an under-covered aspect of both collective action problems globally as well as an area of innovative (and strategic) responses by both state and non-state actors.

A last note to highlight that Jessica will be giving the first hour of lecture. I would encourage you to attend lecture if you can to show your support.

FLS Chapter 13 summary

Despite widely shared interests in the quality of the environment, the interactions of individuals as well as countries suffer from problems of **collective action**. International institutions can also facilitate environmental cooperation, primarily by enhancing information and verifying compliance. TANs and other nongovernmental organizations now play an essential role in monitoring compliance with environmental agreements.

With weak international authority for global environmental issues, **states** have a strong incentive to **free ride** on the environmental protection efforts of others. Smaller groups of states with repeated and broad interactions are more likely to find agreement, especially on regional issues. **Within countries**, those who gain from environmental degradation often enjoy advantages in political organization over larger groups that pay the costs.

Externalities are costs or benefits that accrue to a third party as a result of an economic transaction between two actors. Those who benefit from negative externalities have an incentive to lobby for legislation that externalizes some of their costs. Markets face difficulty providing public goods and some form of authority is often needed to counter free riding. Nonexcludability and nonrival use give incentives for free riding.

The **smaller the number** of resources users, the more likely the cooperation to prevent free riding or overuse. Frequent interaction can create trust and allow effective sanctioning. Public goods can be bundled with private goods to generate incentive to contribute to collective welfare. Finally, a subgroup of actors (a "privileged group") may limit its use or make contributions on behalf of a larger community.

Common property goods require some form of **cooperation** to prevent overuse. International cooperation to prevent overuse of common property resources or to prevent free riding on public goods faces more actors, greater divergence of interests, and institutions with weaker authority.

In the **domestic political struggle** over the environment, policy is subject to bargaining problems as well as the problem of collective action. Political institutions require bargaining for policy implementation. Environmental protections often come with significant costs that are unevenly distributed. Groups subject to the high costs of the policies will oppose them. This process is worsened in bargaining over the future environment as different assumptions about the state of the future compound the problems of current policies. **Mitigating externalities** is a common function of domestic policy. Extending this to the environment and to the international environment is a natural extension of current domestic policies.

The **bargaining logic** of environmental policy is comparable to the bargaining logic that we have seen in many other areas. Disagreement over the distribution of costs and benefits leads to inaction. A similar process takes place at the domestic and international levels.

One axis of interaction in the climate regime is between the **northern** countries with responsibility for pollution and vulnerability to climate change and the **southern** countries with opposite interests and little capacity. Progress on stabilizing greenhouse gases has been disappointing. Fundamental divisions and continuing developments in the climate change regime show the constraints on collective action.

International institutions can mitigate divergent interests and uncertain or asymmetric interactions among states. Environmental regimes often begin as "soft law" where states agree on the shared importance of a problem and that action should be taken. Soft law regimes allow for continued diplomacy and slowly harmonize the expectations of states. They can also modify decision rules to overcome opposition to action.

International institutions can aid in promoting cooperation on the environment in two ways: 1) **facilitating decision making** is possible through the creation of international frameworks such as the FCCC. 2) International institutions can provide **dispute resolution** when states disagree over the terms of agreements. The Montreal Protocol included a noncompliance response system to fill this role.

Divergent interests, collective action dynamics, and a weak international institutional structure have limited success in addressing international environmental problems. When the number of actors is smaller and similar in interests, regimes are more likely to realize substantial achievements. The nature of interaction varies not only with the number and positions of states but also according to the type of environmental good: public, common property or private with externalities. Sadly, the limited success in addressing international environmental harms creates a clear pedagogical tool for understanding collective problems.

Possible discussion topics

1. One problem with environmental cooperation is that people are often fond of environmental regulation when it will be paid for by others and much less fond of it when they will have to pay for it themselves. Have the class break into groups of 5–8 students. Have each group propose a mechanism to fund the promotion of green development in LDCs. How would such a system be funded? Would there be sufficient support to pay for it among domestic political leaders?

2. Polluters typically win in policy decisions over how much an industry can pollute to increase profits. Thinking of the theory of collective action, develop an explanation of why this is the case. Use a specific example drawn from the text (such as the discussion of climate change) or a contemporary example from domestic or international politics that can be efficiently shared with the class, for example through a newspaper article describing the debate over a new environmental regulation.

