Explaining election violence: A meta-analysis

Online appendices

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APPENDIX A. Determining the article sample

The following process was taken to locate the sixty-five articles analyzed in this manuscript. The procedure followed as closely as possible that of Cochran Handbook for systematic reviews (Higgins and Green 2008).

Two Web of Science search strings were used:

(1) "(TS=(election AND violence) OR SU=(election AND violence) OR TI=(election AND violence)) *AND* LANGUAGE: (English) *AND* DOCUMENT TYPES: (Article OR Book OR Book Chapter)."

(2) "(TS=(elect* AND violence) OR SU=(elect* AND violence) OR TI=(elect* AND violence)) *AND* LANGUAGE: (English) *AND* DOCUMENT TYPES: (Article OR Book OR Book Chapter)."

The Scopus search used the same search strings but used options boxes to limit the results to English language articles. All articles had to appear in Scopus or Web of Science databases by January 1, 2023. Books and book chapters were initially included as were qualitative case studies given the inability to narrow results to only ones that use a particular methodology.

After screening the 220 relevant studies, the sample was narrowed to quantitative multivariate articles with a type of election violence as the main dependent variable.

I also include papers that have been accepted and indexed as "first view" or "online first" due to the time it can take between acceptance and receiving an issue number in top journals. For instance, in the *Journal of Peace Research*, articles in the November 2023 issue (volume 60, issue 6) started to initially appear online in December 2022. Therefore, to ensure that the analysis included the most up-to-date articles and empirical models accepted and forthcoming articles were included. Working papers were not included as they were not indexed in the Web of Science or Scopus. Any relevant working papers included in the references section of published works had been accepted at journals by the time I read and reviewed these articles.

The process is summarized in Figure A1 below.

Figure A1. Article search methodology



Table A1. List of all articles used in this review

#	Article	# tests	
		Nat'l	*Sub-nat'l*
1	Aksoy, Deniz. 2014. "Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Politics* 76(4)*:* 899-913.	3	
2	Aksoy, Deniz, and David Carlson. 2022. "Electoral Support and Militants' Targeting Strategies." *Journal of Peace Research* 59(2): 229-241.		12
3	Alesina, Alberto, Savatore Piccolo, and Paolo Pinotti. 2019. "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics." *Review of Economic Studies* 86(2): 457-499.		38
4	Bali, Valentina A., and Johann Park. 2014. "The Effects of the Electoral Calendar on Terrorist Attacks." *Electoral Studies* 35: 346-361.	29	
5	Belokurova, Galina. 2018. "Soviet Legacies, Organized Crime, and Economic Gangsterism: Russia, 1995-2010." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51(1): 1-17.		12
6	Bhasin, Tavishi, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2013. "Timing and Targeting of State Repression in Authoritarian Elections." *Electoral Studies* 32(4): 620-631.	5	
7	Birch, Sarah, and David Muchlinski. 2018. "Electoral Violence Prevention: What Works?" *Democratization* 25(3): 385-403.	4	
8	Birch, Sarah, and David Muchlinski. 2020. "The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32(2): 217-236.	2	
9	Bjarnegård, Elin. 2023. "The Continuum of Election Violence: Gendered Candidate Experiences in the Maldives." *International Political Science Review* 44(1): 107-121.		3
10	Bjarnegård, Elin, Sandra Hakansson, and Par Zetterberg. 2022. "Gender and Violence against Political Candidates: Lessons from Sri Lanka." *Politics and Gender* 18(1): 33-61.		8
11	Braithwaite, Alex, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2018. "Restricting Opposition in Elections and Terrorist Violence." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32(7): 1,550-1,572.	7	
12	Braithwaite, Alex, Dennis M. Foster, and David A. Sobek. 2010. "Ballots, Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities." *International Interactions* 36(3): 294-305.	3	
13	Burchard, Stephanie M., and Meshak Simati. 2019. "The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria." *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 38:* 123-144.		2
14	Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug. 2012. "Elections and Ethnic Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(3): 387-417.	6	11
15	Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vincente. 2014. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *Economic Journal* 124(574): 327-355.		4

16	Collignon, Sofia, and Wolfgang Rudig. 2020. "Harassment and Intimidation of Parliamentary Candidates in the United Kingdom." *Political Quarterly* 91(2): 422-429.		2
17	Collignon, Sofia, and Wolfgang Rüdig. 2021. "Increasing the Cost of Female Representation? The Gendered Effects of Harassment, Abuse and Intimidation Towards Parliamentary Candidates in the UK." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 31(4): 429-449.		2
18	Colombo, Andrea, Olivia D'Aoust, and Olivier Sterck. 2019. "From Rebellion to Electoral Violence: Evidence from Burundi." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 67(2): 333-368.		23
19	Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver, and Austin L. Wright. 2018. "The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence." *American Economic Review* 108(11): 3,199-3,231.		5
20	Crost, Benjamin, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, and Daniel I. Rees. 2020. "Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines." *World Bank Economic Review* 34(3): 767-789.		54
21	Daniele, Gianmarco, and Gemma Dipoppa. 2017. "Mafia, Elections and Violence Against Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 154: 10-33.		4
22	Daxecker, Ursula E. 2012. "The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(4): 503-516.	6	
23	Daxecker, Ursula E. 2014. "All Quiet on Election Day? International Election Observation and Incentives for Pre-election Violence in African Elections." *Electoral Studies* 34: 232-243.	13	
24	Daxecker, Ursula E. 2020. "Unequal Votes, Unequal Violence: Malapportionment and Election Violence in India." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 156-170.		4
25	Daxecker, Ursula E., and Brandon C. Prins. 2016. "The Politicization of Crime: Electoral Competition and the Supply of Maritime Piracy in Indonesia." *Public Choice* 169(4): 375-393.	2	8
26	Daxecker, Ursula E., Elio Amicarelli, and Alexander Jung. 2019. "Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV): A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56(5): 714-723.	2	
27	Daxecker, Ursula, and Mascha Rauschenbach. 2023. "Election Type and the Logic of Pre-election Violence: Evidence from Zimbabwe." *Electoral Studies* 82: 102583.		10
28	Dercon, Stefan, and Roxana Gutierrez-Romero. 2012. "Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence." *World Development* 40(4): 731-744.		4
29	Fielding, David. 2018. "The Geography of Violence During a Presidential Election: Evidence from Zimbabwe." *European Journal of Political Economy* 55: 538-558.		19
30	Fjelde, Hanna, and Kristine Höglund. 2016. "Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 297-320.	16	
31	Fjelde, Hanna, and Kristine Höglund. 2022. "Introducing the Deadly Electoral Conflict Dataset (DECO)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66(1): 162-185.	4	
32	Fjelde, Hanne. 2020. "Political Party Strength and Electoral Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 140-155.	18	

33	Fjelde, Hanne, and Hannah M. Smidt. 2021. "Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence." *British Journal of Political Science* 52(3): 1,113–1,132.		9
34	Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. "Why Incumbents Perpetrate Election Violence During Civil War." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 40(5): 533-553.	8	
35	Frantzeskakisa, Nikolaos, and Brandon Beomseob Park. 2022. "Armed and Dangerous: Legacies of Incumbent-military Ties and Electoral Violence in Africa." *Electoral Studies* 80: 102531.	7	
36	Goldring, Edward, and Michael Wahman. 2018. "Fighting for a Name on the Ballot: Constituency-level Analysis of Nomination Violence in Zambia." *Democratization* 25(6): 996-1015.		5
37	Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. 2013. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 149-179.	9	
38	Hernandez Huerta, Victor Antonio. 2020. "Candidates Murdered in Mexico: Criminal or Electoral Violence?" *Politica y Gobierno* 27(2): 1-28.		4
39	Herrick, Rebekah, and Sue Thomas. 2022. "Violence among State House Candidates During the COVID-19 Pandemic." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47(3): 709-725.		1
40	Ishiyama, John, Michael Christopher Marshall, and Brandon Stewart. 2023. "Are Former Rebel Parties More Likely to Engage in Electoral Violence in Africa?" *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 33(2): 278-299.	4	
41	Keels, Eric. 2017. "Oil Wealth, Post-conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(5): 1,021-1,045.	4	
42	Lacroix, Jean. 2023. "Ballots Instead of Bullets? The Effect of the Voting Rights Act on Political Violence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 21(2): 764-813.		8
43	Linebarger, Christopher, and Idean Saleyhan. 2020. "Electoral Integrity and Election-Related Conflict." *Democracy and Security* 16(3): 260-280.	4	
44	Lordan-Perret, Rebecca, Austin L. Wright, Peter Burgherr, Matteo Spada, and Robert Rosner. 2019. "Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Targeting Democratic Institutions." *Energy Policy* 132: 915-927.		20
45	Mitra, Shabana, and Althaf Shajahan. 2022. Crime, Elections, and Political Competition." *Review of Development Economics* 26(4): 2,394-2,413.		8
46	Müller-Crepon, Carl. 2022. "Local Ethno-political Polarization and Election Violence in Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems." *Journal of Peace Research* 59(2): 242-258.		4
47	Nieto-Matiz, Camelo. 2019. "Democracy in the Countryside: The Rural Sources of Violence Against Voters in Colombia." *Journal of Peace Research* 56(2): 264-278.		3
48	Ponce, Aldo F., Rodrigo Velázquez López Velarde & Jaime Sáinz Santamaría. 2022. "Do Local Elections Increase Violence? Electoral Cycles and Organized Crime in Mexico." *Trends in Organized Crime* 25(1): 37-57.		7
49	Raleigh, Clionadh, and Roudabeh Kishi. 2018. "Hired Guns: Using Pro-Government Militias for Political Competition." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32(3): 582-603.	2	