3. Maps and figures found in the assessment reports of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (available at www.ipcc.ch) compare responsibility for and vulnerability to climate change. What countries are likely to suffer the most from climate change, and how? What regions have polluted the most? How do these two populations interact? Does the impact of environmental change predict the policy positions of these states?

4. Survey students to see to what degree they are willing to make sacrifices for the global public good of a stable climate. Pose questions beginning with the least sacrifice required ("Would you remember to turn off the lights?") and gradually increase the cost of action ("Would you buy a carbon offset credit of $100 for your next airfare?"). On average, how much sacrifice will a student make to address climate? What are the characteristics of those who would sacrifice the most, or the least?

Reading questions

1. Environmental protection seems to be the largest public good, and interest in it would suffer from the largest collective action problems—after all, every human being prefers a healthy environment to live in. Yet non-governmental organizations at times do motivate voluntary action to protect the environment. How can they be so successful, given the huge potential for free riding?

3. In many areas of international cooperation, the problem of different assumptions can prevent action. In the environment, there are differences on the nature of the core problem, the right policies to cope with the problems, and the means to implement these policies. Is this political environment different in kind from the divisions we have seen in trade, investment, and development?

4. As discussed in previous chapters, international politics includes institutions to protect human rights, trade flows, the rights of states, and many other interests. Yet the world lacks any comprehensive global environmental organization. Why?

5. A central trade-off for many countries is the tension between economic development and the environment. Many pro-environmental policies are more expensive than their free-for-all alternatives. So long as most the countries of the world are focused on development, is it possible to make international environmental gains without a massive wealth transfer from developed states to pay for the higher cost of green technologies?

WEEK 12: Conclusion, future directions

Overall goals for this week's tutorial

The main goals for this final tutorial are to (1) discuss areas of future IR challenges and opportunities, (2) review the semester's topics and material to help them see how the topics fit together, and (3) help students prepare for the final exam. This is also your last opportunity to encourage students to complete their student survey forms.

Before Week 12 we will be sharing a final exam guide for students, which should hopefully preempt many questions that might arise during the tutorial. We will not be having separate exam preparation meetings as we did for the midterm, but I will leave the last hour of lecture for an open question and answer session so that students can ask questions they might have and have them answered directly.

Thanks to you all for a great semester!

FLS Chapter 14 summary

Technological change and globalization has heightened the global public's concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (**WMDs**). Nuclear states have never engaged in direct warfare with one another, most likely because they interact in an environment of mutual deterrence (with the notable exception of the limited Kargil War). **Deterrence** has relatively few requirements: 1) countries have a "second strike" ability with their nuclear arsenal 2) political leaders are rational and 3) countries can verify the origins of an attack.

There are three major reasons to fear that new **nuclear-weapons states** may not be as peaceful as the current possessors: 1) states who seek nuclear weapons today generally do so to revise the international power structure and thus may seek destabilizing uses for these weapons 2) states seeking nuclear weapons today are poorer and less likely to be capable of building and maintaining a second-strike capability, leading to a potential "use them or lose them" logic that encourages nuclear first use and 3) the proliferation of WMDs increases the chances that they may fall in to the hands of terrorist organizations.

Proliferation is a function of intent as much as capability; many states could produce nuclear weapons but choose not to. Those states that have acquired WMDs were motivated by security threats. Diplomatic efforts to alter the interests of WMD-seeking states may prevent proliferation. International institutions can help to guarantee the security of potential proliferators, reducing the incentive to proliferate. International institutions can help reshape interests and control the spread of technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1968. Signatories possessing nuclear weapons agreed to not transfer weapons to other states, to reduce their own stockpiles of bombs, and to help non-nuclear states with peaceful nuclear energy projects. Signatories without weapons agreed to not pursue them. Inspections and reports by the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify compliance with NPT provisions. Punishment powers fall to the United Nations Security Council. Some countries have been caught cheating on the NPT, including North Korea. One could characterize the NPT as widely successful, yet with a few spectacular failures. In the end, the international community may opt for coercive disarmament of dangerous proliferators. Economic sanctions and even military force could be used to prevent the proliferation or use of WMDs by dangerous states.

Economic globalization has been one of the main drivers of Chinese growth. Although many people take globalization for granted, it should be remembered that the "Golden Era" of nineteenth-century globalization ended with two world wars and a global depression. During the previous period, as with today, international movements of money, goods, people, and ideas greatly increased. During both expansions, ideological shifts embraced the view that markets performed better than governments in guiding social interest.