50	Reeder, Bryce W., and Merete Bech Seeberg. 2018. “Fighting Your Friends? A Study of Intra-party Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *Democratization* 25(6): 1,033-1,051.	2	2
51	Ruiz-Rufino, Ruben, and Sarah Birch. 2020. “The Effect of Alternation in Power on Electoral Intimidation in Democratizing Regimes.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 126-139.	4	
52	Salehyan, Idean, and Christopher Linebarger. 2015. “Elections and Social Conflict in Africa, 1990-2009.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 50(1): 23-49.	16	
53	Seeberg, Merete Bech. 2021. “How State Capacity Helps Autocrats Win Elections.” *British Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 541-558.	4	
54	Smidt, Hannah. 2016. “From a Perpetrator's Perspective: International Election Observers and Post-electoral Violence.” *Journal of Peace Research* 53(2): 226-241.	4	
55	Smidt, Hannah. 2020. “Mitigating Election Violence Locally: UN Peacekeepers' Election-education Campaigns in Côte d'Ivoire.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 199-216.	3	6
56	Smidt, Hannah. 2021. “Keeping Electoral Peace? Activities of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Their Effects on Election-related Violence.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38(5): 580-604.	3	
57	Snyder, Michael R. 2013. “For Want of a Credible Voter Registry.” *Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies* 5: 27-58.	3	
58	Sterck, Olivier. 2019. “Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence.” *Economica* 87(347): 844-883.		48
59	Sudduth, Jun Koga, and Max Gallop. 2023. “Spatial Dynamics of Election Violence: How Repression Spreads Dissent Around Elections.” *Journal of Politics* 85(3): 933-948.		3
60	Taylor, Charles Fernandes, Jon CW Pevehouse, and Scott Straus. 2017. “Perils of Pluralism: Electoral Violence and Incumbency in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *Journal of Peace Research* 54(3): 397-411.	4	
61	Trejo, Guillermo, and Sandra Ley. 2021. “High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico.” *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 203-229.		6
62	von Borzyskowski, Inken. 2019. “The Risks of Election Observation: International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence.” *International Studies Quarterly* 63(3): 654-667.	6	
63	von Borzyskowski, Inken, and Michael Wahman. 2021. “Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences.” *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 230-252.		8
64	von Borzyskowski, Inken, and Patrick M. Kuhn. 2020. “Dangerously Informed: Voter Information and Pre-electoral Violence in Africa.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 15-29.		3
65	Wahman, Michael, and Edward Goldring. 2020. “Pre-election Violence and Territorial Control: Political Dominance and Subnational Election Violence in Polarized African Electoral Systems.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 93-110.		7

Violence as a form of fraud

Violence is often a form of manipulating the electoral process. To what extent might violence then constitute a form of electoral fraud, and therefore pose an endogeneity risk? Lehoucq (2003: 235) does explicitly see violence as an extreme form of fraud. Briefly, he defines fraud as actions that are hidden, can affect election results and breaks the law. This definition includes official coercion and intimidation. However, violence or the threat of violence are not the core of this definition. Indeed, Lehoucq's description of earlier research (e.g., Kousser 1974 and Graham 1990) highlights fraud and violence as distinct means of electoral control. Violence is only otherwise referred to in Lehoucq's abstract and conclusion. Other work by Brancati and Penn (2023) see violence and fraud as competing electoral strategies, which was the approach taken in this manuscript.

To turn to how often fraud measures are included in this manuscript's meta-analysis and gauge the risk of endogeneity, seven of sixty-five articles (Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014; Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; and Smidt 2021) use election fraud as a predictor variable. Birch & Muchlinski (2018: 399) take steps to explicitly remove any election violence from their proxy for election fraud take from V-Dem. The remaining six studies either use NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012) or code their own fraud variable using US State Department reports.

In reading these seven articles' definitions of fraud, I do not see explicit risks of election violence being included in these measures except for Birch & Muchlinski 2018, which they explicitly address in their variable construction.

Table A2. Electoral fraud definitions and sources

Article	Fraud definition	Data source	Endogeneity concerns
Birch & Muchlinski (2018: 399)	"The electoral fraud variable we have constructed is based on V-DEM data and it is similar to the V-DEM "clean elections index" (Coppedge et al., "Varieties of Democracy: Codebook," 90, 438), save that it excludes electoral violence so as to preclude endogeneity. The index is then inverted such that a higher value designates more fraudulent elections."	V-Dem	Explicitly excludes election violence from fraud measure.
Daxecker (2012: 510)	"[T]he variable is coded 1 if the report includes statements such as that elections did not represent the will of the people, or that elections were highly fraudulent, or were judged not free and fair, were considered as falling short of international standards, or if the report stated that the elections were marred by grave or blatant violations or manipulation. The variable is coded 0 if the US State Department report characterized elections as generally free and fair, elections are seen as reflecting the general will of the people, or the overall election assessment noted minor problems but stated that the elections were generally adequate.	Daxecker's (2012) coding of US State Department reports	Uses matching methods to minimize potential endogeneity between election monitors and violence.
Daxecker (2014 : 237)	"[T]he variable is coded 1 if the report includes statements such as that elections did not represent the will of the people, or that elections were highly fraudulent, or that they were judged not free and fair, were considered as falling short of international standards, or were reported to be marred by grave or blatant violations or manipulation. The variable is coded 0 if the U.S. State	Daxecker's (2014) coding of US State Department reports	Uses matching methods to minimize potential endogeneity between election

Article	Fraud definition	Data source	Endogeneity concerns
	Department report characterized elections as generally free and fair, if elections were seen as reflecting the general will of the people, or if the overall election assessment noted minor problems but stated that the elections were generally adequate."		monitors and violence.
Fjelde & Höglund (2016: 232)	"[W]e control for reports of suspected electoral fraud," (p. 232). *Nelda 29* asks "Were there riots and protests after the election?" Nelda30 asks If yes (nelda29): did they involve allegations of vote fraud? Question 30 was coded as "Yes" if the riots or protests are backed with allegations of vote fraud. If there are no allegations of vote fraud fueling the riots or protests, a "No" was coded. If question 29 is coded "no," "N/A" was coded here. For multiround elections, this question should be coded only for the outcome of the election round." (Hyde and Marinov 2019: 19).	NELDA	Focus on whether protests or riots motivated by allegations of fraud. Implicit directionality between motivation and response.
Flores & Nooruddin (2023: 543)	"From NELDA, we control for fraud suspicions, which captures whether there were significant fears that the election would not be free or fair." From NELDA "nelda11 Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair? A "Yes" indicates that there was evidence of domestic or international concern that the election process was not going to be free or fair. A "Yes" is also coded when the elections were widely perceived to lack basic criteria for competitive elections, such as more than one political party." (Hyde & Marinov 2019: 11)	NELDA	Focus on fraud concerns prior to election or structural inhibitions to competitive elections.
Hafner-Burton et al. (2013: 171)	"Electoral Fraud (Nelda11) measures whether there were concerns before the election that it would not be free and fair."	NELDA	Focus on fraud concerns prior to election or structural inhibitions to competitive elections.
Smidt (2021: 594)	"Using information from the NELDA dataset, the models include indicators for whether past elections experienced violence and whether elections were expected to be fraudulent (Hyde and Marinov, 2011).	NELDA	Focus on fraud concerns prior to election or structural inhibitions to competitive elections.

APPENDIX B. Summary statistics

While quantitative electoral violence articles appeared in thirty-six different journals from 2010 to 2022, only nine journals published more than one election violence study and two (the *Journal of Peace Research* and the *British Journal of Political Science*) published over a quarter of all quantitative articles in this subfield (see Figure B1). Figure B2 shows publication years of these articles and the temporal coverage of their cross-national and subnational data. This figure suggests that most articles analyze elections between the end of the Cold War and 2010 while (as mentioned above) all articles are published in 2010 or later.

Figure B1. Distribution of studies across journals with more than one article



Figure B2. Temporal coverage of election violence sample



Note: Alesina et al. (2019) uses subnational data dating back to 1887. To aid interpretation, this graph begins in 1945.

Table B1. Complete distribution of studies across journals

Journal	Freq.	Percent
Journal of Peace Research	13	19.7%
British Journal of Political Science	6	9.1%
Electoral Studies	5	7.6%
Democratization	3	4.5%
Terrorism and Political Violence	3	4.5%
Journal of Conflict Resolution	2	3.0%
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties	2	3.0%
Journal of Politics	2	3.0%
Public Choice	2	3.0%
American Economic Review	1	1.5%
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos	1	1.5%
Communist and Post-Communist Studies	1	1.5%
Comparative Political Studies	1	1.5%
Conflict Management and Peace Science	1	1.5%
Democracy and Security	1	1.5%
Economic Development and Cultural Change	1	1.5%
Economic Journal	1	1.5%
Economica	1	1.5%
Energy Policy	1	1.5%
European Journal of Political Economy	1	1.5%
International Interactions	1	1.5%
International Political Science Review	1	1.5%
International Studies Quarterly	1	1.5%
Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies	1	1.5%
Journal of Public Economics	1	1.5%
Journal of the European Economic Association	1	1.5%
Legislative Studies Quarterly	1	1.5%
Politica y Gobierno	1	1.5%
Political Quarterly	1	1.5%
Politics and Gender	1	1.5%
Review of Development Economics	1	1.5%
Review of Economic Studies	1	1.5%
Studies in Comparative International Development	1	1.5%
Trends in Organized Crime	1	1.5%
World Bank Economic Review	1	1.5%
World Development	1	1.5%
Total	65	100%

Table B2. Election violence articles, 2010-2023

Year	Frequency	Percentage
2010	1	1%
2011	0	0%
2012	3	5%
2013	3	5%
2014	4	6%
2015	1	2%
2016	3	5%
2017	3	5%
2018	8	12%
2019	8	12%
2020	11	17%
2021	6	9%
2022	8	12%
2023	6	9%

Note: 2023 articles are those accepted for publication and appearing in print prior to January 1, 2023.

Figure B3. Empirical time coverage, 1885-2020



Figure B4. Number of variables per model and study



Table B3. Dependent variable data sources

Source	National				Sub-national			
	tests		*studies*		*tests*		*models*	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SCAD	57	28%	6	19%	13	3%	4	11%
NELDA	35	17%	5	16%				
GTD	24	12%	3	10%	12	3%	1	3%
V-DEM	13	6%	3	10%				
ACLED	10	5%	3	10%	30	8%	6	16%
AEVD	10	5%	2	6%				
CREV	4	2%	2	6%				
ITERATE	15	7%	1	3%				
ECAV	10	5%	1	3%	13	3%	3	8%
UCDP	6	3%	1	3%	11	3%	1	3%
IDEA	5	2%	1	3%				
Joshi & Mason (2011)	4	2%	1	3%				
DECO	3	1%	1	3%	9	2%	1	3%
DIEM	3	1%	1	3%				
TWEED	3	1%	1	3%				
MPELD	2	1%	1	3%	8	2%	1	3%
Zambia Election Monitor Survey					12	3%	2	5%
Rep. Audit of Britain (2019)					4	1%	2	5%
Armed Forces of the Philippines					54	14%	1	3%
IFES					48	13%	1	3%
Italian non-governmental organizations					38	10%	1	3%
Burundi Ushahidi					23	6%	1	3%
Giroux et al. (2013)					20	5%	1	3%
Russian Elite Economic Violence					12	3%	1	3%
Bjarnegård et al. (2022)					8	2%	1	3%
India's Nationa'l Crimes Records Bureau					8	2%	1	3%
McAdams et al. (2003)					8	2%	1	3%
CIDE-PPD					7	2%	1	3%
Trejo & Ley (2021)					6	2%	1	3%
ISAF & Afghan security forces					5	1%	1	3%
Avviso Pubblico					4	1%	1	3%
Collier & Vincente (2014)					4	1%	1	3%
Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero (2012)					4	1%	1	3%
Hernández Huerta (2020)					4	1%	1	3%
Bjarnegard (2023)					3	1%	1	3%
Misión de Observación Electoral					3	1%	1	3%
Sokwanele					3	1%	1	3%
Malawi and Zambia Election Monitor Survey					2	1%	1	3%
Herrick & Thomas (2022)					1	0%	1	3%
TOTAL	204		33		377		42	

Note: SCAD=Social Conflict in Africa Database (Saleyhan et al. 2012); NELDA=National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012); GTD=Global Terrorism Database (START 2022); V-DEM=Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2022); ACLED=Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (Raleigh et al. 2010); AEVD=African Electoral Violence Database (Taylor et al. 2017); CREV=Countries at Risk of Election Violence (Birch & Muchlinski 2020); ITERATE=International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (Mickolus et al., 2015); ECAV=Electoral Contention and Violence (Daxecker et al. 2019); UCDP=Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Davies et al. 2022); IDEA= Integrated Data for Events Analysis (Bond et al. 2003); DECO=Deadly Electoral Conflict Dataset (Fjelde & Höglund 2022); DIEM=Data on International Election Monitoring (Kelley 2012); TWEED=Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data (Engene 2012); MPELD=Maritime Piracy Event and Location Dataset (Phayal 2022); IFES=International Foundation for Electoral Systems; CIDE-PPD=Drug Policy Program of the Center for Economic Research and Teaching; ISAF=International Security Assistance Force.

Table B4. Perpetrators of election violence

Perpetrator type	Country-level		Sub-national level	
	Studies	*Tests*	*Studies*	*Tests*
Not specified/unclear	14 (37%)	69 (34%)	32 (78%)	307 (81%)
Government/military	14 (37%)	75 (37%)	1 (2%)	2 (1%)
Terrorist groups	3 (6%)	39 (19%)	2 (5%)	17 (5%)
Opposition	2 (5%)	10 (5%)	0	0
Nonstate actors	2 (5%)	4 (2%)	0	0
Political parties, former rebels	1 (3%)	4 (2%)	0	0
Pro-gov militias	1 (3%)	2 (1%)	0	0
Intraparty	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	1 (2%)	1 (0%)
Mafia	0	0	1 (2%)	38 (10%)
Rebels	0	0	1 (2%)	2 (1%)
Drug trafficking organization	0	0	1 (2%)	1 (0%)
Criminals	0	0	1 (2%)	6 (2%)
Anti-government	0	0	1 (2%)	3 (1%)
TOTAL	38	204	41	377

Note: The total for studies is more than the studies included because several articles included multiple perpetrator types. “Not specified/unclear” signifies that an article or its data source did not clearly state who the perpetrators of election violence were.

Table B5. Victims/targets of election violence

Target type	Country-level		Sub-national level	
	Studies	*Tests*	*Studies*	*Tests*
Not specified/unclear	31 (86%)	198 (97%)	26 (58%)	280 (74%)
Citizens/civilians	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	1 (2%)	4 (1%)
Opposition	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	0	0
Non-state actors	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	0	0
Demonstrators	1 (3%)	2 (1%)	0	0
Intraparty	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	1 (2%)	1 (0%)
Candidates	0	0	6 (13%)	20 (5%)
Businesspeople	0	0	2 (4%)	17 (5%)
Politicians	0	0	2 (4%)	5 (1%)
Infrastructure	0	0	1 (2%)	20 (5%)
Politicians &/or labor unions	0	0	1 (2%)	15 (4%)
Govt officials, candidates, party activists	0	0	1 (2%)	6 (2%)
Police	0	0	1 (2%)	5 (1%)
Govt/army	0	0	1 (2%)	2 (1%)
Rebels	0	0	1 (2%)	2 (%)
TOTAL	36	204	45	377

NOTE: Total for studies is more than the studies included because several articles included multiple target types. “Not specified/unclear” signifies that an article or its data source did not clearly state who the victims or targets of election violence were.

Appendix C. Meta-analysis process and benchmarking

A meta-analysis can be carried out in myriad ways. Perhaps the most recognized approach is to focuses on articles with the same independent and dependent variable (e.g., democracy and economic growth). This approach allows the researcher to calculate consistent average effect sizes and estimations of publication bias. However, when a meta-analysis focuses on many causes "the variation in reporting strategies makes it difficult to identify a common effect statistic—a common issue in meta-analysis research." (Boulianne 2009, 197). Scholars then often turn to the vote counting and combined tests techniques used in this manuscript.

To confirm which approach would be appropriate given my article and data samples as well as benchmark my approach to the existing political science literature, I conducted a Scopus search of political science articles published through May 2023 using a meta-analysis approach. This search led to forty-six articles by eighty-seven authors (summarized in Table C1).

The most common outcomes in these articles are voting-related (30 per cent). Over half (twenty-five) of these articles are specifically focused on one cause and effect relationship like aid and growth (Mekasha and Tarp 2019), democracy and development (Broderstad 2018), and unemployment and support for far-right parties (Sipma and Lubbers 2020). These mono-causally focused articles often use meta-regression to determine average effect sizes and funnel plots to detect possible publication bias. By contrast, those looking more broadly at a host of distinct explanations are more likely to use vote-counting and combined tests approaches (Imbeau et al. 2001, Geys 2006, Smets and Van Ham 2013). This approach has been used in a number of research areas including voting (Amengay and Stockemer 2019), voter turnout (Smets and van Ham 2013; Stockemer 2017; Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2016; Boulianne 2015), political consumerism (Copeland and Boulianne 2022), invalid voting (Koubat and Lysek 2019), political scandals (von Sikorski 2018), and government politics (Imbeau et al. 2001).[1] Relevant to the main paper's use of both national and subnational data, Cancela and Geys (2016, 271) talk about the importance of looking at national and subnational analyses and Stockemer (2017, 702) pools studies at the national, state regional or local level. Kouba and Lysek (2019) look at individual and aggregate data and analyze their results separately while Baker and Dorr (2022) look at single country models and then combine them with multi-country models. Each study included on average seven (subnational) to ten (national) variables.[2]

Reading these articles and their methodologies informed my meta-analysis as well as demonstrates its comparability in the number of studies and tests analyzed. For instance, Figure C1 suggests that the median meta-analysis includes forty-nine studies, while this manuscript includes sixty-five. Figure C2 finds that the median number of tests analyzed in other political science articles (190) is substantially less than the 584 tests included in this paper. Figure C3 does suggest that the year coverage of the meta-analyses in this study is less than the median meta-analysis, which is unsurprising given the relatively recent nature of the quantitative election violence literature.

In sum, a study of existing political science meta-analyses suggests that this manuscript is consistent with the number of tests, number of studies, and time coverage in recent work. The results in the main paper are as consistent as possible with the recommended reporting systems mentioned by Moher et al. (2015).

[1] Other approaches to evaluating robustness of results include extreme bounds analysis (Leamer 1985) and Bayesian model averaging (Sanso-Navarro and Vera-Cabello 2020).
[2] Appendix Figure B2 shows distributions by level in tests and studies.