The Pax Britannica of the 1800s ended in the First World War. It is a legitimate concern to ask whether the **Pax Americana** may end in the same way. China and the United States cooperate in the world today in many ways, but as Chinese power increases the tensions grow between the security interests of the two states. Power transition theory suggests a strong possibility of a US-China war in the coming decades. But the logic of the bargaining model of war raises questions about whether such a conflict is likely in the foreseeable future. International institutions also have a much greater role in international relations than at any other time of power transition.

Critics of globalization protest that it benefits rich economic actors at the expense of the less powerful ones. Capital moves freely across the globe, yet immigration is subject to increasingly stringent controls. To a large degree, conflicts follow class lines predicted by the Ricardo-Viner model. Economic sectors that use factors of production abundant in a country will favor liberalization, while industries employing scarce factors demand protection form global forces.

Global economic integration has generated uneven costs and benefits and has stressed both domestic and international institutions as groups seek to respond to the changing environment. **Resistance to globalization** in the developed world is focused on groups seeking to protect established interests and to prevent rising challenges from emerging markets and declining competitiveness. Resistance to globalization in the developing world is focused on the insecurity of recent growth and the volatility that comes with globalization. As emerging markets transition to industrial economies, they experience significant economic and social dislocation that domestic political systems can struggle to cope with. Globalization is experiencing opposition from a wide range of groups seeking to protect their interests in the face of changing market conditions.

Many economic, environmental, and human rights **problems span national borders**, beyond the reach of individual states. The increased frequency and scope of international interactions can create opportunities for bargains to regulate global affairs. This creates a growing pressure for global governance solutions to common problems.

The best example of increased demand for and the success of international institutions is the **European Union** (EU). Could the European experience be replicated at the global level or in other regions? The number of international organizations has increased rapidly since the Second World War. However, European countries had economic, cultural, and social similarities that eased the process of integration. Furthermore, all institutions have distributional consequences, and the losers from such changes frequently resist changes to international institutions. The European model has been copied in a number of regions with much less success. The desire to maintain sovereignty remains a significant obstacle to global governance.

Significant differences exist between the interests of the actors in the international system. Disagreements undermine the potential for the creation of common institutions that are accepted by all, or even most parties. The large number of states remains a significant block to the formation of global governance institutions in areas of contention.

Reading questions

1.Nearly two dozen countries could easily develop nuclear weapons yet choose not to. Why do they forgo such an investment in international power? In other words, what are the costs that possessing nuclear weapons can create?

2. Nuclear weapons have existed for over half a century, and yet, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they have never been used. Indeed, they may have contributed to the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. Why is the world so concerned about countries like North Korea or Iran gaining nuclear weapons? Would it make sense to encourage the spread of nuclear weapons with second-strike capabilities? Why or why not?

3. Discuss the best way for the United States to address the rise of China. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a strategy of containment? What are the strengths and weaknesses of a strategy of

engagement? What information would we want to know in choosing between these strategies? How reliable is this information?

4. What are the implications of the 2008 financial crisis for further globalization? Will firms retreat from international positions due to economic constraints or political hostility? If not, what events could challenge the pace of globalization?

5. This chapter identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of China, and resistance to globalization as the largest threats to the global status quo. What factors do you see as most likely to make fundamental changes in world politics in the next two decades? How does the interests, interactions, and institutions framework help us to understand these issues?

6. In this text you have repeatedly applied the concepts of interests, interactions, and institutions to a range of problems. How satisfied are you with the explanations that this model provides? Can you answer the questions that matter most using this framework?

7. What is the best policy toward countries like North Korea and Iran that attempt to obtain nuclear weapons? Should the global community attempt to punish and isolate them, or would engagement be more productive? Could these countries learn the same level of trust and accommodation with the West that the Soviet Union did? Why or why not?

8. Is the recession of 2008–2011 merely a pause in the longer process of globalization, or does it foretell some fundamental change? Do the more powerful economic actors benefit most from the current system, or could they use the crisis to change the way that international organizations and member states manage globalization?

9. Nearly all the immediate concerns related to conflict that are discussed in the media are related to nonstate actors like ISIS and Al Qaeda. But, in 2014–15, Russia seized significant territory in the Ukraine by force of arms and China began a significant program of expansion of both its military and its territory in the South China Sea. Is the world being distracted by trivial conflict with nonstate actors while the foundations are being laid for great-power war in the near future?