Table C1. Other political science meta-analyses

#	Article
1	Ahmadov, Anar and Floris Holstege. 2023. "Does Schooling Promote Democracy? A Meta-Analysis." *Democratization* 30(1): 57-77.
2	Alptekin, Aynur and Paul Levine. 2012. "Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Meta-analysis." *European Journal of Political Economy* 28(4): 636-650.
3	Amengay, Abdelkarim and Daniel Stockemer. 2019. "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Meta-Analysis of Structural Factors." *Political Studies Review* 17(1): 30-40.
4	Amsalem, Eran and Alon Zoizner. 2022. "Real, but Limited: A Meta-Analytic Assessment of Framing Effects in the Political Domain." *British Journal of Political Science* 52(1): 221-237.
5	Araújo, Victor. 2021. "Do Anti-poverty Policies Sway Voters? Evidence from a Meta-analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers." *Research and Politics* 8(1): 1-9.
6	Asatryan Zareh, Annika Havlik, Friedrich Heinemann, and Justus Nover. 2020. "Biases in Fiscal Multiplier Estimates." *European Journal of Political Economy* 63: 101861.
7	Baker, Andy and Dalton Dorr. 2022. "Labor Informality and the Vote in Latin America: A Meta-analysis." *Latin American Politics and Society* 64(2): 21-44.
8	Balliet, Daniel. 2010. "Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-analytic Review." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 39-57.
9	Boulianne, Shelley. 2009. "Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-analysis of Research." *Political Communication* 26(2): 193-211.
10	Broderstad Troy Saghaug. 2018. "A Meta-analysis of Income and Democracy." *Democratization* 25(2): 293-311.
11	Cancela, João, and Benny Geys. 2016. "Explaining Voter Turnout: A Meta-analysis of National and Subnational Elections." *Electoral Studies* 42: 264-275.
12	Colagrossi, Marco, Domenico Rossignoli, and Mario A. Maggioni. 2020. "Does Democracy Cause Growth? A Meta-analysis (of 2000 Regressions)." *European Journal of Political Economy* 61: 101824.
13	Copeland, Lauren, Shelley Boulianne. 2022. "Political Consumerism: A Meta-analysis." *International Political Science Review* 43(1): 3-18.
14	Elgie, Robert. 2020. "An Intellectual History of the Concepts of Premier-Presidentialism and President-Parliamentarism." *Political Studies Review* 18(1): 12-29.
15	Fischer, Ronald, Katja Hanke, and Chris G. Sibley. 2012. "Cultural and Institutional Determinants of Social Dominance Orientation: A Cross-Cultural Meta-Analysis of 27 Societies." *Political Psychology* 33(4): 437-467.
16	Frank, Richard W. and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2023. "Correlates of Voter Turnout." *Political Behavior* 45(2): 607-633.
17	Freire, Danilo, Umberto Mignozzetti, Catarina Roman, and Huzeyfe Alptekin. 2023. "The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 776-788.
18	Geys, Benny. 2006. "Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-level Research." *Electoral Studies* 25(4): 637-663.
19	Heimberger, Philipp. 2021. "Corporate Tax Competition: A Meta-analysis." *European Journal of Political Economy* 69: 102002.
20	Heimberger, Philipp. 2021. "Does Economic Globalization Affect Government Spending? A Meta-analysis." *Public Choice* 187: 349-374
21	Holbein, John B., Marcos A. Rangel, Raeal Moore, and Michelle Croft. 2021. "Is Voting Transformative? Expanding and Meta-Analyzing the Evidence." *Political Behavior* 45: 1015–1044.
22	Houck, Shannon C. and Lucian Gideon Conway III. 2019. "Strategic Communication and the Integrative Complexity-Ideology Relationship: Meta-Analytic Findings Reveal Differences Between Public Politicians and Private Citizens in Their Use of Simple Rhetoric." *Political Psychology* 40(5): 1,119-1,141.

23	Hunger, Sophia and Fred Paxton. 2022. “What's in a Buzzword? A Systematic Review of the State of Populism Research in Political Science.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 10(3): 617-633.
24	Jacques, Karen and Paul J. Taylor. 2009. “Female Terrorism: A Review.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(3): 499-515.
25	Jensen, Mads Christian Dagnis and Peter Marcus Kristensen. 2018. “The Babel of European Union Studies: Beyond the Trans-Atlantic Divide.” *European Political Science* 17(3): 437-465.
26	Kouba, Karel and Jakub Lysek. 2019. “What Affects Invalid Voting? A Review and Meta-Analysis.” *Government and Opposition* 54(4): 745-775.
27	Maggetti, Martino and Fabrizio Gilardi. 2016. “Problems (and Solutions) in the Measurement of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms.” *Journal of Public Policy* 36(1): 87-107.
28	Mallinson, Daniel J. 2021. “Growth and Gaps: A Meta-review of Policy Diffusion Studies in the American States.” *Policy and Politics* 49(3): 369-389.
29	Matthes, Jörg, Johannes Knoll, Sebastián Valenzuela, David Nicolas Hopmann, and Christian Von Sikorski. 2019. “A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Cross-Cutting Exposure on Political Participation.” *Political Communication* 36(4): 523-542.
30	Mekasha, Tseday Jemaneh and Finn Tarp. 2019. “A Meta-analysis of Aid Effectiveness: Revisiting the Evidence.” *Politics and Governance* 7(2): 5-28.
31	Mongrain, Philippe. 2022. “With a Little Help from my Friends? The Impact of Social Networks on Citizens' Forecasting Ability.” *European Journal of Political Research* 62(4): 1,320-1,346.
32	Munzert Simon and Sebastian Ramirez-Ruiz. 2021. “Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Voting Advice Applications.” *Political Communication* 38(6): 691-706.
33	Nijkamp, Peter and Jacques Poot. 2004. “Meta-analysis of the Effect of Fiscal Policies on Long-run Growth.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 20(1): 91-124.
34	O’Brochta, William. 2019. “A Meta-Analysis of Natural Resources and Conflict.” *Research and Politics* 6(1).
35	Philips Andrew Q. 2016. “Seeing the Forest Through the Trees: A Meta-analysis of Political Budget Cycles.” *Public Choice* 168(3): 313-341.
36	Phillips, Brian J. and Keven T. Greene. 2022. “Where is Conflict Research? Western Bias in the Literature on Armed Violence.” *International Studies Review* 24(3)
37	Sager, Fritz. 2006. “Policy Coordination in the European Metropolis: A Meta-analysis.” *West European Politics* 29(3): 433-460.
38	Selb, Peter and Simon Munzert. 2013. “Voter Overrepresentation, Vote Misreporting, and Turnout Bias in Postelection Surveys.” *Electoral Studies* 32(1): 186-196.
39	Sipma, Take and Marcel Lubbers. 2020. “Contextual-level Unemployment and Support for Radical-right Parties: A Meta-analysis.” *Acta Politica* 55(3): 351-387.
40	Smets, Kaat, and Carolien van Ham. 2013. “The Embarrassment of Riches? A Meta-analysis of Individual-level Research on Voter Turnout.” *Electoral Studies* 32(2): 344-359.
41	Stockhemer, Daniel. 2017. “What Affects Voter Turnout? A Review Article/Meta-Analysis of Aggregate Research.” *Government and Opposition* 52(4): 698-722.
42	Stommes, Drew, P.M. Aronow, and Fredrik Sävje. 2023. “On the Reliability of Published Findings Using the Regression Discontinuity Design in Political Science.” *Research and Politics* 10(2).
43	Walter, Nathan, Jonathan Cohen, R. Lance Holbert, and Yasmin Morag. 2020. “Fact-Checking: A Meta-Analysis of What Works and for Whom.” *Political Communication* 37(3): 350-375.
44	Woods, Neal D., Jiyoon Kang, and Morgan A. Lowder. 2023. “Do Green Policies Produce Green Jobs?” *Social Science Quarterly* 104(2): 153-167.
45	Yesilyurt, Filiz and M. Ensar Yesilyurt. 2019. “Meta-analysis, Military Expenditures and Growth.” *Journal of Peace Research* 56(3): 352-363.
46	Zigerell, L.J. 2018. “Black and White Discrimination in the United States: Evidence from an Archive of Survey Experiment Studies.” *Research and Politics* 5(1).

Figure C1. Number of studies analyzed in political science meta-analytic articles, 2004-2023



Figure C2. Number of tests analyzed in political science meta-analytic articles, 2004-2023



Figure C3. Year coverage of political science meta-analyses

How comparable are this study's success rate and those in previous research? Figure C4 includes this study's success rate (at both national and subnational level) compared to the ten meta-analysis articles (Amengay and Stockemer. 2019; Cancela and Geys. 2016; Copeland and Boulianne 2022; Fischer, et al. 2012; Frank, and Martínez i Coma 2023; Geys 2006; Kouba and Lysek 2019; Mallinson 2021; Smets and van Ham 2013; Stockhemer 2017) that use comparable methods to evaluate many predictors for an outcome. Overall, this study's success level is lower than the fitted line, but its residual is not the largest of these articles.

A more direct measure of this manuscript's success rate for election violence studies would be a broader analysis of predictors of political violence. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) use extreme bounds analysis in their sensitivity analysis of 88 civil conflict correlates and find 20 (23%) are the most robust correlates of civil conflict (p. 528). This is lower than the 13 of 44 (30%) reported in this manuscript. Also lower are the success rates of comparable studies of coup d'états (13 of 66 [20%] correlates; Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt 2016: 303) and terrorism (18 of 65 [28%] Gassebner and Luechinger 2011: 235).

Figure C4. Success rates across political science meta-analyses



Table C2. National level variables

Variable	Description	Used by
Lagged dependent variable	The value of the dependent variable at time t-1.	Aksoy 2014; Bali & Park 2014; Bhasin & Gandhi 2013; Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Braithwaite et al. 2010; Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Fjelde & Höglund 2022; Fjelde 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Linebarger & Salehyan 2020; Ruiz-Rufino and Birch 2020; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Smidt 2020
	The value of the dependent variable at time t-2.	Salehyan & Linebarger 2015
	The value of the dependent variable at time t-3.	Salehyan & Linebarger 2015
	A three-period moving average of the dependent variable	Daxecker & Prins 2016
Pre-election violence	Violence occurring before election day	Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Taylor et al. 2017; Von Borzyskowski 2019
Election in armed conflict	Election in armed conflict	Smidt 2020; Raleigh & Kishi 2018; Fjelde 2020
Elections after armed conflict	Elections after armed conflict	Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Smidt 2020
	Post-conflict	Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Taylor et al. 2017; Von Borzyskowski 2019
	Former ethnic civil war	Keel 2017
	Former govt incompatibility civil war	Keel 2017
Domestic conflict	Conflict domestic	Bali & Park 2014; Birch & Muchlinski 2020; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Fjelde & Höglund 2022; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Seeberg 2021; Taylor et al. 2017
	Conflict domestic event count	Fjelde & Höglund 2022
Previous civil war duration	Number of years previous civil war lasted	Keels 2017; Smidt 2020; Ishiyama et al. 2022
Previous civilian war deaths	Civilian war related deaths; previous civil war battle deaths	Keels 2017; Smidt 2020; Ishiyama et al. 2022
	Battle deaths	Smidt 2020
Peacekeeping operation	Peacekeeping operation (PKO)	Keel 2017
	United Nations peacekeeping operation	Ishiyama et al. 2022
	PKO with election related activities	Smidt 2020
	PKO without election related activities	Smidt 2020

Population	Population of either country or subnational unit. Often logged and lagged	Aksoy 2014; Bali & Park 2014; Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Birch & Muchlinski 2020; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Cederman et al 2012; Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014; Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Fjelde & Höglund 2022; Fjelde 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Frantzeskakis and Park 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Keel 2017; Linebarger & Salehyan 2020; Raleigh & Kishi 2018; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Smidt 2016; Smidt 2020; Von Borzyskowski 2019
GDP	Gross national product of either the country or subnational unit	Aksoy 2014; Bali & Park 2014; Birch & Muchlinski 2020; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Cederman et al 2012; Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014 ; Fjelde & Höglund2016 Fjelde & Höglund2022; Fjelde 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Frantzeskakis and Park 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Ishiyama et al. 2022; Keel 2017; Linebarger & Salehyan 2020; Reeder & Seeberg 2018; Ruiz-Rufino & Birch 2020; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Seeberg 2021; Smidt 2016; Smidt 2020; Taylor et al. 2017; Von Borzyskowski 2019
Africa	Dummy reflecting whether the observed state or administrative unit was in Africa	Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Fjelde 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Linebarger & Salehyan 2020; Ruiz-Rufino and Birch 2020
Asia	Dummy reflecting whether the observed state or administrative unit was in Asia	Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Fjelde 2020; Ruiz-Rufino and Birch 2020
Cold War	Post-Cold War period=1	Bali & Park 2014
	Cold War period=1	Aksoy 2014; Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018
Ethnic fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization	Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014; Linebarger & Salehyan; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Von Borzyskowski 2019
Political institutions		
Democracy	Democracy (Polity IV)	Daxecker 2014; Fjelde & Höglund2016; Frantzeskakis & Park 2022; Ishiyama et al. 2022; Keel 2017; Reeder & Seeberg 2018; Smidt 2016; Smidt 2020
	Polyarchy (V-Dem)	Fjelde & Höglund 2022
	Electoral democracy	Fjelde 2020
	Democracy x polity	Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018
Democracy dummy	Democracy dummy African election	Raleigh & Kishi 2018
	Democracy dummy Cheibub	Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Taylor et al. 2017
	Democracy dummy (at least 5, 6 in Polity IV scale)	Linebarger & Sal ehyan 2020; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015

# Years democratic	Years democratic	Fjelde 2020; Frantzeskakis & Park 2022
	Past democratic experience	Keel 2017
Executive constraints	Polity IV's executive constraints variable	Bali & Park 2014; Birch & Muchlinski 2020; Fjelde 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Ruiz-Rufino & Birch 2020; Von Borzyskowski 2019
Government effectiveness	World Bank Governance Indicators measure	Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker 2012; Raleigh & Kishi 2018
Leader tenure	Number of years current leader has been in power	Birch & Muchlinski 2020; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013
Incumbent running	Incumbent running in current election	Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Fjelde 2020; Taylor et al. 2017
National election	National-level election	Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2018; Cederman et al. 2012; Keel 2017
First or second competitive election	First competitive election	Cederman et al 2012; Fjelde 2020; Seeberg 2021
	Second competitive election	Cederman et al. 2012
Competitive election	Competitive election	Cederman et al. 2012; Daxecker & Prins 2016; Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Fjelde 2020; Ruiz-Rufino and Birch 2020
	Competition	Bali & Park 2014
	Non-competitive election	Cederman et al 2012
	Margin of victory	Daxecker 2014; Daxecker et al. 2019; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015
	Loser vote share	Von Borzyskowski 2019
Presidential election	Presidential election	Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Ishiyama et al. 2022
	Executive election	Flores & Nooruddin 2022
Election month	Election month	Bali & Park 2014; Bhasin & Gandhi 2013; Linebarger & Salehyan 2020; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015
	Presidential election month	Bali & Park 2014
	Legislative election month	Bali & Park 2014
	Pres leg election month	Bali & Park 2014
Electoral fraud	Electoral fraud in current or previous election	Birch & Muchlinski 2018; Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014; Fjelde & Höglund2016; Flores & Nooruddin 2022; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013; Smidt 2020
	Voter fraud election day	Snyder 2013
Observers present	International election observers present	Daxecker 2012; Daxecker 2014; Fjelde & Höglund 2016; Salehyan & Linebarger 2015; Smidt 2016; Smidt 2020; Von Borzyskowski 2019

Table C3. Sub-national level variables

Variable	Description	Used by
Dependent variable, spatial lag	A spatial lag of the dependent variable	Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker & Rauschenbach 2023; Trejo & Ley 2021
Conflict, domestic	Previous conflict event dummy	Daxecker 2020
	Conflict domestic events	Lordan-Perret et al. 2019; Sudduth & Gallop 2023
	Prior civil conflict	Cederman et al. 2012
	Prior civil conflict violence	Sterck 2019
	Structural factors	
Population	Municipal-level or district-level population	Belokurova 2018; Burchard & Simati 2019; Cederman et al. 2012; Colombo et al. 2019; Fielding 2018; Fjelde & Smidt 2022; Herrick & Thomas 2022; Müller-Crepon 2022; Ponce et al. 2022; Smidt 2020; Sterck 2019; Sudduth & Gallop 2022
Population density	Municipal-level or district density population density	Colombo et al. 2019; Daxecker & Rauschenbach 2023; Herrick & Thomas 2022; Sterck 2019; Wahman & Goldring 2020
GDP	Gross domestic product at either the municipal or cell level	Belokurova 2018; Cederman et al 2012; Daxecker 2020
Night lights	Night lights at the municipal or cell-level	Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker & Rauschenbach 2023; Goldring & Wahman 2018; Reeder & Seeberg 2018; Sterck 2019; Von Borzyskowski & Wahman 2021; Wahman & Goldring 2020
Literacy	Percentage of literate citizens	Aksoy & Carlson 2022; Goldring & Wahman 2018; Wahman & Goldring 2020
Infant mortality	Infant mortality at the subnational unit	Aksoy & Carlson 2022; Fjelde & Smidt 2022; Smidt 2020
Ethnic fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization of the subnational unit	Colombo et al. 2019; Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero 2012; Goldring & Wahman 2018; Sterck 2019; Wahman & Goldring 2020
Distance from capitol	Distance in kilometers from subnational unit to national capital	Belokurova 2018; Daxecker & Rauschenbach 2023; Fjelde & Smidt 2022; Sudduth & Gallop 2022
Competitive election	Competitive election	Cederman et al. 2012; Sterck 2019; Von Borzyskowski & Wahman 2021
	Non-competitive election	Cederman et al 2012
	Competitiveness in previous election	Reeder & Seeberg 2018; Smidt 2020
	Competition in municipal elections	Trejo & Ley 2021
	Competition state elections	Trejo & Ley 2021

	Margin of victory	Daxecker & Prins 2016; Daxecker & Rauschenbach 2023; Hernandez-Huerta 2020
	Individual factors	
Incumbent candidate	Incumbent candidate	Bjarnegård 2023; Bjarnegård et al. 2022; Collignon & Rüdig 2020; Collignon & Rüdig 2021; Herrick & Thomas 2022
	Local incumbent running	Goldring & Wahman 2018
	PF Zambia incumbent running	Goldring & Wahman 2018
	UPND Zambia incumbent running	Goldring & Wahman 2018
Age	Yearly age	Bjarnegård 2023; Collignon & Rüdig 2020; Collignon & Rüdig 2020; Herrick & Thomas 2022; Von Borzyskowski & Kuhn 2020
Race	White	Herrick & Thomas 2022
	Black and minority ethnicity	Collignon & Rüdig 2020; Collignon & Rüdig 2021
Gender	Male	Von Borzyskowski & Kuhn 2020
	Female	Bjarnegård 2023; Bjarnegård et al. 2022; Collignon & Rüdig 2020; Collignon & Rüdig 2021; Herrick & Thomas 2022

Appendix D—Meta-analysis complete results

Table D1. National-level correlates of election violence

	Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal category	Success rate	Effect size (r_{av})
STRUCTURAL FACTORS						
GDP pc (-)						
Tests (177)	51	101	25	Failure	28.81	0.15 **
Studies (25)	4	17	4	Failure	16.00	0.06 (n.s.)
Population (+)						
Tests (166)	97	65	4	Success	58.43	0.56 ***
Studies (22)	12	10	0	Success	55.00	0.59 ***
Exec constraints (-)						
Tests (74)	20	53	1	Failure	27.03	0.26 ***
Studies (7)	1	6	0	Failure	14.29	0.30 +
Democracy, level (-)						
Tests (68)	25	38	5	Failure	38.24	0.29 **
Studies (11)	2	7	2	Failure	18.18	-0.02 (n.s.)
Ethnic fractionalization (+)						
Tests (45)	9	36	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 **
Studies (5)	0	5	0	Failure	0.00	0.12 (n.s.)
Cold War (+)						
Tests (33)	30	1	2	Success	91.00	0.85 ***
Studies (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	0.72 (n.s.)
Democracy dummy (-)						
Tests (32)	1	14	17	Failure	3.13	-0.50 ***
Studies (5)	1	3	1	Failure	20.00	-0.20 (n.s.)
Leader tenure (+)						
Tests (23)	11	11	1	Failure	48.00	0.43 **
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
Africa/SSA (+)						
Tests (20)	4	16	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 *
Studies (5)	0	5	0	Failure	0.00	0.15 (n.s.)
# years democratic (-)						
Tests (12)	7	5	0	Success	58.33	0.58 **
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
Gov't effectiveness (-)						
Tests (10)	2	8	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 (n.s.)
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
Asia (+)						
Tests (8)	3	4	1	Failure	38.00	0.25 (n.s.)
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.22 (n.s.)
VIOLENCE/CONFLICT FACTORS						
Lagged dependent variable (+)						
Tests (99)	90	9	0	Success	91.00	0.91 ***
Studies (15)	15	0	0	Success	100.00	0.92 ***
Domestic conflict (+)						
Tests (81)	34	41	6	Failure	41.98	0.35 ***
Studies (9)	2	7	0	Failure	22.22	0.32 +
Elections after armed conflict (+)						
Tests (36)	17	18	1	Failure	47.22	0.44 ***
Studies (6)	2	4	0	Failure	33.33	0.25 (n.s.)
Election in armed conflict (+)						
Tests (20)	17	3	0	Success	85.00	0.85 ***
Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.67 (n.s.)
Pre-election violence (+)						
Tests (15)	5	10	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 *
Studies (4)	1	3	0	Failure	25.00	0.50 +

Peacekeeping operation (-)						
Tests (14)	7	7	0	Failure	50.00	0.50 **
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.50 (n.s.)
Previous civil war duration (+)						
Tests (11)	0	11	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
Previous civil war deaths (+)						
Tests (11)	4	7	0	Failure	36.36	0.36 *
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.39 (n.s)
ELECTION FACTORS						
Competitive election (+)						
Tests (81)	28	51	2	Failure	34.57	0.32 ***
Studies (10)	3	7	0	Failure	30.00	0.38 *
Election month (+)						
Tests (54)	29	23	2	Success	53.70	0.50 ***
Studies (5)	3	2	0	Success	60.00	0.63 *
Electoral fraud (+)						
Tests (47)	28	18	1	Success	59.57	0.57 ***
Studies (8)	3	5	0	Failure	37.50	0.54 *
Observers present (+)						
Tests (32)	6	24	2	Failure	18.75	0.13 (n.s.)
Studies (7)	0	7	0	Failure	0.00	0.09 (n.s.)
Incumbent running (+)						
Tests (24)	20	4	0	Success	83.33	0.83 ***
Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.67 (n.s.)
First or second competitive election (+)						
Tests (21)	1	20	0	Failure	4.76	0.48 (n.s.)
Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.13 (n.s.)
Presidential/Executive election (+)						
Tests (16)	12	4	0	Success	75.00	0.75 ***
Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.66	0.67 +
National election (+)						
Tests (7)	0	7	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.00

Note: t-test of effect sizes are calculated with two-tailed significance levels. + p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001; n.s. = not significant. (+) and (-) represent hypothesized direction of relationship with election violence in included studies. Variables ordered in each section by number of tests.

Table D2. Sub-national-level correlates of election violence

Variable	Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal category	Success rate	Effect size (r_{av})
STRUCTURAL FACTORS						
Population (+)						
Tests (74)	53	18	3	Success	71.62	0.68 ***
Studies (11)	7	4	0	Success	63.64	0.64 **
Night lights (+)						
Tests (45)	12	32	1	Failure	26.67	0.24 **
Studies (7)	1	6	0	Failure	0.14	0.17 (n.s.)
Population density (-)						
Tests (37)	9	24	4	Failure	24.32	0.14 (n.s.)
Studies (5)	1	4	0	Failure	20.00	0.11 (n.s.)
Ethnic fractionalization (+)						
Tests (36)	0	36	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
Studies (5)	0	5	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
GDP (-)						
Tests (27)	3	20	4	Failure	11.11	-0.04 (n.s.)
Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.02 (n.s.)
Distance from capitol (+)						
Tests (25)	3	20	2	Failure	6.67	0.04 (n.s.)
Studies (4)	0	4	0	Failure	0.00	0.02 (n.s.)
Literacy (+)						
Tests (15)	3	12	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 +
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
Infant mortality (+)						
Tests (13)	6	6	1	Failure	46.15	0.38 +
Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.50 (n.s.)
VIOLENCE/CONFLICT FACTORS						
Conflict, domestic (+)						
Tests (28)	23	5	0	Success	82.14	0.82 ***
Studies (5)	4	1	0	Success	80.00	0.83 **
Dependent variable, spatial lag (+)						
Tests (21)	11	8	2	Success	52.38	0.43 **
Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.60 (n.s.)
Past violence (+)						
Tests (14)	4	10	0	Failure	28.57	0.29 *
Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
ELECTION FACTORS						
Competitive election (+)						
Tests (92)	11	73	8	Failure	11.96	0.03 (.n.s.)
Studies (9)	1	8	0	Failure	11.11	-0.00 (n.s.)
Incumbent candidate (+)						
Tests (18)	3	10	5	Failure	16.67	-0.11 (n.s.)
Studies (6)	1	4	1	Failure	16.67	0.19 (n.s.)
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS						
Gender (female=1) (+)						
Tests (20)	10	9	1	Failure	50.00	0.45 **
Studies (6)	2	4	0	Failure	33.33	0.51 *
Age (-)						
Tests (11)	5	6	0	Failure	45.45	0.45 *
Studies (5)	3	2	0	Success	60.00	0.60 +
Race (Black & minority ethnicity=1) (+)						
Tests (5)	0	5	0	Failure	0.00	0.00
Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.00

Note: t-test of effect sizes are calculated with two-tailed significance levels. + p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001; n.s. = not significant. (+) and (-) represent hypothesized direction of relationship with election violence in included studies. Variables ordered in each section by number of tests.

Appendix E. Additional results

Table E1. Cross-national results for variables included in fewer than three studies

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
VIOLENCE/CONFLICT						
Post-election opposition violence	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Post-election gov't repression	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Years since previous election violence	1	4	3	1	0	**Success**
Protests (nonviolent or violent)	1	10	10	0	0	**Success**
Terrorist attacks	1	27	27	0	0	**Success**
Former rebel party	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Govt victory in previous civil war	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Election violence, general	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Pre-election opposition violence	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Pre-election govt violence	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Intra-party violence	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Social conflict	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Conflict, international	1	15	1	13	1	Failure
Time after armed conflict	2	9	0	9	0	Failure
Rebel party competitors	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Former liberation movement party	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Govt/mil. power-sharing after civil war	1	8	1	7	0	Failure
Rebel victory in previous civil war	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Negotiated settlement in previous	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Intifada	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
STRUCTURE						
Excluded population	2	10	8	2	0	**Success**
Military expenditures	1	29	28	1	0	**Success**
Media quartiles	1	16	13	3	0	**Success**
State territorial control	1	4	3	1	0	**Success**
Consumer price index	1	3	2	1	0	**Success**
Ethnic power distribution	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Area	1	7	3	4	0	Failure
Coastline	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Ports	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Land inequality	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Urbanization	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Economic growth	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Inequality	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
Oil dependence	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Natural resources	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Oil/gas revenues	2	8	3	5	0	Failure
Europe	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Latin America	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
MENA	2	5	0	5	0	Failure
E Europe & C Asia	2	5	0	5	0	Failure
SE Asia	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS						
Closed autocracy	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Competitive autocracy	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Democracy squared	2	20	13	7	0	**Success**
Political fractionalization	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Previous alternation of power	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Party legislative cohesion	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Party programmatic links	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Leader member of military	2	7	6	1	0	**Success**
Rebel leader	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Corruption	2	11	8	2	1	**Success**
Physical integrity rights	2	11	8	3	0	**Success**

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
Legacy of military ties	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Ex-military regime	1	7	4	3	0	**Success**
Leader age	2	11	1	10	0	Failure
State failure	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
Mixed system	1	8	2	6	0	Failure
Majoritarian system	2	15	6	8	1	Failure
Party strength	1	13	0	13	0	Failure
Party national organization	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Presidential system	1	25	4	15	6	Failure
Political stability	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Autocratization	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Democratization	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Party branches	1	1	1	0	0	Success
Party candidate selection	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Party regime	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Exec recruitment	2	11	1	9	1	Failure
Incumbent rose to office due to	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Path to power violent	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Regime age	1	29	9	20	0	Failure
Left government	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Political liberties	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Private liberties	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Press freedom	1	13	2	11	0	Failure
ELECTION FACTORS						
Three months to peace efforts	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
EMB capacity	1	3	2	1	0	**Success**
Unrestricted election	1	10	9	1	0	**Success**
Unfavorable polls	2	6	4	1	1	**Success**
Demonstrations	1	7	4	3	0	**Success**
Effective threshold	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
EMB autonomy	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Unfair electoral regime	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Intimidation pre-election	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Intimidation, election day	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Voter list problems election day	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Accommodation by govt	1	5	4	1	0	**Success**
Founding election	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Weeks until election	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Weeks until election sq	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Weeks until election cubed	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Months since election	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Pre-election month #2	1	5	3	2	0	**Success**
Election period 12 month	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Any election	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
First election in series	1	8	0	8	0	Failure
Competitive political parties	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Concurrent election	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Poll type	1	6	2	4	0	Failure
Incumbent victory	1	1	0	4	0	Failure
Participation	1	1	14	15	0	Failure
Victory uncertain	2	12	1	11	0	Failure
Concerns election not free and fair	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Early elections	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Boycott	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Ban	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Opposition harassment	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
District magnitude	2	12	4	8	0	Failure
Temperature	1	2	0	2	0	Failure

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
Precipitation	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Media reports on election	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Unfree electoral regime	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Change in free electoral regime	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Change in fair electoral regime	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Improper use of public funds	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Restrictions on campaigning	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Media restrictions	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Voter registration problems	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Complaints about election commis.	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Voter information problems	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Tech diff w. capacity preele	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Vote processing problems	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Incumbent confident victory	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Info insufficiencies election day	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Time since end of civil war	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Months to election	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Pre-election months #4-6	1	25	0	25	0	Failure
Pre-election month #6	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Pre-election month #5	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Pre-election month #4	1	5	2	2	1	Failure
Pre-election month #3	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Pre-election month #1	2	9	3	6	0	Failure
Postelection month #1	2	9	2	7	0	Failure
Postelection month #2	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Postelection month #3	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Postelection month #4	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Postelection month #5	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Postelection month #6	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Between rounds	1	5	1	4	0	Failure
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS						
Observers condemn	1	6	6	0	0	**Success**
Long term observers present	1	3	2	1	0	**Success**
Democracy aid	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Large observer mission	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Low quality observer mission	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Observers find election day fraud	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Observers find fraud	2	6	2	4	0	Failure
ODA	2	17	2	15	0	Failure
PKO military troops	1	7	1	5	1	Failure
UNDP capacity building prevention	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
UNDP attitude transformation prevention	1	4	2	1	1	Failure

Note: Variables in bold have modal category as success.

Table E2. Sub-national results for variables included in fewer than three studies

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
VIOLENCE/POLITICAL INSTABILITY						
Govt violence, spatial lag	1	3	2	1	0	**Success**
Lagged govt election violence	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Opposition violence, spatial lag	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Intraparty violence	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Election violence trend #1	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Election violence trend #2	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Elections since last pre-elect. violence	1	10	10	0	0	**Success**
Years since election violence	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Pre-election fatalities	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Homicide rate	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Drug-related murder	1	6	5	0	1	**Success**
Baseline violence	1	6	4	2	0	**Success**
Demobilization polarization	2	64	42	22	0	**Success**
Lagged DV	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Lagged DV 3yr moving average	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
History of violence	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
Proximity to election violence	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Robberies in municipality	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
General election violence	2	34	2	32	0	Failure
State-based violence	1	16	4	10	2	Failure
One-sided violence	1	16	5	9	2	Failure
Peace years	1	11	0	11	0	Failure
Demobilization rebels' fractionalization	1	16	2	14	0	Failure
Demobilization density	2	21	0	21	0	Failure
STRUCTURE						
Urbanization	2	10	6	4	0	**Success**
Urban population	2	27	23	4	0	**Success**
Rural population	2	9	5	4	0	**Success**
Hutu population share	2	18	11	7	0	**Success**
Population (sq)	1	6	4	2	0	**Success**
Ethnic group size	1	11	11	0	0	**Success**
Border unit	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Distance to coast	1	8	6	2	0	**Success**
Nearby ports (#)	1	8	8	0	0	**Success**
Newspaper circulation (sq)	1	6	4	1	1	**Success**
Railroad density	1	12	8	4	0	**Success**
Prison population	1	8	6	2	0	**Success**
Criminal organizations	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Migration (sq)	1	6	6	0	0	**Success**
Grid is in Malacca (Strait)	1	8	8	0	0	**Success**
Pashtun population	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Population proportion living in district	1	8	0	8	0	Failure
Hutu pop. Share (ave. neighbor share)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Muslim population	1	8	0	8	0	Failure
Human development index municipality	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Ethnic fractionalization (ave. neigh.)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Road density	2	10	0	10	0	Failure
Religious fractionalization	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Geographical area	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Urban land area	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Land concentration	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Ruggedness	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Distance to border	2	10	0	10	0	Failure
Travel time to urban centre	2	10	3	7	0	Failure
Registered crimes (#)	1	12	1	11	0	Failure

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
Registered crimes (sq)	1	6	1	5	0	Failure
Newspaper circulation	1	12	3	8	1	Failure
Thieves born in region (#)	1	12	5	7	0	Failure
Migration (net adjusted)	1	12	5	6	1	Failure
Closed status region	1	12	2	10	0	Failure
Temperature (July-Jan averages)	1	12	2	10	0	Failure
Growing days	1	6	1	5	0	Failure
Tropical moist forest	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Mexican gulf adjacent municipality	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
US/Mexican border municipality	1	7	1	6	0	Failure
Pacific Ocean adjacent municipality	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE						
GDP (sq)	1	6	4	2	0	**Success**
Private sector employment (sq)	1	6	4	2	0	**Success**
Municipality fiscal revenue (sq)	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Population in poverty (num)	1	8	8	0	0	**Success**
Median wealth index	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Night lights change	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Oil price	1	12	1	11	0	Failure
Unemployment	2	22	3	19	0	Failure
Urban unemployment	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Private sector employment	1	12	4	8	0	Failure
Electricity consumption (sq)	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Population in poverty	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
Mexican marginalization index	1	7	0	7	0	Failure
POLITICAL STRUCTURE						
Political fractionalization	1	16	9	7	0	**Success**
State failure	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Group excluded from power	1	11	11	0	0	**Success**
Security subsidy danger pay	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Curfew	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRD-PAN)	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRD-PRI)	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRD-PRD)	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Mexico juxtaposition index	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Polity2	2	10	5	3	2	Failure
Prosecutors	2	8	0	8	0	Failure
Alternation of state governor	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Trust in court (some)	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Trust in court (high)	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Regional legislature seats	1	12	5	4	3	Failure
Capital city council seats	1	12	0	12	0	Failure
Municipal alternation of pol.party control	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
State alternation of political party control	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PAN-PRD)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRI-PAN)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRI-PRI)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Mexico party frag. (PAN-PRI-PRD)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
PAN's mayor	1	7	1	6	0	Failure
ELECTION FACTORS						
Election week	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Presidential election	2	30	16	14	0	**Success**
National election	1	10	7	3	0	**Success**
National election in the next 3mths	1	10	10	0	0	**Success**
Local election	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
New government elected	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Loser vote share	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Opposition votes	2	5	3	0	2	**Success**

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
Opposition votes, prev election	1	16	14	2	0	**Success**
Winning party vote share	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Malapportionment	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Winning party vote share (sq)	1	3	1	0	0	**Success**
Temperature	2	13	7	3	3	**Success**
Precipitation, change	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Weeks until election, exponentiated	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Post-election period (12 months)	2	18	10	7	1	**Success**
Time trend (months), squared	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Diff. in vote share (e-1) betw. parties	1	12	12	0	0	**Success**
COVID-19 public political events	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Increase in COVID-19 cases	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Polarization	2	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Traditionalistic culture	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
State legis. professionalism	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Less competitive election	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Election day road route	1	3	2	1	0	**Success**
US Voting Rgts A. per. 11/1968-8/70	1	8	5	3	0	**Success**
US Voting Rgts A. per. 11/1967-11/68	1	8	6	2	0	**Success**
US Voting Rights Act initial period	1	8	0	8	0	Failure
Federal election	2	8	4	0	4	Failure
State assembly election	4	4	1	2	1	Failure
Election (t-1)	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
First competitive election, t-1	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Second competitive election, t-1	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Incumbent victory	1	54	17	37	0	Failure
Incumbent victory margin	2	39	10	29	0	Failure
Safe seat	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Winning party vote share, prev election	1	9	0	9	0	Failure
Temperature change	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Precipitation	2	13	1	12	0	Failure
Weeks until election	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Trust in EMB	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
State and local incumbent party	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Total votes cast	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
District size, ln	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Margin of majority in constituency	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Imposed candidate (Zambia)	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Court overturned election	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Pre-registration period (3 mths)	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Pre-registration period (6 mths)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Pre-registration period (12 mths)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Pre-election per. betw. reg & elect.day	1	7	3	4	0	Failure
Post-election day (3 mths)	1	3	1	2	0	Failure
Post-election day (6 mths)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Post-election day (12mths)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Month after election	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
National pre-elect. per. (w/n 12 months)	1	36	16	20	0	Failure
Regional pre-elect. per. (w/n 12 months)	1	8	0	8	0	Failure
Gbagbo stronghold	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Median district victory margin	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Chief minister convergence	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
New constituency	1	10	4	6	0	Failure
Anti-violence RCT intervention	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Time trend (months)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Post-election week	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
District socioeconomic status	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
non-COVID other ACLED events	1	1	0	1	0	Failure

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
Regional capital mayoral election	1	12	0	12	0	Failure
Gubernatorial election	1	12	0	12	0	Failure
UPRONA 2005 Burundi vote share	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
FRODEBU 2005 Burundi vote share	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
CNDD 2005 Burundi vote share	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
MRC 2005 Burundi vote share	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
Parena 2005 Burundi vote share	1	6	2	4	0	Failure
Trad.leaders (%) MDC supporters (Zimb)	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Governing coalition	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Elect. alt.s (num) in the previous election	1	7	1	6	0	Failure
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS						
UN peacekeeping bases	1	7	5	2	0	**Success**
UN peacekeeping presence	1	6	4	0	2	**Success**
UN peacekprs elect. educ. (past 6 mths)	1	6	5	1	0	**Success**
UN peacekeeping presence (spatial lag)	1	5	0	5	0	Failure
UN peacekeeping bases (spatial lag)	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
UN police	1	6	2	4	0	Failure
UN military	1	6	0	6	0	Failure
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS						
Newspaper reader	1	3	3	0	0	**Success**
Urban	2	7	5	2	0	**Success**
Living condition fairly bad	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Informal/-complete schooling	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Complete secondary schooling	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Post-secondary schooling	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Employment, yes, part time	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Distance to capital	1	3	3	0	0	Success
University education	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Post-graduate education	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Poverty	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Nonpartisan	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Leading candidate	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Green party candidate	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Labour party candidate	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Liberal Democrats candidate	1	2	2	0	0	**Success**
Candidate vote share	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Heard gangs connectted pols in comm.	1	4	4	0	0	**Success**
Ethnicity-Kamba (Kenya)	1	1	1	0	0	**Success**
Ethnicity-other (Kenya)	1	4	3	1	0	**Success**
Radio listener	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
TV watcher	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Internet consumer	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Living in capital	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Age (sq)	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Living condition neither good nor bad	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Living condition fairly good	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Living condition very good	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Employment, no, looking	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Employment yes, full time	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Incumbent partisan	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Re-elected candidate	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Democrat	1	1	0	1	0	Failure
Party	1	2	1	1	0	Failure
Plaid Cymru candidate	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
SNP candidate	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
UKIP candidate	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Tamil	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
SLFP party candidate (Sri Lanka)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure

Variable	*Studies (#)*	*Tests (#)*	*Success (1)*	*Failure (0)*	*Anomaly (-1)*	*Modal category*
SLPP party candidate (Sri Lanka)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
UNP party candidate (Sri Lanka)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Other party candidate (Sri Lanka)	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Batticallo district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Colombo district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Galle district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Jaffna district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	2	1	1	Failure
Kurunegala district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Nuwara Eliya district FE (Sri Lanka)	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Left/Right	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
LGBT+	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Disability	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Had land disputes before election	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Respondent assets index	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Luo (Kenya)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Luhya (Kenya)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Meru (Kenya)	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Kissi (Kenya)	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Kalenjin (Kenya)	1	4	2	2	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Mijikenda (Kenya)	1	3	0	3	0	Failure
Ethnicity-Somali (Kenya)	1	2	0	2	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Central	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Coast	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Eastern	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Nyanza	1	4	0	4	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Rift Valley	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Kenyan province-Western	1	4	1	3	0	Failure
Kenyan province-North Eastern	1	2	1	1	0	Failure

In total there were 85 variables as IVs at the national level and 82 at subnational level. There are only four variables (competitive election, observers present, election month, and gender) that are still in more than three studies, which enables the comparison of results when comparing when the variable is a control variable and a main variable of interest.

Table E3. All studies and independent variables only compared

Variable	# Nat'l-level studies	# Nat'l IV	# Sub-nat'l studies	# Subnt'l IV
Competitive election	**10**	**5**	**9**	**6**
Observers present	**7**	**3**		
Election month	**5**	**3**		
Gender			6	3
Domestic conflict	9	2	5	1
Electoral fraud	8	2		
Elections after armed conflict	6	2		
Democracy, dummy	5	2		
National election	3	2		
GDP	25	1	3	0
Democracy, level	11	1		
Exec constraints	7	1		
First or second competitive election	4	1		
Incumbent running	3	1	6	1
Peacekeeping operation	3	1		
Population	22	0	11	0
Lagged dependent variable	15	0		
Asia	9	0		
Ethnic fractionalization	5	0	5	1
Africa/SSA	5	0		
Pre-election violence	4	0		
Cold War	3	0		
Leader tenure	3	0		
Years (#) democratic	3	0		
Gov't effectiveness	3	0		
Previous civil war duration	3	0		
Previous civil war deaths	3	0		
Presidential/Executive election	3	0		
Night lights			7	0
Population density			5	0
Age			5	0
Distance to Capital			4	0
Literacy			3	0
Infant mortality			3	0
Lagged DV, spatial lag			3	0
Past violence			3	0
Race			3	0

Table E4. Difference between IV and control variable for three variables in > two studies

	Tests (#)	Studies (#)	Success	Failure	Anomaly	Modal category	Success rate	Effect size (r_{av})	Δ r_{av} test
COMPETITIVE ELECTION (+)									
National level									
Tests	81		29	51	1	Failure	35	0.32***	
IV	28		5	23	0	Failure	21	0.18 *	
Control	53		24	28	1	Failure	45	0.43 ***	
Studies		10	3	7	0	Failure	30	0.30 +	
IV		5	1	4	0	Failure	20	0.30 (n.s.)	n.s.
Control		5	2	3	0	Failure	40	0.55 +	
Subnational level									
Tests	101		28	73	0	Failure	28	0.03 (n.s.)	
IV	83		23	60	0	Failure	28	0.28 ***	
Control	18		5	13	0	Failure	28	0.28 *	
Studies		9	2	7	0	Failure	22	-0.0(n.s.)	
IV		6	1	5	0	Failure	17	0.40 **	
Control		3	1	2	0	Failure	33	0.39 (n.s.)	n.s.
ELECTION OBSERVERS PRESENT (+) National level									
Tests	32		6	24	2	Failure	19	0.13(n.s.)	
IV	18		5	11	2	Failure	17	0.17 (n.s.)	
Control	14		1	13	0	Failure	7	0.07 (n.s.)	
Studies		7	0	7	0	Failure	0	0.09 (n.s.)	
IV		3	0	3	0	Failure	0	0.13 (n.s.)	
Control		4	0	4	0	Failure	0	-0.06 (n.s.)	n.s.
ELECTION MONTH (+) National level									
Tests	54		29	23	2	Success	54	0.50 ***	
IV	44		24	18	2	Success	50	0.50 ***	
Control	10		5	5	0	Failure	50	0.50 *	
Studies		5	3	2	0	Success	60	0.63 *	
IV		3	2	1	0	Success	67	0.66 +	
Control		2	1	1	0	Failure	50	†	†
GENDER* (+) Subnational level									
Tests	20		10	9	1	Failure	50	0.45**	
IV	14		6	7	1	Failure	36	0.36 +	
Control	6		4	2	0	Success	67	0.67 *	
Studies		6	2	4	0	Failure	33	0.51*	
IV		3	1	2	0	Failure	33	0.52 (n.s.)	
Control		3	1	2	0	Failure	33	0.50 (n.s.)	n.s.

Note: + p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001; n.s. = not significant. (+) and (-) represent hypothesized direction of relationship with election violence in included studies. IV=variable included as an independent variable. Control=variable was included in regression models as a control variable. * Female=1. † The effect size cannot calculate due to fewer than three studies. Do a difference of means test for the success rate and the effect sizes.

Table E5. National-level results with and without dichotomous dependent variables (DDV)

	Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal category	Success rate	Effect size (r_{av})
STRUCTURAL FACTORS						
GDP pc (-)						
Tests						
All (177)	51	101	25	Failure	28.81	0.15 **
DDV (75)	21	54	0	Failure	28.00	0.28 ***
Non-DDV (102)	30	47	25	Failure	29.41	0.05 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (25)	4	17	4	Failure	16.00	0.06 (n.s.)
DDV (12)	3	9	0	Failure	25.00	0.25 +
Non-DDV (13)	1	8	4	Failure	7.69	-0.23 (n.s.)
Population (+)						
Tests						
All (166)	97	65	4	Success	58.43	0.56 ***
DDV (63)	32	31	0	Success	50.79	0.51 ***
Non-DDV (103)	65	34	4	Success	63.11	0.59 ***
Studies						
All (22)	12	10	0	**Success**	55.00	0.59 ***
DDV (9)	2	7	0	**Failure**	22.22	0.22 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (13)	10	3	0	**Success**	76.92	0.77 ***
Exec constraints (-)						
Tests						
All (74)	20	53	1	Failure	27.03	0.26 ***
DDV (40)	17	23	0	Failure	35.00	0.43 ***
Non-DDV (34)	3	30	1	Failure	8.82	0.06 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (7)	1	6	0	Failure	14.29	0.30 +
DDV (5)	1	4	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (2)	0	2	0	Failure	0.00	
Democracy, level (-)						
Tests						
All (68)	25	38	5	Failure	38.24	0.29 **
DDV (41)	18	22	1	Failure	43.90	0.41 ***
Non-DDV (27)	7	16	4	Failure	25.93	0.11 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (11)	2	7	2	Failure	18.18	-0.02 (n.s.)
DDV (5)	1	4	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (6)	1	3	2	Failure	16.67	-0.17 (n.s.)
Leader tenure (+)						
Tests						
All (23)	11	11	1	Failure	48.00	0.43 **
DDV (15)	6	9	0	Failure	40.00	0.40 **
Non-DDV (8)	5	2	1	Success	62.50	0.50 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
DDV (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	0.33 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (0)						
VIOLENCE/CONFLICT FACTORS						
Lagged dependent variable (+)						
Tests						
All (99)	90	9	0	Success	91.00	0.91 ***
DDV (29)	29	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00 ***

Non-DDV (70)	61	9	0	Success	87.14	0.87 ***
Studies						
All (15)	15	0	0	Success	100.00	0.92 ***
DDV (5)	5	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00 ***
Non-DDV (10)	10	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00 ***
Domestic conflict (+)						
Tests						
All (81)	34	41	6	Failure	41.98	0.35 ***
DDV (40)	7	27	6	Failure	17.50	0.03 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (41)	27	14	0	**Success**	65.85	0.66 ***
Studies						
All (9)	2	7	0	Failure	22.22	0.32 +
DDV (6)	0	6	0	Failure	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (3)	2	1	0	**Success**	65.85	0.67 (n.s.)
Elections after armed conflict (+)						
Tests						
All (36)	17	18	1	Failure	47.22	0.44 ***
DDV (14)	1	13	0	Failure	7.14	0.07 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (22)	16	5	1	**Success**	72.73	0.68 ***
Studies						
All (6)	2	4	0	Failure	33.33	0.25 (n.s.)
DDV (4)	0	4	0	Failure	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (2)	2	0	0	Success	100.00	
ELECTION FACTORS						
Competitive election (+)						
Tests						
All (81)	28	51	2	**Failure**	34.57	0.32 ***
DDV (33)	22	11	0	**Success**	66.67	0.67 ***
Non-DDV (48)	6	40	2	**Failure**	12.50	0.08 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (10)	3	7	0	Failure	30.00	0.38 *
DDV (5)	2	3	0	Failure	40.00	0.40 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (5)	1	4	0	Failure	20.00	0.20 (n.s.)
Electoral fraud (+)						
Tests						
All (47)	28	18	1	Success	59.57	0.57 ***
DDV (24)	21	3	0	Success	87.50	0.88 ***
Non-DDV (23)	7	15	1	Failure	30.43	0.26 *
Studies						
All (8)	3	5	0	**Failure**	37.50	0.54 *
DDV (5)	3	2	0	**Success**	60.00	0.60 +
Non-DDV (3)	0	3	0	**Failure**	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Observers present (+)						
Tests						
All (32)	6	24	2	Failure	18.75	0.13 (n.s.)
DDV (10)	0	10	0	Failure	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (22)	6	14	2	Failure	27.27	0.18 (n.s.)
Studies						
All (7)	0	7	0	Failure	0.00	0.09 (n.s.)
DDV (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Non-DDV (4)	0	4	0	Failure	0.00	0.00 (n.s.)
Incumbent running (+)						
Tests						
All (24)	20	4	0	Success	83.33	0.83 ***

	DDV (24)	20	4	0	Success	83.33	0.83 ***
	Non-DDV (0)						
Studies							
	All (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.67 (n.s.)
	DDV (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	0.67 (n.s.)
	Non-DDV (0)						
	First or second competitive election (+)						
Tests							
	All (21)	1	20	0	Failure	4.76	0.48 (n.s.)
	DDV (21)	1	20	0	Failure	4.76	0.48 (n.s.)
	Non-DDV (0)						
Studies							
	All (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.13 (n.s.)
	DDV (3)	0	3	0	Failure	0.00	0.13 (n.s.)
	Non-DDV (0)						

Note: t-test of effect sizes are calculated with two-tailed significance levels. + p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001; n.s. = not significant. (+) and (-) represent hypothesized direction of relationship with election violence in included studies. Variables ordered in each section by number of tests. The following variables did not have three articles with dichotomous DVs: *Ethnic fractionalization, Cold War, Democracy dummy, Africa/SSA, # years democratic, Pre-election violence, Election in armed conflict, Peacekeeping operation, Previous civil war duration, Previous civil war deaths, Election month, Presidential/Executive election, National election.* The greyed out cells are statistics that cannot be calculated due to fewer than three studies with a non-dichotomous dependent variable.

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